Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are the cornerstone of programmable cryptography. They enable (1) privacy-preserving and verifiable computation across blockchains, and (2) an expanding range of off-chain applications such as credential schemes. Zero-knowledge virtual machines (zkVMs) lower the barrier by turning ZKPs into a drop-in backend for standard compilation pipelines. This lets developers write proof-generating programs in conventional languages (e.g., Rust or C++) instead of hand-crafting arithmetic circuits. However, these VMs inherit compiler infrastructures tuned for traditional architectures rather than for proof systems. In particular, standard compiler optimizations assume features that are absent in zkVMs, including cache locality, branch prediction, or instruction-level parallelism. Therefore, their impact on proof generation is questionable.

Blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum have revolutionized digital transactions, yet scalability issues persist. Layer 2 solutions, such as validity proof Rollups (ZK-Rollups), aim to address these challenges by processing transactions off-chain and validating them on the main chain. However, concerns remain about security and censorship resistance, particularly regarding centralized control in Layer 2 and inadequate mechanisms for enforcing these properties through Layer 1 smart contracts. In their current form, L2s are susceptible to multisig attacks that can lead to total user funds loss. This work presents a formal analysis using the Alloy specification language to examine and design key Layer 2 functionalities, including forced transaction queues, safe blacklisting, and upgradeability. Through this analysis, we identify pitfalls in existing designs and introduce an enhanced model that has been model-checked to be correct. Finally, we propose a complete end-to-end methodology to analyze rollups' security and censorship resistance based on manually translating Alloy properties to property-based testing invariants, setting new standards.

The growth of the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem built on blockchain technology and smart contracts has led to an increased demand for secure and reliable smart contract development. However, attacks targeting smart contracts are increasing, causing an estimated $6.45 billion in financial losses. Researchers have proposed various automated security tools to detect vulnerabilities, but their real-world impact remains uncertain.

We introduce a novel approach for testing static typing implementations based on the concept of API-driven program synthesis . The idea is to synthesize type-intensive but small and well-typed programs by leveraging and combining application programming interfaces (APIs) derived from existing software libraries. Our primary insight is backed up by real-world evidence: a significant number of compiler typing bugs are caused by small test cases that employ APIs from the standard library of the language under test. This is attributed to the inherent complexity of the majority of these APIs, which often exercise a wide range of sophisticated type-related features. The main contribution of our approach is the ability to produce small client programs with increased feature coverage, without bearing the burden of generating the corresponding well-formed API definitions from scratch. To validate diverse aspects of static typing procedures (i.e., soundness, precision of type inference), we also enrich our API-driven approach with fault-injection and semantics-preserving modes, along with their corresponding test oracles. We evaluate our implemented tool, thalia , on testing the static typing implementations of the compilers for three popular languages, namely, Scala, Kotlin, and Groovy. thalia has uncovered 84 typing bugs (77 confirmed and 22 fixed), most of which are triggered by test cases featuring APIs that rely on parametric polymorphism, overloading, and higher-order functions. Our comparison with state-of-the-art shows that thalia yields test programs with distinct characteristics, offering additional and complementary benefits.

Within just four years, the blockchain-based Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystem has accumulated a peak total value locked (TVL) of more than 253 billion USD. This surge in DeFi’s popularity has, unfortunately, been accompanied by many impactful incidents. According to our data, users, liquidity providers, speculators, and protocol operators suffered a total loss of at least 3.24 billion USD from Apr 30, 2018 to Apr 30, 2022. Given the blockchain’s transparency and increasing incident frequency, two questions arise: How can we systematically measure, evaluate, and compare DeFi incidents? How can we learn from past attacks to strengthen DeFi security?In this paper, we introduce a common reference frame to systematically evaluate and compare DeFi incidents, including both attacks and accidents. We investigate 77 academic papers, 30 audit reports, and 181 real-world incidents. Our data reveals several gaps between academia and the practitioners’ community. For example, few academic papers address "price oracle attacks" and "permissonless interactions", while our data suggests that they are the two most frequent incident types (15% and 10.5% correspondingly). We also investigate potential defenses, and find that: (i) 103 (56%) of the attacks are not executed atomically, granting a rescue time frame for defenders; (ii) bytecode similarity analysis can at least detect 31 vulnerable/23 adversarial contracts; and (iii) 33 (15.3%) of the adversaries leak potentially identifiable information by interacting with centralized exchanges.

Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) mixers are one of the most widely-used blockchain privacy solutions, operating on top of smart contract-enabled blockchains. We find that ZKP mixers are tightly intertwined with the growing number of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) attacks and Blockchain Extractable Value (BEV) extractions. Through coin flow tracing, we discover that 205 blockchain attackers and 2, 595 BEV extractors leverage mixers as their source of funds, while depositing a total attack revenue of 412.87M USD. Moreover, the US OFAC sanctions against the largest ZKP mixer, Tornado.Cash, have reduced the mixer’s daily deposits by more than .

We propose a testing framework for validating static typing procedures in compilers. Our core component is a program generator suitably crafted for producing programs that are likely to trigger typing compiler bugs. One of our main contributions is that our program generator gives rise to transformation-based compiler testing for finding typing bugs. We present two novel approaches (type erasure mutation and type overwriting mutation) that apply targeted transformations to an input program to reveal type inference and soundness compiler bugs respectively. Both approaches are guided by an intra-procedural type inference analysis used to capture type information flow.

