In the secretary problem, a set of secretary candidates arrive in a uniformly random order and reveal their values one by one. A company, who can only hire one candidate and hopes to maximize the expected value of its hire, needs to make irrevocable online decisions about whether to hire the current candidate. The classical framework of evaluating a policy is to compute its worst-case competitive ratio against the optimal solution in hindsight, and there the best policy -- the ''1/e law'' -- has a competitive ratio of 1/e. We propose an alternative evaluation framework through the lens of regret -- the worst-case additive difference between the optimal hindsight solution and the expected performance of the policy, assuming that each value is normalized between 0 and 1. The 1/e law for the classical framework has a regret of 1 - 1/e ≈ 0.632; by contrast, we show that the class of ''pricing curves'' algorithms can guarantee a regret of at most 1/4 = 0.25 (which is tight within the class), and the class of ''best-only pricing curves'' algorithms can guarantee a regret of at most 0.190 (with a lower bound of 0.171). In addition, we show that in general, no policy can give a regret guarantee better than 0.152. Finally, we discuss other objectives in our regret-minimization framework.

We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as bad as 0. For comparison, the price of anarchy of running VCG is 1/2 in the autobidding world. We further show a fined-grained price of anarchy with respect to the discount factors (i.e., the ratios of click probabilities between lower slots and the highest slot in each auction) in the generalized second-price auction, which highlights the qualitative relation between the smoothness of the discount factors and the efficiency of the generalized second-price auction.

Hierarchical Clustering is a popular unsupervised machine learning method with decades of history and numerous applications. We initiate the study of *differentially-private* approximation algorithms for hierarchical clustering under the rigorous framework introduced by Dasgupta (2016). We show strong lower bounds for the problem: that any $\epsilon$-DP algorithm must exhibit $O(|V|^2/ \epsilon)$-additive error for an input dataset $V$. Then, we exhibit a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with $O(|V|^{2.5}/ \epsilon)$-additive error, and an exponential-time algorithm that meets the lower bound. To overcome the lower bound, we focus on the stochastic block model, a popular model of graphs, and, with a separation assumption on the blocks, propose a private $1+o(1)$ approximation algorithm which also recovers the blocks exactly. Finally, we perform an empirical study of our algorithms and validate their performance.

In a typical optimization problem, the task is to pick one of a number of options with the lowest cost or the highest value. In practice, these cost/value quantities are often not accurately known: they can come from physical measurements with imperfect tools, estimations of machine learning algorithms, or observations from differentially private mechanisms. In many of these situations, the cost/value quantities are noisy, but with quantifiable noise distributions. To take these noise distributions into account, one approach is to assume a prior distribution for the values, use it to build a posterior, and then apply standard stochastic optimization to pick a solution. However, in many practical applications, such prior distributions may not be available. In this paper, we study such scenarios using a regret minimization model.

Clustering of data in metric spaces is a fundamental problem and has many applications in data mining and it is often used as an unsupervised learning tool inside other machine learning systems. In many scenarios where we are concerned with the privacy implications of clustering users, clusters are required to have minimum-size constraint. A canonical example of min-size clustering is in enforcing anonymization and the protection of the privacy of user data. Our work is motivated by real-world applications (such as the Federated Learning of Cohorts project–FLoC) where a min size clustering algorithm needs to handle very large amount of data and the data may also change over time. Thus efficient parallel or dynamic algorithms are desired. In this paper, we study the r-gather problem, a natural formulation of minimum-size clustering in metric spaces. The goal of r-gather is to partition n points into clusters such that each cluster has size at least r, and the maximum radius of the clusters is minimized. This additional constraint completely changes the algorithmic nature of the problem, and many clustering techniques fail. Also previous dynamic and parallel algorithms do not achieve desirable complexity. We propose algorithms both in the Massively Parallel Computation (MPC) model and in the dynamic setting. Our MPC algorithm handles input points from the Euclidean space ℝd. It computes an O(1)-approximate solution of r-gather in O(log∊ n) rounds using total space O(n1 + γ · d) for arbitrarily small constants ∊, γ > 0. In addition our algorithm is fully scalable, i.e., there is no lower bound on the memory per machine. Our dynamic algorithm maintains an O(1)-approximate r-gather solution under insertions/deletions of points in a metric space with doubling dimension d. The update time is r·2O(d)·logO(1) Λ and the query time is 2O(d) · logO(1) Λ, where Λ is the ratio between the largest and the smallest distance. To obtain our results, we reveal connections between r-gather and r-nearest neighbors and provide several geometric and graph algorithmic tools including a near neighbor graph construction, and results on the maximal independent set / ruling set of the power graph in the MPC model, which might be both of independent interest. To show their generality, we extend our algorithm to solve several variants of r-gather in the MPC model, including r-gather with outliers and r-gather with total distance cost. Finally, we show effectiveness of these algorithmic techniques via a preliminary empirical study for Interest-Based Advertisement applications.

Streaming computation plays an important role in large-scale data analysis. The sliding window model is a model of streaming computation which also captures the recency of the data. In this model, data arrives one item at a time, but only the latest W data items are considered for a particular problem. The goal is to output a good solution at the end of the stream by maintaining a small summary during the stream. In this work, we propose a new algorithmic framework for designing efficient sliding window algorithms via bucketing-based sketches. Based on this new framework, we develop space-efficient sliding window algorithms for k-cover, k-clustering and diversity maximization problems. For each of the above problems, our algorithm achieves (1 ± ∊)-approximation. Compared with the previous work, it improves both the approximation ratio and the space.

