The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time---known as decision-time planning---has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Minimum-entropy coupling (MEC)—the process of finding a joint distribution with minimum entropy for given marginals—has applications in areas such as causality and steganography. However, existing algorithms are either computationally intractable for large-support distributions or limited to specific distribution types and sensitive to hyperparameter choices. This work addresses these limitations by unifying a prior family of iterative MEC (IMEC) approaches into a generalized partition-based formalism. From this framework, we derive a novel IMEC algorithm called ARIMEC, capable of handling arbitrary discrete distributions, and introduce a method to make IMEC robust to suboptimal hyperparameter settings. These innovations facilitate the application of IMEC to high-throughput steganography with language models, among other settings.

An unaddressed challenge in multi-agent coordination is to enable AI agents to exploit the semantic relationships between the features of actions and the features of observations. Humans take advantage of these relationships in highly intuitive ways. For instance, in the absence of a shared language, we might point to the object we desire or hold up our fingers to indicate how many objects we want. To address this challenge, we investigate the effect of network architecture on the propensity of learning algorithms to exploit these semantic relationships. Across a procedurally generated coordination task, we find that attention-based architectures that jointly process a featurized representation of observations and actions have a better inductive bias for learning intuitive policies. Through fine-grained evaluation and scenario analysis, we show that the resulting policies are human-interpretable. Moreover, such agents coordinate with people without training on any human data.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem—thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

This work studies the design of neural networks that can process the weights or gradients of other neural networks, which we refer to as *neural functional networks* (NFNs). Despite a wide range of potential applications, including learned optimization, processing implicit neural representations, network editing, and policy evaluation, there are few unifying principles for designing effective architectures that process the weights of other networks. We approach the design of neural functionals through the lens of symmetry, in particular by focusing on the permutation symmetries that arise in the weights of deep feedforward networks because hidden layer neurons have no inherent order. We introduce a framework for building *permutation equivariant* neural functionals, whose architectures encode these symmetries as an inductive bias. The key building blocks of this framework are *NF-Layers* (neural functional layers) that we constrain to be permutation equivariant through an appropriate parameter sharing scheme. In our experiments, we find that permutation equivariant neural functionals are effective on a diverse set of tasks that require processing the weights of MLPs and CNNs, such as predicting classifier generalization, producing "winning ticket" sparsity masks for initializations, and classifying or editing implicit neural representations (INRs). In addition, we provide code for our models and experiments at https://github.com/AllanYangZhou/nfn.

The recent success of neural networks as implicit representation of data has driven growing interest in neural functionals: models that can process other neural networks as input by operating directly over their weight spaces. Nevertheless, constructing expressive and efficient neural functional architectures that can handle high-dimensional weight-space objects remains challenging. This paper uses the attention mechanism to define a novel set of permutation equivariant weight-space layers and composes them into deep equivariant models called neural functional Transformers (NFTs). NFTs respect weight-space permutation symmetries while incorporating the advantages of attention, which have exhibited remarkable success across multiple domains. In experiments processing the weights of feedforward MLPs and CNNs, we find that NFTs match or exceed the performance of prior weight-space methods. We also leverage NFTs to develop Inr2Array, a novel method for computing permutation invariant latent representations from the weights of implicit neural representations (INRs). Our proposed method improves INR classification accuracy by up to $+17\\%$ over existing methods. We provide an implementation of our layers at https://github.com/AllanYangZhou/nfn.

We consider the problem of communicating exogenous information by means of Markov decision process trajectories. This setting, which we call a Markov coding game (MCG), generalizes both source coding and a large class of referential games. MCGs also isolate a problem that is important in decentralized control settings in which cheap-talk is not available—namely, they require balancing communication with the associated cost of communicating. We contribute a theoretically grounded approach to MCGs based on maximum entropy reinforcement learning and minimum entropy coupling that we call MEME. Due to recent breakthroughs in approximation algorithms for minimum entropy coupling, MEME is not merely a theoretical algorithm, but can be applied to practical settings. Empirically, we show both that MEME is able to outperform a strong baseline on small MCGs and that MEME is able to achieve strong performance on extremely large MCGs. To the latter point, we demonstrate that MEME is able to losslessly communicate binary images via trajectories of Cartpole and Pong, while simultaneously achieving the maximal or near maximal expected returns, and that it is even capable of performing well in the presence of actuator noise.

Zero-shot coordination (ZSC) evaluates an algorithm by the performance of a team of agents that were trained independently under that algorithm. Off-belief learning (OBL) is a recent method that achieves state-of-the-art results in ZSC in the game Hanabi. However, the implementation of OBL relies on a belief model that experiences covariate shift. Moreover, during ad-hoc coordination, OBL or any other neural policy may experience test-time covariate shift. We present two methods addressing these issues. The first method, off-team belief learning (OTBL), attempts to improve the accuracy of the belief model of a target policy πT on a broader range of inputs by weighting trajectories approximately according to the distribution induced by a different policy πb. The second, off-team off-belief learning (OT-OBL), attempts to compute an OBL equilibrium, where fixed point error is weighted according to the distribution induced by cross-play between the training policy π and a different fixed policy πb instead of self-play of π. We investigate these methods in variants of Hanabi.

