Everyone wants to know the future. Exploring the future is not to make predictions, but to anticipate which futures might happen, so we may make better decisions today. The foresight process is a tool which enables researchers to become more attuned to the future; the foresight process is designed to help anticipate emerging trends, rather than be surprised by dramatic change. This paper identifies possible futures in two ways: extrapolating from the present into the future, and starting from future states to reconstruct how they might be arrived at from the current state. The result is 12 fresh scenarios and 13 new paradigms.

Article Share on Assuring critical systems Author: Bob Blakley Tivoli Systems, Inc. Tivoli Systems, Inc.View Profile Authors Info & Claims NSPW '02: Proceedings of the 2002 workshop on New security paradigmsSeptember 2002 Pages 110–112https://doi.org/10.1145/844102.844122Online:23 September 2002Publication History 0citation308DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations0Total Downloads308Last 12 Months2Last 6 weeks0 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteGet Access

Information security is important in proportion to an organization's dependence on information technology. When an organization's information is exposed to risk, the use of information security technology is obviously appropriate. Current information security technology, however, deals with only a small fraction of the problem of information risk. In fact, the evidence increasingly suggests that information security technology does not reduce information risk very effectively.This paper argues that we must reconsider our approach to information security from the ground up if we are to deal effectively with the problem of information risk, and proposes a new model inspired by the history of medicine.

Decoupling authorization logic from application logic allows applications with fine-grain access control requirements to be independent of a particular access control policy and from factors that are used in authorization decisions as well as access control models, no matter how dynamic those policies and factors are. It also enables elaborate and consistent access control policies across heterogeneous systems. We present the design of a service for resource access authorization in distributed systems. The service enables one to decouple authorization logic from application functionality. Although the described service is based on CORBA technology, the design approach can be successfully used in any distributed computing environment.

This paper summarizes the affirmative argument supporting the proposition that "the concept of the trusted computing base (TCB) as a basis for constructing systems to meet security requirements is fundamentally flawed and should no longer be used to justify system security architectures".

The traditional model of computer security was formulated in the 1970’s, when computers were espensive, solitary, heavy, and rare. It rests on three fundamental foundations: management of security policy describing the set of actions each user is entit.led to perform, integrity of the physical system, its software, and especially its security-enforcing mechanisms, and secrecy of cryptographic keys and sensitive data. The modern computing environment, with its rapidly accelerating complexity, connectivity, and miniaturization, is undermining all three of these foundations. Nevertheless, the newest “secure ” computer systems continue to be built on them. This paper argues that the traditional model of computer security is no longer viable, and that new definitions of the security problem are needed before the industry can begin to work toward effective security in the new environment. 1