In this paper, we study a number of well-known combinatorial optimization problems that fit in the following paradigm: the input is a collection of (potentially inconsistent) local relationships between the elements of a ground set (e.g., pairwise comparisons, similar/dissimilar pairs, or ancestry structure of triples of points), and the goal is to aggregate this information into a global structure (e.g., a ranking, a clustering, or a hierarchical clustering) in a way that maximizes agreement with the input. Well-studied problems such as rank aggregation, correlation clustering, and hierarchical clustering with triplet constraints fall in this class of problems. We study these problems on stochastic instances with a hidden embedded ground truth solution. Our main algorithmic contribution is a unified technique that uses the maximum cut problem in graphs to approximately solve these problems. Using this technique, we can often get approximation guarantees in the stochastic setting that are better than the known worst case inapproximability bounds for the corresponding problem. On the negative side, we improve the worst case inapproximability bound on several hierarchical clustering formulations through a reduction to related ranking problems.

Recently, Hierarchical Clustering (HC) has been considered through the lens of optimization. In particular, two maximization objectives have been defined. Moseley and Wang defined the \emph{Revenue} objective to handle similarity information given by a weighted graph on the data points (w.l.o.g., $[0,1]$ weights), while Cohen-Addad et al. defined the \emph{Dissimilarity} objective to handle dissimilarity information. In this paper, we prove structural lemmas for both objectives allowing us to convert any HC tree to a tree with constant number of internal nodes while incurring an arbitrarily small loss in each objective. Although the best-known approximations are 0.585 and 0.667 respectively, using our lemmas we obtain approximations arbitrarily close to 1, if not all weights are small (i.e., there exist constants $\epsilon, \delta$ such that the fraction of weights smaller than $\delta$, is at most $1 - \epsilon$); such instances encompass many metric-based similarity instances, thereby improving upon prior work. Finally, we introduce Hierarchical Correlation Clustering (HCC) to handle instances that contain similarity and dissimilarity information simultaneously. For HCC, we provide an approximation of 0.4767 and for complementary similarity/dissimilarity weights (analogous to $+/-$ correlation clustering), we again present nearly-optimal approximations.

In this paper, we study correlation clustering under fairness constraints. Fair variants of $k$-median and $k$-center clustering have been studied recently, and approximation algorithms using a notion called fairlet decomposition have been proposed. We obtain approximation algorithms for fair correlation clustering under several important types of fairness constraints.Our results hinge on obtaining a fairlet decomposition for correlation clustering by introducing a novel combinatorial optimization problem. We define a fairlet decomposition with cost similar to the $k$-median cost and this allows us to obtain approximation algorithms for a wide range of fairness constraints. We complement our theoretical results with an in-depth analysis of our algorithms on real graphs where we show that fair solutions to correlation clustering can be obtained with limited increase in cost compared to the state-of-the-art (unfair) algorithms.

Hierarchical Clustering is an unsupervised data analysis method which has been widely used for decades. Despite its popularity, it had an underdeveloped analytical foundation and to address this, Dasgupta recently introduced an optimization viewpoint of hierarchical clustering with pairwise similarity information that spurred a line of work shedding light on old algorithms (e.g., Average-Linkage), but also designing new algorithms. Here, for the maximization dual of Dasgupta’s objective (introduced by Moseley-Wang), we present polynomial-time 42.46% approximation algorithms that use Max-Uncut Bisection as a subroutine. The previous best worst-case approximation factor in polynomial time was 33.6%, improving only slightly over Average-Linkage which achieves 33.3%. Finally, we complement our positive results by providing APX-hardness (even for 0-1 similarities), under the Small Set Expansion hypothesis.

We propose a general framework for interactively learning combinatorial structures, such as (binary or non-binary) classifiers, orderings/rankings of items, or clusterings, when the underlying structure changes over time. Inspired by Angluin’s equivalence query model, the algorithm proposes a structure in each round, and it either learns that its proposal is the true structure in this round, or it observes a specific mistake in the proposal. The feedback is correct only with probability $1 - p$, and adversarially incorrect with probability $p$. The algorithm’s goal is to minimize its number of mistakes over the course of $R$ rounds. Our general framework is based on a graph representation of the structures and feedback in a static environment, proposed by Emamjomeh-Zadeh and Kempe (2017). To be able to learn efficiently, it is sufficient that there be a graph $G$ whose nodes are the candidate structures and whose (weighted) edges capture the possible feedback, satisfying a certain natural shortest paths property. To model the evolution of the underlying structure, we consider two natural models, which we term the Shifting Target model and Drifting Target model. In the former, the true structure always belongs to a small pool of candidate structures. In the latter, the structure can change only by transitioning along the edges of a known evolution graph. In order to achieve non-trivial results, we bound the total number of times the underlying structure can change, denoted by $B$. We provide upper and lower bounds on the number of mistakes, which depend on the total number of changes $B$, the total number of structures $n$, and natural measures of complexity of the dynamic models: the size of the pool of candidate structures in the Shifting Target model, and the maximum degree of the evolution graph in the Drifting Target model.

As machine learning has become more prevalent, researchers have begun to recognize the necessity of ensuring machine learning systems are fair. Recently, there has been an interest in defining a notion of fairness that mitigates over-representation in traditional clustering. In this paper we extend this notion to hierarchical clustering, where the goal is to recursively partition the data to optimize a specific objective. For various natural objectives, we obtain simple, efficient algorithms to find a provably good fair hierarchical clustering. Empirically, we show that our algorithms can find a fair hierarchical clustering, with only a negligible loss in the objective.

