A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting in a necessity to relax welfare efficiency and the use of approximation mechanisms. Such mechanisms in general make extensive use of the Bayesian priors. In this work, we investigate a question of increasing theoretical and practical importance: how much prior information is required to design mechanisms with near-optimal approximations?

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret minimization framework. At each time step, a new seller and buyer arrive, and the broker has to propose a mechanism that is incentivecompatible and individually rational, with the goal of maximizing profit. We propose a learning algorithm that guarantees a nearly tight regret in the stochastic setting when seller and buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed and possibly correlated unknown distribution. We further show that it is impossible to achieve sublinear regret in the non-stationary scenario where valuations are generated upfront by an adversary. Our ambitious benchmark for these results is the best incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism. This separates us from previous works on efficiency maximization in bilateral trade, where the benchmark is a single number: the best fixed price in hindsight. A particular challenge we face is that uniform convergence for all mechanisms’ profits is impossible. We overcome this difficulty via a careful chaining analysis that proves convergence for a provably near-optimal mechanism at (essentially) optimal rate. We further showcase the broader applicability of our techniques by providing nearly optimal results for the joint ads problem.

In the random-order model for online learning, the sequence of losses is chosen upfront by an adversary and presented to the learner after a random permutation. Any random-order input is *asymptotically* equivalent to a stochastic i.i.d.~one, but, for finite times, it may exhibit significant *non-stationarity*, which can hinder the performance of stochastic learning algorithms. While algorithms for adversarial inputs naturally maintain their regret guarantees in random order, simple no-regret algorithms exist for the stochastic model that fail against random-order instances. In this paper, we propose a general procedure to adapt stochastic learning algorithms to the random-order model without substantially affecting their regret guarantees. This allows us to recover improved regret bounds for prediction with delays, bandits with switching costs, and online learning with constraints. Finally, we investigate online classification and prove that, in random order, learnability is characterized by the VC dimension rather than by the Littlestone dimension, thus providing a further separation from the general adversarial model.

In this work, we study online submodular maximization and how the requirement of maintaining a stable solution impacts the approximation. In particular, we seek bounds on the best-possible approximation ratio that is attainable when the algorithm is allowed to make, at most, a constant number of updates per step. We show a tight information-theoretic bound of 2/3 for general monotone submodular functions and an improved (also tight) bound of 3/4 for coverage functions. Since both these bounds are attained by non poly-time algorithms, we also give a poly-time randomized algorithm that achieves a 0.51-approximation. Combined with an information-theoretic hardness of 1/2 for deterministic algorithms from prior work, our work thus shows a separation between deterministic and randomized algorithms, both information theoretically and for poly-time algorithms.

We study the deletion robust version of submodular maximization under matroid constraints. The goal is to extract a small-size summary of the data set that contains a high-value independent set even after an adversary deletes some elements. We present constant-factor approximation algorithms, whose space complexity depends on the rank $k$ of the matroid, the number $d$ of deleted elements, and the input precision $\varepsilon$. In the centralized setting we present a $(4.494+O(\varepsilon))$-approximation algorithm with summary size $O( \frac{k+d}{\varepsilon^2}\log \frac{k}{\varepsilon})$ that improves to a $(3.582+O(\varepsilon))$-approximation with $O(k + \frac{d}{\varepsilon^2}\log \frac{k}{\varepsilon})$ summary size when the objective is monotone. In the streaming setting we provide a $(9.294 + O(\varepsilon))$-approximation algorithm with summary size and memory $O(k + \frac{d}{\varepsilon^2}\log \frac{k}{\varepsilon})$; the approximation factor is then improved to $(5.582+O(\varepsilon))$ in the monotone case.

Maximizing monotone submodular functions under a matroid constraint is a classic algorithmic problem with multiple applications in data mining and machine learning. We study this significant problem in the fully dynamic setting, where elements can be both inserted and deleted in real-time. Our main result is a randomized algorithm that maintains an efficient data structure with an \({\tilde{O}(\frac{{k^{2}}}{{\varepsilon}})}\) amortized update time (in the number of insertions and deletions) and yields a \({(4+O(\varepsilon))}\) -approximate solution with respect to the dynamic optimum, where \(k\) is the rank of the matroid.

Pandora’s problem is a fundamental model that studies optimal search under costly inspection. In the classic version, there are n boxes, each associated with a known cost and a known distribution over values. A strategy inspects the boxes sequentially and obtains a utility that equals the difference between the maximum value of an inspected box and the total inspection cost. Weitzman (1979) presented a surprisingly simple strategy that obtains the optimal expected utility. In this work we introduce a new variant of Pandora’s problem in which every box is also associated with a publicly known deadline, indicating the final round by which its value may be chosen. This model captures many real-life scenarios where alternatives admit deadlines, such as candidate interviews and college admissions. Our main result is an efficient threshold-based strategy that achieves a constant approximation relative to the performance of the optimal strategy for the deadlines setting.

