Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions---where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm---as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at \url{https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure}.

We demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to **implicit meta-learning (IML)**: in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about the capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems.

To determine the safety of large language models (LLMs), AI developers must be able to assess their dangerous capabilities. But simple prompting strategies often fail to elicit an LLM’s full capabilities. One way to elicit capabilities more robustly is to fine-tune the LLM to complete the task. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which fine-tuning-based elicitation suffices to elicit capabilities. To do this, we introduce password-locked models, LLMs fine-tuned such that some of their capabilities are deliberately hidden. Specifically, these LLMs are trained to exhibit these capabilities only when a password is present in the prompt, and to imitate a much weaker LLM otherwise. Password-locked models enable a novel method of evaluating capabilities elicitation methods, by testing whether these password-locked capabilities can be elicited without using the password. We find that a few high-quality demonstrations are often sufficient to fully elicit password-locked capabilities. More surprisingly, fine-tuning can elicit other capabilities that have been locked using the same password, or even different passwords. Furthermore, when only evaluations, and not demonstrations, are available, approaches like reinforcement learning are still often able to elicit capabilities. Overall, our findings suggest that fine-tuning is an effective method of eliciting hidden capabilities of current models but may be unreliable when high-quality demonstrations are not available, e.g., as may be the case when models’ (hidden) capabilities exceed those of human demonstrators.

We provide the first formal definition of \textbf{reward hacking}, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function, $\mathcal{\tilde{R}}$, leads to poor performance according to the true reward function, $\mathcal{R}$. We say that a proxy is \textbf{unhackable} if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return.Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it ``narrower'') or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case.A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant.We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability.Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.