A differentially private algorithm guarantees that the input of a single user won’t significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. When a user contributes more data points, more information can be collected to improve the algorithm’s performance. But at the same time, more noise might need to be added to the algorithm in order to keep the algorithm differentially private and this might hurt the algorithm’s performance. Amin et al. (2019) initiates the study on bounding user contributions and proposes a very natural algorithm which limits the number of samples each user can contribute by a threshold. For a better trade-off between utility and privacy guarantee, we propose a method which smoothly bounds user contributions by setting appropriate weights on data points and apply it to estimating the mean/quantiles, linear regression, and empirical risk minimization. We show that our algorithm provably outperforms the sample limiting algorithm. We conclude with experimental evaluations which validate our theoretical results.

A soft-max function has two main efficiency measures: (1) approximation - which corresponds to how well it approximates the maximum function, (2) smoothness - which shows how sensitive it is to changes of its input. Our goal is to identify the optimal approximation-smoothness tradeoffs for different measures of approximation and smoothness. This leads to novel soft-max functions, each of which is optimal for a different application. The most commonly used soft-max function, called exponential mechanism, has optimal tradeoff between approximation measured in terms of expected additive approximation and smoothness measured with respect to Renyi Divergence. We introduce a soft-max function, called piece-wise linear soft-max, with optimal tradeoff between approximation, measured in terms of worst-case additive approximation and smoothness, measured with respect to l_q-norm. The worst-case approximation guarantee of the piece-wise linear mechanism enforces sparsity in the output of our soft-max function, a property that is known to be important in Machine Learning applications Martins et al. 16, Laha et al. 18 and is not satisfied by the exponential mechanism. Moreover, the l_q-smoothness is suitable for applications in Mechanism Design and Game Theory where the piece-wise linear mechanism outperforms the exponential mechanism. Finally, we investigate another soft-max function, called power mechanism, with optimal tradeoff between expected multiplicative approximation and smoothness with respect to the Renyi Divergence, which provides improved theoretical and practical results in differentially private submodular optimization.

Motivated by online advertising applications, we study incentive properties of stationary mechanisms that satisfy budget constraints in expectation at a stationary equilibrium. We consider a general repeated auction setting where a seller sells identical items to buyers with budget constraints and the buyers' value distributions can be arbitrarily correlated. We introduce the novel notion of budget-constrained incentive compatibility (BCIC) under which each buyer chooses an optimal bidding strategy among stationary budget-feasible bidding strategies. Armed with the notion of BCIC, we characterize Bayesian optimal mechanisms that satisfy the budget constraints in expectation with respect to the profit, utility and welfare objectives in the restricted setting where the buyers' value distributions are independent. Furthermore, in the general setting where the buyers' value distributions are correlated, we provide the first systematic study on the incentive properties of different budget management mechanisms, including those studied in the literature and, to the best of our knowledge, used in the industry. We explore the following mechanisms and show some popular mechanisms are not incentive compatible even when restricting attention to stationary budget-feasible deviations: throttling, thresholding, bid shading, reserve pricing and two versions of multiplicative boosting.

In this paper we consider clustering problems in which each point is endowed with a color. The goal is to cluster the points to minimize the classical clustering cost but with the additional constraint that no color is over-represented in any cluster. This problem is motivated by practical clustering settings, e.g., in clustering news articles where the color of an article is its source, it is preferable that no single news source dominates any cluster. For the most general version of this problem, we obtain an algorithm that has provable guarantees of performance; our algorithm is based on finding a fractional solution using a linear program and rounding the solution subsequently. For the special case of the problem where no color has an absolute majority in any cluster, we obtain a simpler combinatorial algorithm also with provable guarantees. Experiments on real-world data shows that our algorithms are effective in finding good clustering without over-representation.

In the classical contextual bandits problem, in each round $t$, a learner observes some context $c$, chooses some action $a$ to perform, and receives some reward $r_{a,t}(c)$. We consider the variant of this problem where in addition to receiving the reward $r_{a,t}(c)$, the learner also learns the values of $r_{a,t}(c')$ for all other contexts $c'$; i.e., the rewards that would have been achieved by performing that action under different contexts. This variant arises in several strategic settings, such as learning how to bid in non-truthful repeated auctions (in this setting the context is the decision maker's private valuation for each auction). We call this problem the contextual bandits problem with cross-learning. The best algorithms for the classical contextual bandits problem achieve $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{CKT})$ regret against all stationary policies, where $C$ is the number of contexts, $K$ the number of actions, and $T$ the number of rounds. We demonstrate algorithms for the contextual bandits problem with cross-learning that remove the dependence on $C$ and achieve regret $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$ (when contexts are stochastic with known distribution), $\tilde{O}(K^{1/3}T^{2/3})$ (when contexts are stochastic with unknown distribution), and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$ (when contexts are adversarial but rewards are stochastic). We simulate our algorithms on real auction data from an ad exchange running first-price auctions (showing that they outperform traditional contextual bandit algorithms).

