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Dan Wang 0031

dblp:23/2060-31 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-8132-9785ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Privacy and data protection · 85% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 15%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Efficient and distributed learning · 100%

Topics — the 11 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
2.232026
Two-Dimensional Stackelberg Game-Based Incentive Mechanism for Differential Private Federated Learning With Non-IID Data · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2026
PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Computers 2023
Privacy-Preserving Streaming Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Differential Privacy · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning
1.012026
Two-Dimensional Stackelberg Game-Based Incentive Mechanism for Differential Private Federated Learning With Non-IID Data · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2026
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › differentially private learning
differentially private federated learning
1.012026
Two-Dimensional Stackelberg Game-Based Incentive Mechanism for Differential Private Federated Learning With Non-IID Data · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2026
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
incentive mechanism
1.012026
Two-Dimensional Stackelberg Game-Based Incentive Mechanism for Differential Private Federated Learning With Non-IID Data · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2026
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
local differential privacy
0.712023
PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Computers 2023
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving computation
0.712023
PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Computers 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.712023
PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Computers 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › auction mechanism
reverse auction
0.712023
PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Computers 2023
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving data analysis
privacy-preserving truth discovery
0.612022
Privacy-Preserving Streaming Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Differential Privacy · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › continual release
streaming data publication
0.612022
Privacy-Preserving Streaming Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Differential Privacy · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022
Edge and fog computing
edge server
0.212022
Privacy-Preserving Streaming Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Differential Privacy · IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

differential privacy · 2.5stackelberg game · 2.0bi-level multi-agent reinforcement learning · 2.0multi-dimensional reverse auction · 1.3truth discovery · 1.1budget recycling · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 A Server-Side Model Intellectual Property Protection Method for Federated Learning Against Model Theft
abstract
Federated Learning (FL) has gained significant attention for enabling collaborative model training while preserving data privacy. However, protecting the intellectual property (IP) of models in FL, particularly against model theft by malicious clients, remains a critical challenge. Existing works often employ watermarking techniques to embed watermarks into models for ownership verification, but most of them can only verify ownership after the model has been stolen and cannot proactively defend against malicious clients attempting to steal the model. To address this limitation, this paper proposes FedLock, a novel server-side watermarking mechanism designed to resist model theft and safeguard the IP of global models. Specifically, FedLock leverages Split Federated Learning (SFL) to partition the model, effectively preventing malicious clients from accessing the complete set of global model parameters. To enhance security, FedLock incorporates an autoencoder for label encoding, safeguarding the server-side model from reconstruction attacks. Furthermore, FedLock introduces an additional backdoor client to embed a black-box watermark into the global model, enabling remote verification of model ownership. Experimental results demonstrate that FedLock achieves robust watermarking with minimal impact on model performance, effectively resisting various attacks, including model theft, pruning, and fine-tuning.
Wenxiong Chen, Xuantao Tang, Dan Wang 0031, Ju Ren 0001
IEEE Internet Things J.3
2026 Two-Dimensional Stackelberg Game-Based Incentive Mechanism for Differential Private Federated Learning With Non-IID Data
abstract
Incentive mechanisms are essential for boosting client engagement in differential private federated learning (DP-FL). However, existing Stakelberg games-based incentive mechanisms typically assume that client decisions are one-dimension and that data is independent and identically distributed (IID) across clients. In reality, data distributions are often non-IID and clients have two-dimensional resources decisions, including data quantity and privacy. Therefore, in this paper, we present a novel two-dimensional Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism for DP-FL with non-IID data, aiming to maximize the total utility of clients and server by seeking a balance between the clients' two-dimensional decisions and the server's payment. Specifically, we first formulate the utility functions of both server and clients under two-dimensional decisions and then model the interactions between server and clients as a single-leader-multiple-followers Stackelberg game. To derive the optimal decisions that maximize their utilities, we theoretically prove the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium between server and clients. Due to the difficulty to directly calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium, we propose a bi-level multi-agent reinforment learning algorithm to learn the optimal decisions for both server and clients by trial and error. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that our proposed method outperforms the baselines in terms of total utility.
Dan Wang 0031, Xiaoyi Pang, Jiahui Hu 0001, Sheng Yue 0001, Ju Ren 0001
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.1
2023 PrivAim: A Dual-Privacy Preserving and Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning
abstract
Privacy protection and incentive mechanism are two fundamental problems in federated learning (FL), which aim at protecting the privacy of data owners and stimulating them to share more resources, respectively. Recent works have proposed differential privacy (DP) based privacy-preserving incentive mechanisms to solve both problems simultaneously. However, almost all of them took the privacy level as the only incentive item, without considering other factors, such as data quantity and quality. Moreover, an untrusted server can further infer sensitive information from the bids that reflect the true costs of data owners. To solve these problems, in this paper, we propose a dual-privacy preserving and quality-aware incentive mechanism, PrivAim, for federated learning. Specifically, it utilizes differential privacy to protect the local models and true costs against the untrusted parameter server, and carefully designs a multi-dimensional reverse auction mechanism to incentivize data owners with high quality and low cost to participate in FL without knowing the true bids. We theoretically prove that PrivAim satisfies$\Delta b$-truthfulness, individual rational, computational efficiency, and differential privacy. Extensive experiments show that PrivAim can effectively protect bid privacy, and achieve at least 21% and 6% improvement on social welfare and model accuracy, respectively, compared to the state-of-the-art.
Dan Wang 0031, Ju Ren 0001, Zhibo Wang 0001, Yichuan Wang 0003, Yaoxue Zhang
IEEE Trans. Computers1
2022 Privacy-Preserving Streaming Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Differential Privacy
abstract
Differential privacy (DP) has gained popularity in truth discovery recently due to its strong privacy guarantee. However, existing DP mechanisms for streaming data publication are not suitable for truth discovery as they fail to consider the different reliabilities of individuals, while the DP-based approaches for truth discovery are not suitable for streaming data because they ignore the correlations between truths over time. Directly applying these existing methods to streaming crowdsourced data would lead to low accuracy of the discovered truth. To solve this problem, in this paper, we propose an edge computing based privacy-preserving truth discovery mechanism, named PrivSTD, for streaming crowdsourced data to realize high accuracy of discovered truth while protecting the privacy of workers. Specifically, edge servers are introduced between the untrusted cloud server and workers to securely calculate the local truths and workers’ reliabilities. A truth-dependent budget recycle mechanism is proposed for each edge server to adaptively determine the perturbed timestamp and allocate the privacy budget according to the changing pattern of local truths. Besides, a reliability-based perturbation mechanism is proposed to reduce the perturbation magnitude on the basis of worker's reliability. We theoretical analyze the data utility and computation cost of PrivSTD, and prove that PrivSTD can satisfy$w$-event ($\epsilon,\delta$)-differential privacy. Extensive experimental results on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that PrivSTD achieves better utility than the state-of-the-art approaches.
Dan Wang 0031, Ju Ren 0001, Zhibo Wang 0001, Xiaoyi Pang, Yaoxue Zhang, Xuemin Shen
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.1