Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about others’ mental states, and higher-order ToM involves considering that others also possess their own ToM. Equipping large language model (LLM)-driven agents with ToM has long been considered to improve their coordination in multiagent collaborative tasks. However, we find that misaligned ToM orders—mismatches in the depth of ToM reasoning between agents—can lead to insufficient or excessive reasoning about others, thereby impairing their coordination. To address this issue, we design an adaptive ToM (A-ToM) agent, which can align in ToM orders with its partner. Based on prior interactions, the agent estimates the partner’s likely ToM order and leverages this estimation to predict the partner’s action, thereby facilitating behavioral coordination. We conduct empirical evaluations on four multi-agent coordination tasks: a repeated matrix game, two grid navigation tasks and an Overcooked task. The results validate our findings on ToM alignment and demonstrate the effectiveness of our AToM agent. Furthermore, we discuss the generalizability of our A-ToM to non-LLM-based agents, as well as what would diminish the importance of ToM alignment.

Understanding and predicting the behavior of large-scale multiagents in games remains a fundamental challenge in multiagent systems. This article examines the role of heterogeneity in equilibrium formation by analyzing how smooth regret matching drives a large number of heterogeneous agents with diverse initial policies toward unified behavior. By modeling the system state as a probability distribution of regrets and analyzing its evolution through the continuity equation, we uncover a key phenomenon in diverse multiagent settings: the variance of the regret distribution diminishes over time, leading to the disappearance of heterogeneity and the emergence of consensus among agents. This universal result enables us to prove convergence to quantal response equilibria in both competitive and cooperative multiagent settings. This work advances the theoretical understanding of multiagent learning and offers a novel perspective on equilibrium selection in diverse game-theoretic scenarios.

Developing a dynamical model for learning in games has attracted much recent interest. In stochastic games, agents need to make decisions in multiple states, and transitions between states, in turn, influence the dynamics of strategies. While previous works typically focus either on 2-agent stochastic games or on normal form games under an infinite-agent setting, we aim at formally modelling the learning dynamics in stochastic games under the infinite-agent setting. With a novel use of pair-approximation method, we develop a formal model for myopic Q-learning in stochastic games with symmetric state transition. We verify the descriptive power of our model (a partial differential equation) across various games through comparisons with agent-based simulation results. Based on our proposed model, we can gain qualitative and quantitative insights into the influence of transition probabilities on the dynamics of strategies. In particular, we illustrate that a careful design of transition probabilities can help players overcome the social dilemmas and promote cooperation, even if agents are myopic learners.

Understanding the learning dynamics in multiagent systems is an important and challenging task. Past research on multi-agent learning mostly focuses on two-agent settings. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which a population of infinitely many agents apply regret minimization in repeated symmetric games. We propose a new formal model based on the master equation approach in statistical physics to describe the evolutionary dynamics in the agent population. Our model takes the form of a partial differential equation, which describes how the probability distribution of regret evolves over time. Through experiments, we show that our theoretical results are consistent with the agent-based simulation results.