Mixed strategies are often evaluated based on the expected payoff that they guarantee. This is not always desirable. In this paper, we consider games for which maximizing the expected payoff deviates from the actual goal of the players. To address this issue, we introduce the notion of a (u,p)-maxmin strategy which ensures receiving a minimum utility of u with probability at least p. We then give approximation algorithms for the problem of finding a (u, p)-maxmin strategy for these games. The first game that we consider is Colonel Blotto, a well-studied game that was introduced in 1921. In the Colonel Blotto game, two colonels divide their troops among a set of battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the colonel that puts more troops in it. The payoff of each colonel is the weighted number of battlefields that she wins. We show that maximizing the expected payoff of a player does not necessarily maximize her winning probability for certain applications of Colonel Blotto. For example, in presidential elections, the players’ goal is to maximize the probability of winning more than half of the votes, rather than maximizing the expected number of votes that they get. We give an exact algorithm for a natural variant of continuous version of this game. More generally, we provide constant and logarithmic approximation algorithms for finding (u, p)-maxmin strategies. We also introduce a security game version of Colonel Blotto which we call auditing game. It is played between two players, a defender and an attacker. The goal of the defender is to prevent the attacker from changing the outcome of an instance of Colonel Blotto. Again, maximizing the expected payoff of the defender is not necessarily optimal. Therefore we give a constant approximation for (u, p)-maxmin strategies.

In a typical learning problem, one key step is to use training data to pick one model from a collection of models that optimizes an objective function. In many multi-agent settings, the training data is generated through the actions of the agents, and the model is used to make a decision (e.g., how to sell an item) that affects the agents. An illustrative example of this is the problem of learning the reserve price in an auction. In such cases, the agents have an incentive to influence the training data (e.g., by manipulating their bids in the case of an auction) to game the system and achieve a more favorable outcome. In this paper, we study such incentive-aware learning problem in a general setting and show that it is possible to approximately optimize the objective function under two assumptions: (i) each individual agent is a "small" (part of the market); and (ii) there is a cost associated with manipulation. For our illustrative application, this nicely translates to a mechanism for setting approximately optimal reserve prices in auctions where no individual agent has significant market share. For this application, we also show that the second assumption (that manipulations are costly) is not necessary since we can "perturb" any auction to make it costly for the agents to manipulate.

In online advertising, advertisers purchase ad placements by participating in a long sequence of repeated auctions. One of the most important features advertising platforms often provide, and advertisers often use, is budget management, which allows advertisers to control their cumulative expenditures. Advertisers typically declare the maximum daily amount they are willing to pay, and the platform adjusts allocations and payments to guarantee that cumulative expenditures do not exceed budgets. There are multiple ways to achieve this goal, and each one, when applied to all budget-constrained advertisers simultaneously, steers the system toward a different equilibrium. While previous research focused on online stochastic optimization techniques or game-theoretic equilibria of such settings, our goal in this paper is to compare the ``system equilibria'' of a range of budget management strategies in terms of the seller's profit and buyers' utility. In particular, we consider six different budget management strategies including probabilistic throttling, thresholding, bid shading, reserve pricing, and multiplicative boosting. We show these methods admit a system equilibrium in a rather general setting, and prove dominance relations between them in a simplified setting. Our study sheds light on the impact of budget management strategies on the tradeoff between the seller's profit and buyers' utility. Finally, we also empirically compare the system equilibria of these strategies using real ad auction data in sponsored search and randomly generated bids. The empirical study confirms our theoretical findings about the relative performances of budget management strategies.

As the number of ad exchanges has grown, publishers have turned to low regret learning algorithms to decide which exchange offers the best price for their inventory. This in turn opens the following question for the exchange: how to set prices to attract as many sellers as possible and maximize revenue. In this work we formulate this precisely as a learning problem, and present algorithms showing that by simply knowing that the counterparty is using a low regret algorithm is enough for the exchange to have its own low regret learning algorithm to find the optimal price.

Clustering is a fundamental step in many information-retrieval and data-mining applications. Detecting clusters in graphs is also a key tool for finding the community structure in social and behavioral networks. In many of these applications, the input graph evolves over time in a continual and decentralized manner, and, to maintain a good clustering, the clustering algorithm needs to repeatedly probe the graph. Furthermore, there are often limitations on the frequency of such probes, either imposed explicitly by the online platform (e.g., in the case of crawling proprietary social networks like twitter) or implicitly because of resource limitations (e.g., in the case of crawling the web). In this paper, we study a model of clustering on evolving graphs that captures this aspect of the problem. Our model is based on the classical stochastic block model, which has been used to assess rigorously the quality of various static clustering methods. In our model, the algorithm is supposed to reconstruct the planted clustering, given the ability to query for small pieces of local information about the graph, at a limited rate. We design and analyze clustering algorithms that work in this model, and show asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds on their accuracy. Finally, we perform simulations, which demonstrate that our main asymptotic results hold true also in practice.

We offer a novel classification of voting methods popular in social choice theory. Our classification is based on the more general problem of rank aggregation in which, beyond electing a winner, we also seek to compute an aggregate ranking of all the candidates; moreover, our classification is offered from a computational perspective---based on whether or not the voting method generalizes to an aggregation algorithm guaranteed to produce solutions that are near optimal in minimizing the distance of the aggregate ranking to the voters' rankings with respect to one of three well-known distance measures: the Kendall tau, the Spearman footrule, and the Spearman rho measures. We show that methods based on the average rank of the candidates (Borda counting), on the median rank of the candidates, and on the number of pairwise-majority wins (Copeland) all satisfy the near-optimality criterion with respect to each of these distance measures. On the other hand, we show that natural extensions of each of plurality voting, single transferable voting, and Simpson--Kramer minmax voting do not satisfy the near-optimality criterion with respect to these distance measures.

