The spread of malicious information is highly destructive to society. In this article, we propose a prediction model for malicious information dissemination based on user behavior analysis. We analyze the potential connection between users and malicious information and the implicit relationship between features. First, considering the complex relationship between users and malicious information, and the fact that knowledge learning can effectively capture this dynamic, this article proposes a method to represent the implicit connection between users and information as vectors, in which the Trans-H knowledge representation learning algorithm is used to map the implicit relationships between users and malicious information onto a low-dimensional relational plane, achieving vectorized representation. Second, considering the interactions between different user features, this article uses a behavioral analysis network to solve the problem of insufficient expression ability of users' original features. This network can be used to predict users' preforwarding behaviors. Finally, time slicing is introduced for the timeliness of malicious information, and the diffusion stage of information is discretized, while the behavioral analysis network is populated according to the user's preforwarding behavior, and a kind of information-user feature matrix is constructed. Then, combined with the convolutional neural network on local spatiotemporal features, this article proposes a prediction model TS-CNN. Experiments show that on publicly available benchmark datasets, comparative experiments with existing popular methods reveal that our approach achieves significant improvements in accuracy, recall, and F1-score, thereby validating the effectiveness of our proposed relationship modeling and optimization method. The model cannot only effectively predict users' dissemination behaviors for information but also more realistically reflect the hidden factors that drive users' dissemination.

Selling reserved instances (or virtual machines) is a basic service in cloud computing. In this paper, we consider a more flexible pricing model for instance reservation, in which a customer can propose the time length and number of resources of her request, while in today's industry, customers can only choose from several predefined reservation packages. Under this model, we design randomized mechanisms for customers coming online to optimize social welfare and providers' revenue. We first consider a simple case, where the requests from the customers do not vary too much in terms of both length and value density. We design a randomized mechanism that achieves a competitive ratio 1/42 for both social welfare and revenue, which is a improvement as there is usually no revenue guarantee in previous works such as (Azar et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2015. This ratio can be improved up to 1/11 when we impose a realistic constraint on the maximum number of resources used by each request. On the hardness side, we show an upper bound 1/3 on competitive ratio for any randomized mechanism.We then extend our mechanism to the general case and achieve a competitive ratio 1/42⌈log k⌉ log T for both social welfare and revenue, where T is the ratio of the maximum request length to the minimum request length and k is the ratio of the maximum request value density to the minimum request value density. This result outperforms the previous upper bound 1/CkT for deterministic mechanisms (Wang et al. 2015). We also prove an upper bound 2/log 8kT for any randomized mechanism. All the mechanisms we provide are in a greedy style. They are truthful and easy to be integrated into practical cloud systems.

This work concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms, and study the maximization of social welfare (i.e., the aggregated value of completed jobs) by competitive analysis. We first derive two lower bounds on the competitive ratio of any deterministic IC mechanism to characterize the landscape of our research: one bound is 5, which holds for equal-length jobs; the other bound is $\frac{\kappa}{\ln\kappa}+1-o(1)$, which holds for unequal-length jobs, where $\kappa$ is the maximum ratio between lengths of any two jobs. We then propose a deterministic IC mechanism and show that such a simple mechanism works very well for two models: (1) In the preemption-restart model, the mechanism can achieve the optimal competitive ratio of 5 for equal-length jobs and a near optimal ratio of $(\frac{1}{(1-\epsilon)^2}+o(1)) \frac{\kappa}{\ln\kappa}$ for unequal-length jobs, where $0<\epsilon<1$ is a small constant; (2) In the preemption-resume model, the mechanism can achieve the optimal competitive ratio of 5 for equal-length jobs and a near optimal competitive ratio (within factor 2) for unequal-length jobs.

Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT) is a popular machine learning algorithm, and has quite a few effective implementations such as XGBoost and pGBRT. Although many engineering optimizations have been adopted in these implementations, the efficiency and scalability are still unsatisfactory when the feature dimension is high and data size is large. A major reason is that for each feature, they need to scan all the data instances to estimate the information gain of all possible split points, which is very time consuming. To tackle this problem, we propose two novel techniques: \emph{Gradient-based One-Side Sampling} (GOSS) and \emph{Exclusive Feature Bundling} (EFB). With GOSS, we exclude a significant proportion of data instances with small gradients, and only use the rest to estimate the information gain. We prove that, since the data instances with larger gradients play a more important role in the computation of information gain, GOSS can obtain quite accurate estimation of the information gain with a much smaller data size. With EFB, we bundle mutually exclusive features (i.e., they rarely take nonzero values simultaneously), to reduce the number of features. We prove that finding the optimal bundling of exclusive features is NP-hard, but a greedy algorithm can achieve quite good approximation ratio (and thus can effectively reduce the number of features without hurting the accuracy of split point determination by much). We call our new GBDT implementation with GOSS and EFB \emph{LightGBM}. Our experiments on multiple public datasets show that, LightGBM speeds up the training process of conventional GBDT by up to over 20 times while achieving almost the same accuracy.

This paper concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms, and study the maximization of social welfare (i.e., the aggregated value of completed jobs) by competitive analysis. We first derive two lower bounds on the competitive ratio of any deterministic IC mechanism to characterize the landscape of our research. We then propose a deterministic IC mechanism and show that such a simple mechanism works very well for both the preemption-restart model and the preemption-resume model. We show the mechanism can achieve the optimal competitive ratio of 5 for equal-length jobs and a near optimal competitive ratio (within a constant factor) for unequal-length jobs.