The Solidity programming language is the most widely used language for smart contract development. Improving smart contracts’ correctness, security, and performance has been the driving force for research in vulnerability detection, program analysis, and compiler techniques for Solidity. Similar to system-level languages such as C, Solidity enables the embedding of low-level code in programs, in the form of inline assembly code. Developers use inline assembly for low-level optimizations, extending the Solidity language through libraries, and using blockchain-specific opcodes only available through inline assembly. Nevertheless, inline assembly fragments are not well understood by an average developer and can introduce security threats as well as affect the optimizations that can be applied to programs by the compiler; it also significantly limits the effectiveness of source code static analyzers that operate on the Solidity level. A better understanding of how inline assembly is used in practice could in turn increase the performance, security, and support for inline assembly in Solidity. This paper presents a large-scale quantitative study of the use of inline assembly in 6.8M smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. We find that 23% of the analyzed smart contracts contain inline assembly code, and that the use of inline assembly has become more widespread over time. We further performed a manual qualitative analysis for identifying usage patterns of inline assembly in Solidity smart contracts. Our findings are intended to help practitioners understand when they should use inline assembly and guide developers of Solidity tools in prioritizing which parts of inline assembly to implement first. Finally, the insights of this study could be used to enhance the Solidity language, improve the Solidity compiler, and to open up new research directions by driving future researchers to build appropriate methods and techniques for replacing inline assembly in Solidity programs when there is no real necessity to use it.

We introduce, what is to the best of our knowledge, the first approach for systematically testing Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) systems. Our approach leverages differential testing to establish a test oracle for ORM-specific bugs. Specifically, we first generate random relational database schemas, set up the respective databases, and then, we query these databases using the APIs of the ORM systems under test. To tackle the challenge that ORMs lack a common input language, we generate queries written in an abstract query language. These abstract queries are translated into concrete, executable ORM queries, which are ultimately used to differentially test the correctness of target implementations. The effectiveness of our method heavily relies on the data inserted to the underlying databases. Therefore, we employ a solver-based approach for producing targeted database records with respect to the constraints of the generated queries. We implement our approach as a tool, called CYNTHIA, which found 28 bugs in five popular ORM systems. The vast majority of these bugs are confirmed (25 / 28), more than half were fixed (20 / 28), and three were marked as release blockers by the corresponding developers.

Despite the substantial progress in compiler testing, research endeavors have mainly focused on detecting compiler crashes and subtle miscompilations caused by bugs in the implementation of compiler optimizations. Surprisingly, this growing body of work neglects other compiler components, most notably the front-end. In statically-typed programming languages with rich and expressive type systems and modern features, such as type inference or a mix of object-oriented with functional programming features, the process of static typing in compiler front-ends is complicated by a high-density of bugs. Such bugs can lead to the acceptance of incorrect programs (breaking code portability or the type system's soundness), the rejection of correct (e.g. well-typed) programs, and the reporting of misleading errors and warnings. We conduct, what is to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical study for understanding and characterizing typing-related compiler bugs. To do so, we manually study 320 typing-related bugs (along with their fixes and test cases) that are randomly sampled from four mainstream JVM languages, namely Java, Scala, Kotlin, and Groovy. We evaluate each bug in terms of several aspects, including their symptom, root cause, bug fix's size, and the characteristics of the bug-revealing test cases. Some representative observations indicate that: (1) more than half of the typing-related bugs manifest as unexpected compile-time errors: the buggy compiler wrongly rejects semantically correct programs, (2) the majority of typing-related bugs lie in the implementations of the underlying type systems and in other core components related to operations on types, (3) parametric polymorphism is the most pervasive feature in the corresponding test cases, (4) one third of typing-related bugs are triggered by non-compilable programs. We believe that our study opens up a new research direction by driving future researchers to build appropriate methods and techniques for a more holistic testing of compilers.

Incremental and parallel builds are crucial features of modern build systems. Parallelism enables fast builds by running independent tasks simultaneously, while incrementality saves time and computing resources by processing the build operations that were affected by a particular code change. Writing build definitions that lead to error-free incremental and parallel builds is a challenging task. This is mainly because developers are often unable to predict the effects of build operations on the file system and how different build operations interact with each other. Faulty build scripts may seriously degrade the reliability of automated builds, as they cause build failures, and non-deterministic and incorrect outputs. To reason about arbitrary build executions, we present BuildFS, a generally-applicable model that takes into account the specification (as declared in build scripts) and the actual behavior (low-level file system operation) of build operations. We then formally define different types of faults related to incremental and parallel builds in terms of the conditions under which a file system operation violates the specification of a build operation. Our testing approach, which relies on the proposed model, analyzes the execution of single full build, translates it into BuildFS, and uncovers faults by checking for corresponding violations. We evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, and applicability of our approach by examining 612 Make and Gradle projects. Notably, thanks to our treatment of build executions, our method is the first to handle JVM-oriented build systems. The results indicate that our approach is (1) able to uncover several important issues (247 issues found in 47 open-source projects have been confirmed and fixed by the upstream developers), and (2) much faster than a state-of-the-art tool for Make builds (the median and average speedup is 39X and 74X respectively).