We study the problem of selecting a set of points of interest (POIs) to show on a map. We begin with a formal model of the setting, noting that the utility of a POI may be discounted by (i) the presence of competing businesses nearby as well as (ii) its position in the set of establishments ordered by distance from the user. We present simple, approximately optimal selection algorithms, coupled with incentive compatible pricing schemes in case of advertiser supplied points of interest. Finally, we evaluate our algorithms on real data sets and show that they outperform simple baselines.

In this work we study the dynamics of geographic choice, i.e., how users choose one from a set of objects in a geographic region. We postulate a model in which an object is selected from a slate of candidates with probability that depends on how far it is (distance) and how many closer alternatives exist (rank). Under a discrete choice formulation, we argue that there exists a factored form in which unknown functions of rank and distance may be combined to produce an accurate estimate of the likelihood that a user will select each alternative. We then learn these hidden functions and show that each can be closely approximated by an appropriately parameterized lognormal, even though the respective marginals look quite different. We give a theoretical justification to support the presence of lognormal distributions.

In this paper we consider efficient construction of "composable core-sets" for basic diversity and coverage maximization problems. A core-set for a point-set in a metric space is a subset of the point-set with the property that an approximate solution to the whole point-set can be obtained given the core-set alone. A composable core-set has the property that for a collection of sets, the approximate solution to the union of the sets in the collection can be obtained given the union of the composable core-sets for the point sets in the collection. Using composable core-sets one can obtain efficient solutions to a wide variety of massive data processing applications, including nearest neighbor search, streaming algorithms and map-reduce computation.

One of the most important innovations of social networking websites is the notion of a "feed", a sequence of news items presented to the user as a stream that expands as the user scrolls down. The common method for monetizing such streams is to insert ads in between news items. In this paper, we model this setting, and observe that allocation and pricing of ad insertions in a stream poses interesting algorithmic and mechanism design challenges. In particular, we formulate an optimization problem that captures a typical stream ad placement setting. We give an approximation algorithm for this problem that provably achieves a value close to the optimal, and show how this algorithm can be turned into an incentive compatible mechanism. Finally, we conclude with a simple practical algorithm that makes the allocation decisions in an online fashion. We prove this algorithm to be approximately welfare-maximizing and show that it also has good incentive properties.

Motivated by applications that concern graphs that are evolving and massive in nature, we define a new general framework for computing with such graphs. In our framework, the graph changes over time and an algorithm can only track these changes by explicitly probing the graph. This framework captures the inherent tradeoff between the complexity of maintaining an up-to-date view of the graph and the quality of results computed with the available view. We apply this framework to two classical graph connectivity problems, namely, path connectivity and minimum spanning trees, and obtain efficient algorithms.

One of the most important features of the Web graph and social networks is that they are constantly evolving. The classical computational paradigm, which assumes a fixed data set as an input to an algorithm that terminates, is inadequate for such settings. In this paper we study the problem of computing PageRank on an evolving graph. We propose an algorithm that, at any moment in the time and by crawling a small portion of the graph, provides an estimate of the PageRank that is close to the true PageRank of the graph at that moment. We will also evaluate our algorithm experimentally on real data sets and on randomly generated inputs. Under a stylized model of graph evolution, we show that our algorithm achieves a provable performance guarantee that is significantly better than the naive algorithm that crawls the nodes in a round-robin fashion.

Modern online advertising increasingly relies on the availability of user tracking technology called cookie-matching to increase efficiency in ad allocations. Web publishers today use this technology to share information about the websites a user has visited, making it possible to target advertisements to users based on their prior history. This begs the question: do publishers (who are competitors for advertising money) always have the incentive to share online information? Intuitive arguments as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that sometimes a premium publisher might suffer from information sharing through an effect called information leakage: by sharing user information with the advertiser, the advertiser will be able to target the same user elsewhere on cheaper publishers, leading to a dilution of the value of the supply on the premium publishers.

We introduce a new framework for designing online algorithms that can incorporate additional information about the input sequence, while maintaining a reasonable competitive ratio if the additional information is incorrect. Within this framework, we present online algorithms for several problems including allocation of online advertisement space, load balancing, and facility location.

In a seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani show that a simple ranking algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1/e for the online bipartite matching problem in the standard adversarial model, where the ratio of 1-1/e is also shown to be optimal. Their result also implies that in the random arrivals model defined by Goel and Mehta, where the online nodes arrive in a random order, a simple greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1/e. In this paper, we study the ranking algorithm in the random arrivals model, and show that it has a competitive ratio of at least 0.696, beating the 1-1/e ≈ 0.632 barrier in the adversarial model. Our result also extends to the i.i.d. distribution model of Feldman et al., removing the assumption that the distribution is known.

This special section comprises eight fully refereed papers whose extended abstracts were presented at the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2008) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 26–28, 2008. The unrefereed conference versions of these papers were published by IEEE in the FOCS 2008 proceedings. The regular conference program consisted of 79 papers chosen from among 276 submissions. These were selected by a program committee consisting of Scott Aaronson, Yossi Azar, Avrim Blum, Harry Buhrman, Artur Czumaj, Yevgeniy Dodis, David Eppstein, Jeff Erickson, Naveen Garg, Tom Hayes, Sampath Kannan, Jonathan Katz, Valerie King, Mohammad Mahdian, Yury Makarychev, Yishay Mansour, Rafail Ostrovsky, Toniann Pitassi, Harald Raecke, R. Ravi (chair), Madhu Sudan, and Emanuele Viola. The papers invited to this special section were also selected with the input of the program committee. The eight papers in this section span a broad range of topics, including algorithmic game theory, computational complexity, hardness of approximation, learning theory, pseudorandomness, and quantum algorithms. Each paper underwent an extensive refereeing process; we thank both the authors and the anonymous referees for their efforts. In addition, we would like to thank Eva Tardos, who was SICOMP's editor-in-chief as this project began, and SIAM staff member Cherie Trebisky for their help in preparing this special section.