The bandits with knapsacks (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio $\alpha$ when $B=\Omega(T)$ or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{1/2})$ regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Maximizing monotone submodular functions under cardinality constraints is a classic optimization task with several applications in data mining and machine learning. In this paper, we study this problem in a dynamic environment with consistency constraints: elements arrive in a streaming fashion, and the goal is maintaining a constant approximation to the optimal solution while having a stable solution (i.e., the number of changes between two consecutive solutions is bounded). In this setting, we provide algorithms with different trade-offs between consistency and approximation quality. We also complement our theoretical results with an experimental analysis showing the effectiveness of our algorithms in real-world instances.

In online learning, a decision maker repeatedly selects one of a set of actions, with the goal of minimizing the overall loss incurred. Following the recent line of research on algorithms endowed with additional predictive features, we revisit this problem by allowing the decision maker to acquire additional information on the actions to be selected. In particular, we study the power of \emph{best-action queries}, which reveal beforehand the identity of the best action at a given time step. In practice, predictive features may be expensive, so we allow the decision maker to issue at most $k$ such queries. We establish tight bounds on the performance any algorithm can achieve when given access to $k$ best-action queries for different types of feedback models. In particular, we prove that in the full feedback model, $k$ queries are enough to achieve an optimal regret of $\Theta(\min\{\sqrt T, \frac{T}{k}\})$. This finding highlights the significant multiplicative advantage in the regret rate achievable with even a modest (sublinear) number $k \in \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ of queries. Additionally, we study the challenging setting in which the only available feedback is obtained during the time steps corresponding to the $k$ best-action queries. There, we provide a tight regret rate of $\Theta(\min\{\frac{T}{\sqrt k},\frac{T^2}{k^2}\})$, which improves over the standard $\Theta(\frac{T}{\sqrt k})$ regret rate for label efficient prediction for $k \in \Omega(T^{2/3})$.

We address a generalization of the bandit with knapsacks problem, where a learner aims to maximize rewards while satisfying an arbitrary set of long-term constraints. Our goal is to design best-of-both-worlds algorithms that perform optimally under both stochastic and adversarial constraints. Previous works address this problem via primal-dual methods, and require some stringent assumptions, namely the Slater's condition, and in adversarial settings, they either assume knowledge of a lower bound on the Slater's parameter, or impose strong requirements on the primal and dual regret minimizers such as requiring weak adaptivity. We propose an alternative and more natural approach based on optimistic estimations of the constraints. Surprisingly, we show that estimating the constraints with an UCB-like approach guarantees optimal performances. Our algorithm consists of two main components: (i) a regret minimizer working on moving strategy sets and (ii) an estimate of the feasible set as an optimistic weighted empirical mean of previous samples. The key challenge in this approach is designing adaptive weights that meet the different requirements for stochastic and adversarial constraints. Our algorithm is significantly simpler than previous approaches, and has a cleaner analysis. Moreover, ours is the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm providing bounds logarithmic in the number of constraints. Additionally, in stochastic settings, it provides $\widetilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret without Slater's condition.

Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively bid in an auction to advertise a product, and both benefit from the ad being shown. A mechanism collects bids from the two and decides whether to allocate and which payments the two parties should make. This gives rise to intricate incentive compatibility constraints, e.g., on how to split payments between the two parties. We approach the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible mechanism from an online learning perspective; this poses significant technical challenges. First, the action space (the class of all possible mechanisms) is huge; second, the function that maps mechanisms to revenue is highly irregular, ruling out standard discretization-based approaches.

Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents — a seller and a buyer — both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We study the online learning version of the problem, in which at each time step a new seller and buyer arrive and the learner has to set prices for them without any knowledge about their (adversarially generated) valuations.

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item’s value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction’s transparency, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed variants) on the environment generating the bidder’s valuations and competing bids. These minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.

We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely arbitrary ( i.e. , determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with private valuations for the good and the goal is to design a mechanism that maximizes efficiency (or gain from trade) while being incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced. In this paper we consider gain from trade, which is harder to approximate than social welfare. We consider a variety of feedback scenarios and distinguish the cases where the mechanism posts one price and when it can post different prices for buyer and seller. We show several surprising results about the separation between the different scenarios. In particular we show that (a) it is impossible to achieve sublinear α -regret for any α < 2 , (b) but with full feedback sublinear 2-regret is achievable; (c) with a single price and partial feedback one cannot get sublinear α regret for any constant α (d) nevertheless, posting two prices even with one-bit feedback achieves sublinear 2-regret, and (e) there is a provable separation in the 2-regret bounds between full and partial feedback.

