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Chris Finlay

dblp:227/1604 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Deep learning architectures and training · 42% Trustworthy machine learning · 37% Generative modeling · 21%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Generative modeling › generative model
continuous-time generative model
0.412020
How to Train Your Neural ODE: the World of Jacobian and Kinetic Regularization · ICML 2020
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training › neural differential equations
neural ordinary differential equations
0.412020
How to Train Your Neural ODE: the World of Jacobian and Kinetic Regularization · ICML 2020
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training › regularization
training regularization
0.412020
How to Train Your Neural ODE: the World of Jacobian and Kinetic Regularization · ICML 2020
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial attack
0.412019
The LogBarrier Adversarial Attack: Making Effective Use of Decision Boundary Information · ICCV 2019
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness
0.412019
The LogBarrier Adversarial Attack: Making Effective Use of Decision Boundary Information · ICCV 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

stability regularization · 0.4optimal transport regularization · 0.4adaptive ODE solver · 0.4logarithmic barrier method · 0.4constrained optimization · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2020 A principled approach for generating adversarial images under non-smooth dissimilarity metrics
abstract
Deep neural networks perform well on real world data but are prone to adversarial perturbations: small changes in the input easily lead to misclassification. In this work, we propose an attack methodology not only for cases where the perturbations are measured by Lp norms, but in fact any adversarial dissimilarity metric with a closed proximal form. This includes, but is not limited to, L1, L2, and L-infinity perturbations; the L0 counting "norm" (i.e. true sparseness); and the total variation seminorm, which is a (Lp) convolutional dissimilarity measuring local pixel changes. Our approach is a natural extension of a recent adversarial attack method, and eliminates the differentiability requirement of the metric. We demonstrate our algorithm, ProxLogBarrier, on the MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet-1k datasets. We consider undefended and defended models, and show that our algorithm easily transfers to various datasets. We observe that ProxLogBarrier outperforms a host of modern adversarial attacks specialized for the L0 case. Moreover, by altering images in the total variation seminorm, we shed light on a new class of perturbations that exploit neighboring pixel information.
Aram-Alexandre Pooladian, Chris Finlay, Tim Hoheisel, Adam M. Oberman
AISTATS2
2020 How to Train Your Neural ODE: the World of Jacobian and Kinetic Regularization
abstract
Training neural ODEs on large datasets has not been tractable due to the necessity of allowing the adaptive numerical ODE solver to refine its step size to very small values. In practice this leads to dynamics equivalent to many hundreds or even thousands of layers. In this paper, we overcome this apparent difficulty by introducing a theoretically-grounded combination of both optimal transport and stability regularizations which encourage neural ODEs to prefer simpler dynamics out of all the dynamics that solve a problem well. Simpler dynamics lead to faster convergence and to fewer discretizations of the solver, considerably decreasing wall-clock time without loss in performance. Our approach allows us to train neural ODE-based generative models to the same performance as the unregularized dynamics, with significant reductions in training time. This brings neural ODEs closer to practical relevance in large-scale applications.
Chris Finlay, Jörn-Henrik Jacobsen, Levon Nurbekyan, Adam M. Oberman
ICML1
2019 The LogBarrier Adversarial Attack: Making Effective Use of Decision Boundary Information
abstract
Adversarial attacks for image classification are small perturbations to images that are designed to cause misclassification by a model. Adversarial attacks formally correspond to an optimization problem: find a minimum norm image perturbation, constrained to cause misclassification. A number of effective attacks have been developed. However, to date, no gradient-based attacks have used best practices from the optimization literature to solve this constrained minimization problem. We design a new untargeted attack, based on these best practices, using the well-regarded logarithmic barrier method. On average, our attack distance is similar or better than all state-of-the-art attacks on benchmark datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet-1K). In addition, our method performs significantly better on the most challenging images, those which normally require larger perturbations for misclassification. We employ the LogBarrier attack on several adversarially defended models, and show that it adversarially perturbs all images more efficiently than other attacks: the distance needed to perturb all images is significantly smaller with the LogBarrier attack than with other state-of-the-art attacks.
Chris Finlay, Aram-Alexandre Pooladian, Adam M. Oberman
ICCV1