How do online conversations build? Is there a common model that human communication follows? In this work we explore these questions in detail. We analyze the structure of conversations in three different social datasets, namely, Usenet groups, Yahoo! Groups, and Twitter. We propose a simple mathematical model for the generation of basic conversation structures and then refine this model to take into account the identities of each member of the conversation.

Worst-case upper bounds are derived on the minimum distance of parallel concatenated turbo codes, serially concatenated convolutional codes, repeat-accumulate codes, repeat-convolute codes, and generalizations of these codes obtained by allowing nonlinear and large-memory constituent codes. It is shown that parallel-concatenated turbo codes and repeat-convolute codes with sub-linear memory are asymptotically bad. It is also shown that depth-two serially concatenated codes with constant-memory outer codes and sublinear-memory inner codes are asymptotically bad. Most of these upper bounds hold even when the convolutional encoders are replaced by general finite-state automata encoders. In contrast, it is proven that depth-three serially concatenated codes obtained by concatenating a repetition code with two accumulator codes through random permutations can be asymptotically good.

In many online social systems, social ties between users play an important role in dictating their behavior. One of the ways this can happen is through social influence, the phenomenon that the actions of a user can induce his/her friends to behave in a similar way. In systems where social influence exists, ideas, modes of behavior, or new technologies can diffuse through the network like an epidemic. Therefore, identifying and understanding social influence is of tremendous interest from both analysis and design points of view.

Most models for online advertising assume that an advertiser's value from winning an ad auction, which depends on the clickthrough rate or conversion rate of the advertisement, is independent of other advertisements served alongside it in the same session. This ignores an important 'externality effect': as the advertising audience has a limited attention span, a high-quality ad on a page can detract attention from other ads on the same page. That is, the utility to a winner in such an auction also depends on the set of other winners.

A cost-sharing scheme is a set of rules defining how to share the cost of a service (often computed by solving a combinatorial optimization problem) amongs serviced customers. A cost-sharing scheme is cross-monotonic if it satisfies the property that everyone is better off when the set of people who receive the service expands. In this article, we develop a novel technique for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes or the worst-case ratio of recovered cost to total cost. We apply this technique to games defined, based on several combinatorial optimization problems, including the problems of edge cover, vertex cover, set cover, and metric facility location and, in each case, derive tight or nearly-tight bounds. In particular, we show that for the facility location game, there is no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme that recovers more than a third of the total cost. This result, together with a recent 1/3-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme of Pál and Tardos [2003] closes the gap for the facility location game. For the vertex cover and set cover games, we show that no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme can recover more than a O ( n −1/3 ) and O (1/ n ) fraction of the total cost, respectively. Finally, we study the implications of our results on the existence of group-strategyproof mechanisms. We show that every group-strategyproof mechanism corresponds to a cost-sharing scheme that satisfies a condition weaker than cross-monotonicity. Using this, we prove that group-strategyproof mechanisms satisfying additional properties give rise to cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes and therefore our upper bounds hold.

The online advertising industry is currently based on two dominant business models: the pay-per-impression model and the pay-per-click model. These pricing models aim to address two dimensions of an advertisers' objective function: brand awareness and sales generation. An alternative model, discussed but not widely used in the advertising industry, is pay-per-conversion, or more generally, pay-per-action. In this note, we discuss mechanisms for the pay-per-action model and various challenges involved in designing such mechanisms.

We study the power of ascending auctions in a scenario in which a seller is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit'demand bidders. We show that even with full knowledge of the set of bidders' private valuations for the items, if the bidders are ex-ante identical, no ascending auction can extract more than a constant. times the revenue of the best fixed-price scheme. This problem is equivalent to the problem of coming up with an optimal strategy for blowing up indistinguishable balloons with known capacities in order to maximize the amount of contained, air. We show that the algorithm which simply inflates all balloons to a fixed volume is close to optimal in this setting.

In many settings, competing technologies -- for example, operating systems, instant messenger systems, or document formats -- can be seen adopting a limited amount of compatibility with one another; in other words, the difficulty in using multiple technologies is balanced somewhere between the two extremes of impossibility and effortless interoperability. There are a range of reasons why this phenomenon occurs, many of which -- based on legal, social, or business considerations -- seem to defy concise mathematical models. Despite this, we show that the advantages of limited compatibility can arise in a very simple model of diffusion in social networks, thus offering a basic explanation for this phenomenon in purely strategic terms. Our approach builds on work on the diffusion of innovations in the economics literature, which seeks to model how a new technology A might spread through a social network of individuals who are currently users of technology B. We consider several ways of capturing the compatibility of A and B, focusing primarily on a model in which users can choose to adopt A, adopt B, or -- at an extra cost -- adopt both A and B. We characterize how the ability of A to spread depends on both its quality relative to B, and also this additional cost of adopting both, and find some surprising non-monotonicity properties in the dependence on these parameters: in some cases, for one technology to survive the introduction of another, the cost of adopting both technologies must be balanced within a narrow, intermediate range. We also extend the framework to the case of multiple technologies, where we find that a simple model captures the phenomenon of two firms adopting a limited "strategic alliance" to defend against a new, third technology.