Abstract We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive one by one in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated $$e/(e-1)$$ e / ( e - 1 ) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.

We study repeated bilateral trade where an adaptive $\sigma$-smooth adversary generates the valuations of sellers and buyers. We completely characterize the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms under different feedback models in the two cases where the learner can post the same or different prices to buyers and sellers. We begin by showing that, in the full-feedback scenario, the minimax regret after $T$ rounds is of order $\sqrt{T}$. Under partial feedback, any algorithm that has to post the same price to buyers and sellers suffers worst-case linear regret. However, when the learner can post two different prices at each round, we design an algorithm enjoying regret of order $T^{3/4}$, ignoring log factors. We prove that this rate is optimal by presenting a surprising $T^{3/4}$ lower bound, which is the paper's main technical contribution.

We study repeated bilateral trade where an adaptive $\sigma$-smooth adversary generates the valuations of sellers and buyers. We provide a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms under different feedback models in the two cases where the learner can post either the same or different prices to buyers and sellers.We begin by showing that the minimax regret after $T$ rounds is of order $\sqrt{T}$ in the full-feedback scenario. Under partial feedback, any algorithm that has to post the same price to buyers and sellers suffers worst-case linear regret. However, when the learner can post two different prices at each round, we design an algorithm enjoying regret of order $T^{3/4}$ ignoring log factors.We prove that this rate is optimal by presenting a surprising $T^{3/4}$ lower bound, which is the main technical contribution of the paper.

We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multiparameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive online in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated e/(e − 1) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.

Maximizing monotone submodular functions under a matroid constraint is a classic algorithmic problem with multiple applications in data mining and machine learning. We study this classic problem in the fully dynamic setting, where elements can be both inserted and deleted in real-time. Our main result is a randomized algorithm that maintains an efficient data structure with an $\tilde{O}(k^2)$ amortized update time (in the number of additions and deletions) and yields a $4$-approximate solution, where $k$ is the rank of the matroid.

Streaming submodular maximization is a natural model for the task of selecting a representative subset from a large-scale dataset. If datapoints have sensitive attributes such as gender or race, it becomes important to enforce fairness to avoid bias and discrimination. This has spurred significant interest in developing fair machine learning algorithms. Recently, such algorithms have been developed for monotone submodular maximization under a cardinality constraint. In this paper, we study the natural generalization of this problem to a matroid constraint. We give streaming algorithms as well as impossibility results that provide trade-offs between efficiency, quality and fairness. We validate our findings empirically on a range of well-known real-world applications: exemplar-based clustering, movie recommendation, and maximum coverage in social networks.

Pandora's problem is a fundamental model in economics that studies optimal search strategies under costly inspection. In this paper we initiate the study of Pandora's problem with combinatorial costs, capturing many real-life scenarios where search cost is non-additive. Weitzman's celebrated algorithm [1979] establishes the remarkable result that, for additive costs, the optimal search strategy is non-adaptive and computationally feasible.

Maximizing a monotone submodular function is a fundamental task in machine learning. In this paper we study the deletion robust version of the problem under the classic matroids constraint. Here the goal is to extract a small size summary of the dataset that contains a high value independent set even after an adversary deleted some elements. We present constant-factor approximation algorithms, whose space complexity depends on the rank $k$ of the matroid and the number $d$ of deleted elements. In the centralized setting we present a $(3.582+O(\varepsilon))$-approximation algorithm with summary size $O(k + \frac{d}{\eps^2}\log \frac{k}{\eps})$. In the streaming setting we provide a $(5.582+O(\varepsilon))$-approximation algorithm with summary size and memory $O(k + \frac{d}{\eps^2}\log \frac{k}{\eps})$. We complement our theoretical results with an in-depth experimental analysis showing the effectiveness of our algorithms on real-world datasets.

We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely arbitrary ({\sl i.e.}, determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with private valuations for the good and the goal is to design a mechanism that maximizes efficiency (or gain from trade) while being incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced. In this paper we consider gain from trade which is harder to approximate than social welfare.We consider a variety of feedback scenarios and distinguish the cases where the mechanism posts one price and when it can post different prices for buyer and seller. We show several surprising results about the separation between the different scenarios. In particular we show that (a) it is impossible to achieve sublinear $\alpha$-regret for any $\alpha<2$, (b) but with full feedback sublinear $2$-regret is achievable (c) with a single price and partial feedback one cannot get sublinear $\alpha$ regret for any constant $\alpha$ (d) nevertheless, posting two prices even with one-bit feedback achieves sublinear $2$-regret, and (e) there is a provable separation in the $2$-regret bounds between full and partial feedback.