Fully cooperative, partially observable multi-agent problems are ubiquitous in the real world. In this paper, we focus on a specific subclass of coordination problems in which humans are able to discover self-explaining deviations (SEDs). SEDs are actions that deviate from the common understanding of what reasonable behavior would be in normal circumstances. They are taken with the intention of causing another agent or other agents to realize, using theory of mind, that the circumstance must be abnormal. We motivate this idea with a real world example and formalize its definition. Next, we introduce an algorithm for improvement maximizing SEDs (IMPROVISED). Lastly, we evaluate IMPROVISED both in an illustrative toy setting and the popular benchmark setting Hanabi, where we show that it can produce so called finesse plays.

For artificially intelligent learning systems to have widespread applicability in real-world settings, it is important that they be able to operate decentrally. Unfortunately, decentralized control is difficult---computing even an epsilon-optimal joint policy is a NEXP complete problem. Nevertheless, a recently rediscovered insight---that a team of agents can coordinate via common knowledge---has given rise to algorithms capable of finding optimal joint policies in small common-payoff games. The Bayesian action decoder (BAD) leverages this insight and deep reinforcement learning to scale to games as large as two-player Hanabi. However, the approximations it uses to do so prevent it from discovering optimal joint policies even in games small enough to brute force optimal solutions. This work proposes CAPI, a novel algorithm which, like BAD, combines common knowledge with deep reinforcement learning. However, unlike BAD, CAPI prioritizes the propensity to discover optimal joint policies over scalability. While this choice precludes CAPI from scaling to games as large as Hanabi, empirical results demonstrate that, on the games to which CAPI does scale, it is capable of discovering optimal joint policies even when other modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms are unable to do so.

Decision-time planning is the process of constructing a transient, local policy with the intent of using it to make the immediate decision. Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS), which has been leveraged to great success in Go, chess, shogi, Hex, Atari, and other settings, is perhaps the most celebrated decision-time planning algorithm. Unfortunately, in its original form, MCTS can degenerate to one-step search in domains with stochasticity. Progressive widening is one way to ameliorate this issue, but we argue that it possesses undesirable properties for some settings. In this work, we present a method, called abstraction refining, for extending MCTS to stochastic environments which, unlike progressive widening, leverages the geometry of the state space. We argue that leveraging the geometry of the space can offer advantages. To support this claim, we present a series of experimental examples in which abstraction refining outperforms progressive widening, given equal simulation budgets.

In model-based reinforcement learning, planning with an imperfect model of the environment has the potential to harm learning progress. But even when a model is imperfect, it may still contain information that is useful for planning. In this paper, we investigate the idea of using an imperfect model selectively. The agent should plan in parts of the state space where the model would be helpful but refrain from using the model where it would be harmful. An effective selective planning mechanism requires estimating predictive uncertainty, which arises out of aleatoric uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and model inadequacy, among other sources. Prior work has focused on parameter uncertainty for selective planning. In this work, we emphasize the importance of model inadequacy. We show that heteroscedastic regression can signal predictive uncertainty arising from model inadequacy that is complementary to that which is detected by methods designed for parameter uncertainty, indicating that considering both parameter uncertainty and model inadequacy may be a more promising direction for effective selective planning than either in isolation.

We present a novel approach for identifying approximate role-symmetric Nash equilibria in large simulation-based games. Our method uses neural networks to learn a mapping from mixed-strategy profiles to deviation payoffs—the expected values of playing pure-strategy deviations from those profiles. This learning can generalize from data about a tiny fraction of a game’s outcomes, permitting tractable analysis of exponentially large normal-form games. We give a procedure for iteratively refining the learned model with new data produced by sampling in the neighborhood of each candidate Nash equilibrium. Relative to the existing state of the art, deviation payoff learning dramatically simplifies the task of computing equilibria and more effectively addresses player asymmetries. We demonstrate empirically that deviation payoff learning identifies better approximate equilibria than previous methods and can handle more difficult settings, including games with many more players, strategies, and roles.

Accurate models of patient survival probabilities provide important information to clinicians prescribing care for life-threatening and terminal ailments. A recently developed class of models -- known as individual survival distributions (ISDs) -- produces patient-specific survival functions that offer greater descriptive power of patient outcomes than was previously possible. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, ISD models almost universally lack uncertainty quantification. In this paper we demonstrate that an existing method for estimating simultaneous prediction intervals from samples can easily be adapted for patient-specific survival curve analysis and yields accurate results. Furthermore, we introduce both a modification to the existing method and a novel method for estimating simultaneous prediction intervals and show that they offer competitive performance. It is worth emphasizing that these methods are not limited to survival analysis and can be applied in any context in which sampling the distribution of interest is tractable. Code is available at https://github.com/ssokota/spie.