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Nitya Lakshmanan

dblp:239/4292 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
1 paper
Cellular and mobile networks · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cellular and mobile networks › multi-connectivity
carrier aggregation
0.512021
A Stealthy Location Identification Attack Exploiting Carrier Aggregation in Cellular Networks · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Privacy and data protection
location privacy
0.112021
A Stealthy Location Identification Attack Exploiting Carrier Aggregation in Cellular Networks · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 A Stealthy Location Identification Attack Exploiting Carrier Aggregation in Cellular Networks
Nitya Lakshmanan, Nishant Budhdev, Min Suk Kang, Mun Choon Chan, Jun Han 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1
2019 SurFi: detecting surveillance camera looping attacks with wi-fi channel state information
abstract
The proliferation of surveillance cameras has greatly improved the physical security of many security-critical properties including buildings, stores, and homes. However, recent surveillance camera looping attacks demonstrate new security threats --- adversaries can replay a seemingly benign video feed of a place of interest while trespassing or stealing valuables without getting caught. Unfortunately, such attacks are extremely difficult to detect in real-time due to cost and implementation constraints. In this paper, we propose SurFi to detect these attacks in real-time by utilizing commonly available Wi-Fi signals. In particular, we leverage that channel state information (CSI) from Wi-Fi signals also perceives human activities in the place of interest in addition to surveillance cameras. SurFi processes and correlates the live video feeds and the Wi-Fi CSI signals to detect any mismatches that would identify the presence of the surveillance camera looping attacks. SurFi does not require the deployment of additional infrastructure because Wi-Fi transceivers are easily found in the urban indoor environment. We design and implement the SurFi system and evaluate its effectiveness in detecting surveillance camera looping attacks. Our evaluation demonstrates that SurFi effectively identifies attacks with up to an attack detection accuracy of 98.8% and 0.1% false positive rate.
Nitya Lakshmanan, Inkyu Bang, Min Suk Kang, Jun Han 0001, Jong Taek Lee
WiSec1