Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities for social interaction and are increasingly being deployed in situations where they might engage with both human and artificial agents. These interactions represent a critical frontier for LLM-based agents, yet existing evaluation methods fail to measure how well these capabilities generalize to novel social situations. In this paper, we introduce a method for evaluating the ability of LLM-based agents to cooperate in zero-shot, mixed-motive environments using Concordia, a natural language multi-agent simulation environment. Our method measures general cooperative intelligence by testing an agent's ability to identify and exploit opportunities for mutual gain across diverse partners and contexts. We present empirical results from the NeurIPS 2024 Concordia Contest, where agents were evaluated on their ability to achieve mutual gains across a suite of diverse scenarios ranging from negotiation to collective action problems. Our findings reveal significant gaps between current agent capabilities and the robust generalization required for reliable cooperation, particularly in scenarios demanding persuasion and norm enforcement.

Multi-agent AI research promises a path to develop human-like and human-compatible intelligent technologies that complement the solipsistic view of other approaches, which mostly do not consider interactions between agents. Aiming to make progress in this direction, the Melting Pot contest 2023 focused on the problem of cooperation among interacting agents and challenged researchers to push the boundaries of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for mixed-motive games. The contest leveraged the Melting Pot environment suite to rigorously evaluate how well agents can adapt their cooperative skills to interact with novel partners in unforeseen situations. Unlike other reinforcement learning challenges, this challenge focused on social rather than environmental generalization. In particular, a population of agents performs well in Melting Pot when its component individuals are adept at finding ways to cooperate both with others in their population and with strangers. Thus Melting Pot measures cooperative intelligence.The contest attracted over 600 participants across 100+ teams globally and was a success on multiple fronts: (i) it contributed to our goal of pushing the frontiers of MARL towards building more cooperatively intelligent agents, evidenced by several submissions that outperformed established baselines; (ii) it attracted a diverse range of participants, from independent researchers to industry affiliates and academic labs, both with strong background and new interest in the area alike, broadening the field’s demographic and intellectual diversity; and (iii) analyzing the submitted agents provided important insights, highlighting areas for improvement in evaluating agents' cooperative intelligence. This paper summarizes the design aspects and results of the contest and explores the potential of Melting Pot as a benchmark for studying Cooperative AI. We further analyze the top solutions and conclude with a discussion on promising directions for future research.

The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner’s Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings. But inefficiencies due to private information have been neglected thus far in this literature, despite the fact that these problems are pervasive and might also be addressed by greater mutual transparency. In this work, we introduce a framework for commitment games with a new kind of conditional commitment device, which agents can use to conditionally disclose private information. We prove a folk theorem for this setting that provides sufficient conditions for ex post efficiency, and thus represents a model of ideal cooperation between agents without a third-party mediator. Further, extending previous work on program equilibrium, we develop an implementation of conditional information disclosure. We show that this implementation forms program ε-Bayesian Nash equilibria corresponding to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of these commitment games.