The framework of feedback graphs is a generalization of sequential decision-making with bandit or full information feedback. In this work, we study an extension where the directed feedback graph is stochastic, following a distribution similar to the classical Erdős-Rényi model. Specifically, in each round every edge in the graph is either realized or not with a distinct probability for each edge. We prove nearly optimal regret bounds of order $\min\bigl\{\min_{\varepsilon} \sqrt{(\alpha_\varepsilon/\varepsilon) T},\, \min_{\varepsilon} (\delta_\varepsilon/\varepsilon)^{1/3} T^{2/3}\bigr\}$ (ignoring logarithmic factors), where $\alpha_{\varepsilon}$ and $\delta_{\varepsilon}$ are graph-theoretic quantities measured on the support of the stochastic feedback graph $\mathcal{G}$ with edge probabilities thresholded at $\varepsilon$. Our result, which holds without any preliminary knowledge about $\mathcal{G}$, requires the learner to observe only the realized out-neighborhood of the chosen action. When the learner is allowed to observe the realization of the entire graph (but only the losses in the out-neighborhood of the chosen action), we derive a more efficient algorithm featuring a dependence on weighted versions of the independence and weak domination numbers that exhibits improved bounds for some special cases.

We study single-sample prophet inequalities (SSPIs), i.e., prophet inequalities where only a single sample from each prior distribution is available. Besides a direct, and optimal, SSPI for the basic single choice problem [Rubinstein et al., 2020], most existing SSPI results were obtained via an elegant, but inherently lossy reduction to order-oblivious secretary (OOS) policies [Azar et al., 2014]. Motivated by this discrepancy, we develop an intuitive and versatile greedy-based technique that yields SSPIs directly rather than through the reduction to OOSs. Our results can be seen as generalizing and unifying a number of existing results in the area of prophet and secretary problems. Our algorithms significantly improve on the competitive guarantees for a number of interesting scenarios (including general matching with edge arrivals, bipartite matching with vertex arrivals, and certain matroids), and capture new settings (such as budget additive combinatorial auctions). Complementing our algorithmic results, we also consider mechanism design variants. Finally, we analyze the power and limitations of different SSPI approaches by providing a partial converse to the reduction from SSPI to OOS given by Azar et al.

Abstract Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers revenue maximization in the online stochastic setting with non-preemptive jobs and a unit capacity server. One agent/job arrives at every time step, with parameters drawn from the underlying distribution. We design a posted-price mechanism which can be efficiently computed and is revenue-optimal in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent’s type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic, depending only on the length of the allotted time interval and on the earliest time the server is available. We also prove that the proposed pricing strategy is robust to imprecise knowledge of the job distribution and that a distribution learned from polynomially many samples is sufficient to obtain a near-optimal truthful pricing strategy.

Constrained submodular maximization problems encompass a wide variety of applications, including personalized recommendation, team formation, and revenue maximization via viral marketing. The massive instances occurring in modern-day applications can render existing algorithms prohibitively slow. Moreover, frequently those instances are also inherently stochastic. Focusing on these challenges, we revisit the classic problem of maximizing a (possibly non-monotone) submodular function subject to a knapsack constraint. We present a simple randomized greedy algorithm that achieves a 5.83-approximation and runs in O(n log n) time, i.e., at least a factor n faster than other state-of-the-art algorithms. The versatility of our approach allows us to further transfer it to a stochastic version of the problem. There, we obtain a (9 + ε)-approximation to the best adaptive policy, which is the first constant approximation for non-monotone objectives. Experimental evaluation of our algorithms showcases their improved performance on real and synthetic data.

The growing need to deal with massive instances motivates the design of algorithms balancing the quality of the solution with applicability. For the latter, an important measure is the \emph{adaptive complexity}, capturing the number of sequential rounds of parallel computation needed. In this work we obtain the first \emph{constant factor} approximation algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint with \emph{near-optimal} $O(\log n)$ adaptive complexity. Low adaptivity by itself, however, is not enough: one needs to account for the total number of function evaluations (or value queries) as well. Our algorithm asks $\tilde{O}(n^2)$ value queries, but can be modified to run with only $\tilde{O}(n)$ instead, while retaining a low adaptive complexity of $O(\log^2n)$. Besides the above improvement in adaptivity, this is also the first \emph{combinatorial} approach with sublinear adaptive complexity for the problem and yields algorithms comparable to the state-of-the-art even for the special cases of cardinality constraints or monotone objectives. Finally, we showcase our algorithms’ applicability on real-world datasets.