We study the problem of optimally allocating online advertisement space to budget-constrained advertisers. This problem was defined and studied from the perspective of worst-case online competitive analysis by Mehta et al.

We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and study a natural bidding heuristic in which advertisers attempt to optimize their utility by equalizing their return-on-investment across all keywords. We show that existing auction mechanisms combined with this heuristic can experience cycling (as has been observed in many current systems), and therefore propose a modified class of mechanisms with small random perturbations. This perturbation is reminiscent of the small time-dependent perturbations employed in the dynamical systems literature to convert many types of chaos into attracting motions. We show that the perturbed mechanism provably converges in the case of first-price auctions and experimentally converges in the case of second-price auctions. Moreover, the point of convergence has a natural economic interpretation as the unique market equilibrium in the case of first-price mechanisms. In the case of second-price auctions, we conjecture that it converges to the "supply-aware" market equilibrium. Thus, our results can be alternatively described as a tâtonnement process for convergence to market equilibriumin which prices are adjusted on the side of the buyers rather than the sellers. We also observe that perturbation in mechanism design is useful in a broader context: In general, it can allow bidders to "share" a particular item, leading to stable allocations and pricing for the bidders, and improved revenue for the auctioneer.

We consider matching markets where a centralized authority must find a matching between the agents on one side of the market, and the items on the other side. Such settings occur, for example, in mail-based DVD rental services such as NetFlix or in some job markets. The objective is to find a popular matching, or a matching that is preferred by a majority of the agents to any other matching. This concept was first defined and studied by Abraham et al. The main drawback of this concept is that popular matchings sometimes do not exist. We partially address this issue in this paper, by proving that in a probabilistic setting where preference lists are drawn at random and the number of items is more than the number of agents by a small multiplicative factor, popular matchings almost surely exist. More precisely, we prove that there is a threshold α ≈ 1.42 such that if the number of items divided by the number of agents exceeds this threshold, then a solution almost always exists. Our proof uses a characterization result by Abraham et al., and a number of tools from the theory of random graphs and phase transitions.

We study multi-unit auctions for perishable goods, in a setting where the supply arrives online. This is motivated by its application in advertisement auctions on the internet. We give a 1 4 -competitive algorithm for computing the optimal single price auction assuming that all the agents report their bids truthfully. We use that algorithm to develop a truthful auction with a constant competitive ratio compared to the optimum offline single-price auction.

Let G be an n-vertex graph that has a vertex separator of size k that partitions the graph into connected components of size smaller than α n, for some fixed 2/3 ≤ α < 1. Such a separator is called an α-separator. Finding an α-separator of size at most k is NP-hard. Moreover, under reasonable complexity theoretic assumptions, it is shown that this problem is not polynomially solvable even when k=O(log n). In this paper, we give a randomized algorithm that finds an α-separator of size k in the given graph, unless the graph contains an (α+ε)-separator of size strictly less than k, in which case our algorithm finds one such separator. For fixed ε, the running time of our algorithm is nO(1)2O(k), which is polynomial for k = O(log n). For bounded degree graphs (as well as for the case of finding balanced edge separators), we present a deterministic algorithm with similar running time.Our algorithm involves (among other things) a new concept that we call (ε,k)-samples. This is related to the notion of detection sets for network failures, introduced by Kleinberg [FOCS 2000]. Our proofs adapt and simplify techniques that were introduced by Kleinberg. As a by-product, our proof improves the known bounds on the size of detection sets. We also show applications of (ε,k)-samples to problems in approximation algorithms and rigorous analysis of heuristics.

In this paper we present a 1.52-approximation algorithm for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem, and a 2-approximation algorithm for the metric capacitated facility location problem with soft capacities. Both these algorithms improve the best previously known approximation factor for the corresponding problem, and our soft-capacitated facility location algorithm achieves the integrality gap of the standard linear programming relaxation of the problem. Furthermore, we will show, using a result of Thorup, that our algorithms can be implemented in quasi-linear time.

We provide a comprehensive picture of how to compare partial rankings, that is, rankings that allow ties. We propose several metrics to compare partial rankings and prove that they are within constant multiples of each other.

We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense that, under standard assumptions, we prove that it is impossible to design a non-trivial truthful auction which allocates all units, while we provide the design of an asymptotically revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism which may allocate only some of the units. Our asymptotic parameter is a budget dominance parameter which measures the size of the budget of a single agent relative to the maximum revenue. We discuss the relevance of these results for the design of Internet ad auctions.

This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each agent is assumed to arrive and depart dynamically, and in the basic model require the resource for one unit of time. We seek mechanisms that are truthful in the sense that truthful revelation of arrival, departure and value information is a dominant strategy, and that are online in the sense that they make allocation decisions without knowledge of the future. First, we provide two characterizations for the class of truthful online allocation rules. The characterizations extend beyond the typical single-parameter settings, and formalize the role of restricted misreporting in reversing existing price-based characterizations. Second, we present an online auction for unit-length jobs that achieves total value that is 2-competitive with the maximum offline value. We prove that no truthful deterministic online mechanism can achieve a better competitive ratio. Third, we consider revenue competitiveness and prove that no deterministic truthful online auction has revenue that is constant-competitive with that of the offline Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism We provide a randomized online auction that achieves a competitive ratio of O(log h), where h is the ratio of maximum value to minimum value among the agents; this mechanism does not require prior knowledge of h. Finally, we generalize our model to settings with multiple re-usable goods and to agents with different job lengths.

