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Shangxi Wu

dblp:230/8010 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
5as first author
7since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-6826-6396ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 4 · 3 first-author · 4 since 2021Computer networks · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 86% Authentication and access control · 14%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program synthesis and code generation · 100%
Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Language models and text generation · 57% Image recognition and object detection · 43%

Topics — the 11 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
A Disguised Wolf Is More Harmful Than a Toothless Tiger: Adaptive and Malicious Code Injection Backdoor Attack Leveraging User Behavior as Triggers · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Program synthesis and code generation
code generation with language models
0.912025
A Disguised Wolf Is More Harmful Than a Toothless Tiger: Adaptive and Malicious Code Injection Backdoor Attack Leveraging User Behavior as Triggers · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Program synthesis and code generation › code generation with language models
secure code generation
0.912025
A Disguised Wolf Is More Harmful Than a Toothless Tiger: Adaptive and Malicious Code Injection Backdoor Attack Leveraging User Behavior as Triggers · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
model intellectual property protection
0.712023
Are You Copying My Model? Protecting the Copyright of Large Language Models for EaaS via Backdoor Watermark · ACL (1) 2023
Security and privacy of machine learning › model intellectual property protection
model watermarking
0.712023
Are You Copying My Model? Protecting the Copyright of Large Language Models for EaaS via Backdoor Watermark · ACL (1) 2023
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
0.512021
Robust CAPTCHAs Towards Malicious OCR · IEEE Trans. Multim. 2021
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs
CAPTCHA
0.512021
Robust CAPTCHAs Towards Malicious OCR · IEEE Trans. Multim. 2021
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack
0.312025
A Disguised Wolf Is More Harmful Than a Toothless Tiger: Adaptive and Malicious Code Injection Backdoor Attack Leveraging User Behavior as Triggers · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
trigger design
0.312025
A Disguised Wolf Is More Harmful Than a Toothless Tiger: Adaptive and Malicious Code Injection Backdoor Attack Leveraging User Behavior as Triggers · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model
0.212023
Are You Copying My Model? Protecting the Copyright of Large Language Models for EaaS via Backdoor Watermark · ACL (1) 2023
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
character recognition
0.112021
Robust CAPTCHAs Towards Malicious OCR · IEEE Trans. Multim. 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

