Learning representations that accurately capture long-range dependencies in sequential inputs --- including text, audio, and genomic data --- is a key problem in deep learning. Feed-forward convolutional models capture only feature interactions within finite receptive fields while recurrent architectures can be slow and difficult to train due to vanishing gradients. Here, we propose Temporal Feature-Wise Linear Modulation (TFiLM) --- a novel architectural component inspired by adaptive batch normalization and its extensions --- that uses a recurrent neural network to alter the activations of a convolutional model. This approach expands the receptive field of convolutional sequence models with minimal computational overhead. Empirically, we find that TFiLM significantly improves the learning speed and accuracy of feed-forward neural networks on a range of generative and discriminative learning tasks, including text classification and audio super-resolution.

Users regularly enter sensitive data, such as passwords, credit card numbers, or tax information, into the browser window. While modern browsers provide powerful client-side privacy measures to protect this data, none of these defenses prevent a browser compromised by malware from stealing it. In this work, we present Fidelius, a new architecture that uses trusted hardware enclaves integrated into the browser to enable protection of user secrets during web browsing sessions, even if the entire underlying browser and OS are fully controlled by a malicious attacker. Fidelius solves many challenges involved in providing protection for browsers in a fully malicious environment, offering support for integrity and privacy for form data, JavaScript execution, XMLHttpRequests, and protected web storage, while minimizing the TCB. Moreover, interactions between the enclave and the browser, the keyboard, and the display all require new protocols, each with their own security considerations. Finally, Fidelius takes into account UI considerations to ensure a consistent and simple interface for both developers and users. As part of this project, we develop the first open source system that provides a trusted path from input and output peripherals to a hardware enclave with no reliance on additional hypervisor security assumptions. These components may be of independent interest and useful to future projects. We implement and evaluate Fidelius to measure its performance overhead, finding that Fidelius imposes acceptable overhead on page load and user interaction for secured pages and has no impact on pages and page components that do not use its enhanced security features.