We prove the existence of tolls to induce multicommodity, heterogeneous network users that independently choose routes minimizing their own linear function of tolls versus latency to collectively form the traffic pattern of a minimum average latency flow. This generalizes both the previous known results of the existence of tolls for multicommodity, homogeneous users (Beckman et al., 1956) and for single commodity, heterogeneous users (Cole et al., 2003). Unlike previous proofs for single commodity users in general graphs, our proof is constructive - it does not rely on a fixed point theorem - and results in a simple polynomial-sized linear program to compute tolls when the number of different types of users is bounded by a polynomial. We show that our proof gives a complete characterization of flows that are enforceable by tolls. In particular, tolls exist to induce any traffic pattern that is the result of minimizing an arbitrary function from R/sup E(G)/ to the reals that is nondecreasing in each of its arguments. Thus, tolls exist to induce flows with minimum average weighted latency, minimum maximum latency, and other natural objectives. We give an exponential bound on tolls that is independent of the number of network users and the number of commodities. We use this to show that multicommodity tolls also exist when users are not from discrete classes, but instead define a general function that trades off latency versus toll preference. Finally, we show that our result extends to very general frameworks. In particular, we show that tolls exist to induce the Nash equilibrium of general nonatomic congestion games to be system optimal. In particular, tolls exist even when 1) latencies depend on user type; 2) latency functions are nonseparable functions of traffic on edges; 3) the latency of a set S is an arbitrary function of the latencies of the resources contained in S. Our exponential bound on size of tolls also holds in this case; and we give an example of a congestion game that shows this is tight; it requires tolls that are exponential in the size of the game.

Efficient integration of a multi-hop wireless network with the Internet is an important research problem. In a wireless neighborhood network, a few Internet transit access points (ITAPs), serving as gateways to the Internet, are deployed across the neighborhood; houses are equipped with low-cost antennas, and form a multi-hop wireless network among themselves to cooperatively route traffic to the Internet through the ITAPs. Furthermore, the placement of Internet TAPs is a critical determinant of system performance and resource usage. We explore the placement problem under three wireless link models. For each link model, we develop algorithms to make informed placement decisions based on neighborhood layouts, user demands, and wireless link characteristics. We also extend our algorithms to provide fault tolerance and handle significant workload variation. We evaluate our placement algorithms and show that our algorithms yield close to optimal solutions over a wide range of scenarios we have considered.

We propose to use the community structure of Usenet for organizing and retrieving the information stored in newsgroups. In particular, we study the network formed by cross-posts, messages that are posted to two or more newsgroups simultaneously. We present what is, to our knowledge, by far the most detailed data that has been collected on Usenet cross-postings. We analyze this network to show that it is a small-world network with significant clustering. We also present a spectral algorithm which clusters newsgroups based on the cross-post matrix. The result of our clustering provides a topical classification of newsgroups. Our clustering gives many examples of significant relationships that would be missed by semantic clustering methods.

Rank aggregation has recently been proposed as a useful abstraction that has several applications, including meta-search, synthesizing rank functions from multiple indices, similarity search, and classification. In database applications (catalog searches, fielded searches, parametric searches, etc.), the rankings are produced by sorting an underlying database according to various fields. Typically, there are a number of fields that each have very few distinct values, and hence the corresponding rankings have many ties in them. Known methods for rank aggregation are poorly suited to this context, and the difficulties can be traced back to the fact that we do not have sound mathematical principles to compare two partial rankings, that is, rankings that allow ties.In this work, we provide a comprehensive picture of how to compare partial rankings, We propose several metrics to compare partial rankings, present algorithms that efficiently compute them, and prove that they are within constant multiples of each other. Based on these concepts, we formulate aggregation problems for partial rankings, and develop a highly efficient algorithm to compute the top few elements of a near-optimal aggregation of multiple partial rankings. In a model of access that is suitable for databases, our algorithm reads essentially as few elements of each partial ranking as are necessary to determine the winner(s).

In this article, we will formalize the method of dual fitting and the idea of factor-revealing LP. This combination is used to design and analyze two greedy algorithms for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem. Their approximation factors are 1.861 and 1.61, with running times of O ( m log m ) and O ( n 3 ), respectively, where n is the total number of vertices and m is the number of edges in the underlying complete bipartite graph between cities and facilities. The algorithms are used to improve recent results for several variants of the problem.

Abstract In this paper, we introduce a generalized version of the facility location problem in which the facility cost is a function of the number of clients assigned to the facility. We focus on the case of concave facility cost functions. We observe that this problem can be reduced to the uncapacitated facility location problem. We analyze a natural greedy algorithm for this problem and show that its approximation factor is at most 1.861. We also consider several generalizations and variants of this problem. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

We present a simple and natural greedy algorithm for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem achieving an approximation guarantee of 1.61. We use this algorithm to find better approximation algorithms for the capacitated facility location problem with soft capacities and for a common generalization of the k-median and facility location problems. We also prove a lower bound of 1+2/e on the approximability of the k-median problem. At the end, we present a discussion about the techniques we have used in the analysis of our algorithm, including a computer-aided method for proving bounds on the approximation factor.

Abstract The path‐matching problem is to find a set of vertex‐ or edge‐disjoint paths with length constraints in a given graph with a given set of endpoints. This problem has several applications in broadcasting and multicasting in computer networks. In this paper, we study the algorithmic complexity of different cases of this problem. In each case, we either provide a polynomial‐time algorithm or prove that the problem is NP‐complete. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.