game theory · 1.7embedding-based watermark · 1.3backdoor watermarking · 1.3multi-target attack · 1.0ensemble adversarial training · 1.0adversarial perturbation · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Backdoor for Debias: Mitigating Model Bias With Backdoor Attack-Based Artificial Bias
abstract
With the swift advancement of deep learning, state-of-the-art algorithms have been utilized in various social situations. Nonetheless, some algorithms have been discovered to exhibit biases and provide unequal results. The current debiasing methods face challenges such as poor utilization of data or intricate training requirements. In this work, we found that the backdoor attack can construct an artificial bias similar to the model bias derived in standard training. Considering the strong adjustability of backdoor triggers, we are motivated to mitigate the model bias by carefully designing reverse artificial bias created from backdoor attack. Based on this, we propose a backdoor debiasing framework based on knowledge distillation, which effectively reduces the model bias from original data and minimizes security risks from the backdoor attack. The proposed solution is validated on both image and structured datasets, showing promising results. This work advances the understanding of backdoor attacks and highlights its potential for beneficial applications. The code for the study can be found athttps://github.com/KirinNg/DwB.
Shangxi Wu, Qiuyang He, Jian Yu 0001, Jitao Sang 0001
IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol.1
2025 A Disguised Wolf Is More Harmful Than a Toothless Tiger: Adaptive and Malicious Code Injection Backdoor Attack Leveraging User Behavior as Triggers
abstract
In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in code generation. However, as these models are increasingly adopted for software development, their associated security risks have become more pronounced. Studies have shown that traditional deep learning robustness issues also adversely affect the reliability of code generation. In this paper, we use game theory to systematically examine security vulnerabilities in code generation and illustrate how attackers can propagate malicious models to create genuine threats. We also demonstrate, for the first time, that attackers can leverage user behavior as a trigger for backdoor attacks—dynamically controlling when malicious code is injected—and calibrate these attacks to a user’s skill level, leading to varying degrees of impact. Through extensive experiments on leading code generation models, we verify that these security threats are both feasible and dangerous. Our research code will be available at https://github.com/KirinNg/Adaptive_Malicious_Code_Injection_Backdoor_Attack.
Shangxi Wu, Jinlin Xiao, Jitao Sang 0001
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.1
2024 Adaptive Adversarial Logits Pairing
abstract
Adversarial examples provide an opportunity as well as impose a challenge for understanding image classification systems. Based on the analysis of the adversarial training solution—Adversarial Logits Pairing (ALP), we observed in this work that: (1) The inference of adversarially robust model tends to rely on fewer high-contribution features compared with vulnerable ones. (2) The training target of ALP does not fit well to a noticeable part of samples, where the logits pairing loss is overemphasized and obstructs minimizing the classification loss. Motivated by these observations, we design an Adaptive Adversarial Logits Pairing (AALP) solution by modifying the training process and training target of ALP. Specifically, AALP consists of an adaptive feature optimization module with Guided Dropout to systematically pursue fewer high-contribution features, and an adaptive sample weighting module by setting sample-specific training weights to balance between logits pairing loss and classification loss. The proposed AALP solution demonstrates superior defense performance on multiple datasets with extensive experiments.
Shangxi Wu, Jitao Sang 0001, Kaiyan Xu, Guanhua Zheng, Changsheng Xu
ACM Trans. Multim. Comput. Commun. Appl.1
2023 Are You Copying My Model? Protecting the Copyright of Large Language Models for EaaS via Backdoor Watermark
abstract
Wenjun Peng, Jingwei Yi, Fangzhao Wu, Shangxi Wu, Bin Bin Zhu, Lingjuan Lyu, Binxing Jiao, Tong Xu, Guangzhong Sun, Xing Xie. Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2023.
Wenjun Peng 0001, Jingwei Yi, Fangzhao Wu, Shangxi Wu, Bin B. Zhu, Lingjuan Lyu, Binxing Jiao, Tong Xu 0001, Guangzhong Sun, Xing Xie 0001
ACL (1)4
2023 Debiasing backdoor attack: A benign application of backdoor attack in eliminating data bias
Shangxi Wu, Qiuyang He, Yi Zhang 0101, Dongyuan Lu, Jitao Sang 0001
Inf. Sci.1
2023 Attention, Please! Adversarial Defense via Activation Rectification and Preservation
abstract
This study provides a new understanding of the adversarial attack problem by examining the correlation between adversarial attack and visual attention change. In particular, we observed that: (1) images with incomplete attention regions are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks; and (2) successful adversarial attacks lead to deviated and scattered activation map. Therefore, we use the mask method to design an attention-preserving loss and a contrast method to design a loss that makes the model’s attention rectification. Accordingly, an attention-based adversarial defense framework is designed, under which better adversarial training or stronger adversarial attacks can be performed through the above constraints. We hope the attention-related data analysis and defense solution in this study will shed some light on the mechanism behind the adversarial attack and also facilitate future adversarial defense/attack model design.
Shangxi Wu, Jitao Sang 0001, Jiaming Zhang 0006, Jian Yu 0001
ACM Trans. Multim. Comput. Commun. Appl.1
2021 Robust CAPTCHAs Towards Malicious OCR
abstract
Turing test was originally proposed to examine whether machine's behavior is indistinguishable from a human. The most popular and practical Turing test is CAPTCHA, which is to discriminate algorithm from human by offering recognition-alike questions. The recent development of deep learning has significantly advanced the capability of algorithm in solving CAPTCHA questions, forcing CAPTCHA designers to increase question complexity. Instead of designing questions difficult for both algorithm and human, this study attempts to employ the limitations of algorithm to design robust CAPTCHA questions easily solvable to human. Specifically, our data analysis observes that human and algorithm demonstrates different vulnerability to visual distortions: adversarial perturbation is significantly annoying to algorithm yet friendly to human. We are motivated to employ adversarially perturbed images for robust CAPTCHA design in the context of character-based questions. Four modules of multi-target attack, ensemble adversarial training, image preprocessing differentiable approximation, and expectation are proposed to address the characteristics of character-based CAPTCHA cracking. Qualitative and quantitative experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. We hope this study can lead to the discussions around adversarial attack/defense in CAPTCHA design and also inspire the future attempts in employing algorithm limitation for practical usage.
Jiaming Zhang 0006, Jitao Sang 0001, Shangxi Wu, Yongli Hu, Jian Yu 0001
IEEE Trans. Multim.4