EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yaru Zhao 0002
dblp:233/4833-2
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-4782-4571ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 67% Hardware security and side channels · 33% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Efficient and distributed learning · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning With Improved Personalization and Poison Rectification of Client Models · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning
privacy-preserving federated learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning With Improved Personalization and Poison Rectification of Client Models · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › federated learning defense
byzantine-robust federated learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning With Improved Personalization and Poison Rectification of Client Models · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning With Improved Personalization and Poison Rectification of Client Models · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning With Improved Personalization and Poison Rectification of Client Models · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
robust regression · 1.5personalized dual-layer training · 1.5clustering-based outlier filtering · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Shielding federated learning: mitigating label transferability against poisoning attacks in cloud-edge-client system
Yaru Zhao 0002, Yihao Cao, Jianbiao Zhang, Zhaoqian Zhang, Weiru Wang 0001 |
Expert Syst. Appl. | 1 |
| 2025 | MOFDRNet: A Model for Data Leakage Attacks in Federated LearningabstractABSTRACT Federated Learning allows multiple clients to train local models and aggregate them on the server side. The client is invisible to the shared global model generated by the server, which provides an opportunity for malicious attackers to utilize the inherent vulnerability of federated learning to initiate data leakage attacks. Existing attack techniques are largely client‐based and focus on inferring model parameters directly, but do not work for server‐based attacks, mainly due to differences in their ability to generalize attacks. Yet few robust data leakage attacks toward federated learning vulnerability have been developed on the server side. To address the above problem, we propose MOFDRNet, a Multi‐Objective Fake Data Regression Network model that integrates the loss function and multiple metrics strategies. The key idea is to deploy a malicious attack model on the server with the purpose of generating fake data and labels and continuously approximating the shared gradients between clients and the server, thereby recovering clients' private data. Experimental results demonstrate that the MOFDRNet model has significant advantages in implementing data leakage attacks. Finally, we also discuss the differential privacy defense approach in this study. Yaru Zhao 0002, Jianbiao Zhang, Yihao Cao, Xianqun Han |
Concurr. Comput. Pract. Exp. | 1 |
| 2024 | SRFL: A Secure & Robust Federated Learning framework for IoT with trusted execution environments
Yihao Cao, Jianbiao Zhang, Yaru Zhao 0002, Pengchong Su, Haoxiang Huang |
Expert Syst. Appl. | 3 |
| 2024 | FlexibleFL: Mitigating poisoning attacks with contributions in cloud-edge federated learning systems
Yaru Zhao 0002, Yihao Cao, Jianbiao Zhang, Haoxiang Huang |
Inf. Sci. | 1 |
| 2024 | Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning With Improved Personalization and Poison Rectification of Client ModelsabstractFederated Learning (FL), a secure and emerging distributed learning paradigm, has garnered significant interest in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain. However, it remains vulnerable to adversaries who may compromise privacy and integrity. Previous studies on privacy-preserving FL (PPFL) have demonstrated limitations in client model personalization and resistance to poisoning attacks, including Byzantine and backdoor attacks. In response, we propose a novel PPFL framework, FedRectify, that employs a personalized dual-layer approach through the deployment of Trusted Execution Environments and an interactive training strategy. This strategy facilitates the learning of personalized client features via private and shared layers. Furthermore, to improve model’s robustness to poisoning attacks, we introduce a novel aggregation method that employs clustering to filter out outlier model parameters and robust regression to assess the confidence of cluster members, thereby rectifying poisoned parameters. We theoretically prove the convergence of FedRectify and empirically validate its performance through extensive experiments. The results demonstrate that FedRectify converges 1.47-2.63 times faster than state-of-the-art methods when countering Byzantine attacks. Moreover, it can rapidly reduce the attack success rate to a low level between 10% and 40% in subsequent rounds when confronting bursty backdoor attacks. Yihao Cao, Jianbiao Zhang, Yaru Zhao 0002, Hong Shen 0001, Haoxiang Huang |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 3 |
| 2023 | Manipulating vulnerability: Poisoning attacks and countermeasures in federated cloud-edge-client learning for image classification
Yaru Zhao 0002, Jianbiao Zhang, Yihao Cao |
Knowl. Based Syst. | 1 |