We study the problem of online multiclass classification in a setting where the learner's feedback is determined by an arbitrary directed graph. While including bandit feedback as a special case, feedback graphs allow a much richer set of applications, including filtering and label efficient classification.We introduce \textproc{Gappletron}, the first online multiclass algorithm that works with arbitrary feedback graphs. For this new algorithm,we prove surrogate regret bounds that hold, both in expectation and with high probability, for a large class of surrogate losses. Our bounds are of order $B\sqrt{\rho KT}$, where $B$ is the diameter of the prediction space, $K$ is the number of classes, $T$ is the time horizon, and $\rho$ is the domination number (a graph-theoretic parameter affecting the amount of exploration). In the full information case, we show that \textproc{Gappletron} achieves a constant surrogate regret of order $B^2K$. We also prove a general lower bound of order $\max\big\{B^2K,\sqrt{T}\big\}$ showing that our upper bounds are not significantly improvable. Experiments on synthetic data show that for various feedback graphs our algorithm is competitive against known baselines.

Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. Despite the simplicity of this problem, a classical result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) affirms the impossibility of designing a mechanism that is simultaneously efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced. This impossibility result fostered an intense investigation of meaningful trade-offs between these desired properties. Much work has focused on approximately efficient fixed-price mechanisms, e.g., Blumrosen and Dobzinski (2014, 2016), Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016), which have been shown to fully characterize strong budget balanced and ex-post individually rational direct revelation mechanisms. All these results, however, either assume some knowledge on the priors of the seller/buyer valuations, or black-box access to some samples of the distributions, as in Dütting et al. (2021). In this paper, we cast for the first time the bilateral trade problem in a regret minimization framework over T rounds of seller/buyer interactions, with no prior knowledge on their private valuations. Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms with different feedback models and private valuations, using as a benchmark the best fixed-price in hindsight. More precisely, we prove the following bounds on the regret ~Θ (√T) for full-feedback (i.e., direct revelation mechanisms); ~Θ(T2/3) for realistic feedback (i.e., posted-price mechanisms) and independent seller/buyer valuations with bounded densities; Θ(T) for realistic feedback and seller/buyer valuations with bounded densities; Θ(T) for realistic feedback and independent seller/buyer valuations; Θ(T) for the adversarial setting.

A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting in a necessity to relax welfare efficiency and the use of approximation mechanisms. Such mechanisms in general make extensive use of the Bayesian priors. In this work, we investigate a question of increasing theoretical and practical importance: how much prior information is required to design mechanisms with near-optimal approximations? Our first contribution is a more general impossibility result stating that no meaningful approximation is possible without any prior information, expanding the famous impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite. Our second contribution is that one single sample (one number per item), arguably a minimum-possible amount of prior information, from each seller distribution is sufficient for a large class of two-sided markets. We prove matching upper and lower bounds on the best approximation that can be obtained with one single sample for subadditive buyers and additive sellers, regardless of computational considerations. Our third contribution is the design of computationally efficient blackbox reductions that turn any one-sided mechanism into a two-sided mechanism with a small loss in the approximation, while using only one single sample from each seller. On the way, our blackbox-type mechanisms deliver several interesting positive results in their own right, often beating even the state of the art that uses full prior information.

Constrained submodular maximization problems encompass a wide variety of applications, including personalized recommendation, team formation, and revenue maximization via viral marketing. The massive instances occurring in modern-day applications can render existing algorithms prohibitively slow. Moreover, frequently those instances are also inherently stochastic. Focusing on these challenges, we revisit the classic problem of maximizing a (possibly non-monotone) submodular function subject to a knapsack constraint. We present a simple randomized greedy algorithm that achieves a $5.83$ approximation and runs in $O(n \log n)$ time, i.e., at least a factor $n$ faster than other state-of-the-art algorithms. The robustness of our approach allows us to further transfer it to a stochastic version of the problem. There, we obtain a 9-approximation to the best adaptive policy, which is the first constant approximation for non-monotone objectives. Experimental evaluation of our algorithms showcases their improved performance on real and synthetic data.

The Pandora's Box Problem, originally formalized by Weitzman in 1979, models selection from a set of options each with stochastic parameters, when evaluation (i.e. sampling) is costly. This includes, for example, the problem of hiring a skilled worker, where only one hire can be made, but the evaluation of each candidate is an expensive procedure.