Nonprofit fundraising websites often display a set of donation amounts, allowing prospective donors to effortlessly select an amount from this menu of suggestions instead of manually inputting their ideal donation. Although this strategy is effective at shaping behavior, it can also backfire: suggested amounts ("defaults") attract donors with both lower and higher ideal donations, potentially leading to a net decrease in revenue. To address this challenge, we present a comprehensive framework for designing a menu of defaults to maximize fundraising revenue in the presence of heterogeneous donors.

Motivated by our collaboration with Food Rescue U.S. (FRUS), a food recovery organization that relies on volunteers to complete recurring tasks, we study how crowdsourcing platforms can use commitment to promote growth and engagement. Despite reducing match uncertainty, high levels of commitment can decrease the probability of forming new matches in the spot market, which in turn can suppress growth. To better understand this trade-off, we develop a model for two-sided random markets which repeatedly match volunteers with tasks. Our model incorporates match uncertainty as well as the negative impact of failing to match on future engagement. We study the optimal level of commitment to maximize the total discounted number of matches.

Two-sided platforms rely on their recommendation algorithms to help their visitors successfully find a match. However, on platforms such as VolunteerMatch - which has facilitated tens of millions of connections between volunteers and nonprofits - a sizable fraction of website traffic arrives directly to a nonprofit's volunteering page via an external link, thus bypassing the platform's recommendation algorithm. We study how such platforms should account for this external traffic in the design of their recommendation engines, given the goal of maximizing the total number of successful matches. We model the platform's problem as a special case of online matching with stochastic rewards, where (using VolunteerMatch as a motivating example) volunteers arrive sequentially and (probabilistically) match with one opportunity, each of which has finite need for volunteers. In our framework, external traffic is interested only in their targeted opportunity; in contrast, internal traffic may be interested in many opportunities, and the platform's online algorithm selects which opportunity to recommend. In evaluating the performance of different algorithms, we take a worst-case analysis approach, yet we refine the notion of the competitive ratio by parameterizing it based on the amount of external traffic. After demonstrating the shortcomings of a commonly-used algorithm which is optimal in the absence of external traffic, we introduce a new algorithm - Adaptive Capacity (AC) - which accounts for matches differently based on whether they originate from internal or external traffic. We establish a lower bound on AC's competitive ratio that is increasing in the amount of external traffic, and we compare our lower bound to a parameterized upper bound on the competitive ratio of any online algorithm. We find that (in certain parameter regimes) AC is near-optimal regardless of the amount of external traffic, even though it does not know this amount a priori. Our analysis utilizes a path-based, pseudo-rewards approach, which we further generalize to settings where the platform can recommend a ranked set of opportunities. Beyond our theoretical results, we demonstrate the strong performance of AC in a case study motivated by VolunteerMatch data.

We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs (demands) realize sequentially and are possibly correlated. As one example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Emergency Management Agency faced overwhelming, temporally scattered, a priori uncertain, and correlated demands for medical supplies from different states. In such contexts, social planners aim to maximize the minimum fill rate across sequentially arriving agents, where each agent's fill rate is determined by an irrevocable, one-time allocation. For an arbitrarily correlated sequence of demands, we establish upper bounds on the expected minimum fill rate (ex-post fairness) and the minimum expected fill rate (ex-ante fairness) achievable by any policy. Our upper bounds are parameterized by the number of agents and the expected demand-to-supply ratio, yet we design a simple adaptive policy called projected proportional allocation (PPA) that simultaneously achieves matching lower bounds for both objectives (ex-post and ex-ante fairness), for any set of parameters. Our PPA policy is transparent and easy to implement, as it does not rely on distributional information beyond the first conditional moments. Despite its simplicity, we demonstrate that the PPA policy provides significant improvement over the canonical class of non-adaptive target-fill-rate policies. We complement our theoretical developments with a numerical study motivated by the rationing of COVID-19 medical supplies based on a standard SEIR modeling approach that is commonly used to forecast pandemic trajectories. In such a setting, our PPA policy significantly outperforms its theoretical guarantee as well as the optimal target-fill-rate policy.

Nonprofit crowdsourcing platforms such as food recovery organizations rely on volunteers to perform time-sensitive tasks. Thus, their success crucially depends on efficient volunteer utilization and engagement. To encourage volunteers to complete a task, platforms use nudging mechanisms to notify a subset of volunteers with the hope that at least one of them responds positively. However, since excessive notifications may reduce volunteer engagement, the platform faces a trade-off between notifying more volunteers for the current task and saving them for future ones. Motivated by these applications, we introduce the online volunteer notification problem, a generalization of online stochastic bipartite matching where tasks arrive following a known time-varying distribution over task types. Upon arrival of a task, the platform notifies a subset of volunteers with the objective of minimizing the number of missed tasks. To capture each volunteer's adverse reaction to excessive notifications, we assume that a notification triggers a random period of inactivity, during which she will ignore all notifications. However, if a volunteer is active and notified, she will perform the task with a given pair-specific match probability that captures her preference for the task. We develop two online randomized policies that achieve constant-factor guarantees which are close to the upper-bounds we establish for the performance of any online policy. Our policies as well as hardness results are parameterized by the minimum discrete hazard rate of the inter-activity time distribution. The design of our policies relies on two modifications of an ex-ante feasible solution: (1) properly scaling down the notification probability prescribed by the ex-ante solution, and (2) sparsifying that solution. Further, in collaboration with Food Rescue U.S., a volunteer-based food recovery platform, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our policies by testing them on the platform's data from various locations across the U.S.