How hard is it to achieve consensus in a social network under uncertainty? In this paper we model this problem as a social graph of agents where each vertex is initially colored red or blue. The goal of the agents is to achieve consensus, which is when the colors of all agents align. Agents attempt to do this locally through steps in which an agent changes their color to the color of the majority of their neighbors. In real life, agents may not know exactly how many of their neighbors are red or blue, which introduces uncertainty into this process. Modeling uncertainty as perturbations of relative magnitude $1+\varepsilon$ to these color neighbor counts, we show that even small values of $\varepsilon$ greatly hinder the ability to achieve consensus in a social network. We prove theoretically tight upper and lower bounds on the price of uncertainty, a metric defined in previous work by Balcan et al. to quantify the effect of uncertainty in network games.

Machine learning is now ubiquitous in societal decision-making, for example in evaluating job candidates or loan applications, and it is increasingly important to take into account how classified agents will react to the learning algorithms. The majority of recent literature on strategic classification has focused on reducing and countering deceptive behaviors by the classified agents, but recent work of Attias et al. identifies surprising properties of learnability when the agents genuinely improve in order to attain the desirable classification, such as smaller generalization error than standard PAC-learning. In this paper we characterize so-called learnability with improvements across multiple new axes. We introduce an asymmetric variant of minimally consistent concept classes and use it to provide an exact characterization of proper learning with improvements in the realizable setting. While prior work studies learnability only under general, arbitrary agent improvement regions, we give positive results for more natural Euclidean ball improvement sets. In particular, we characterize improper learning under a generative assumption on the data distribution. We further show how to learn in more challenging settings, achieving lower generalization error under well-studied bounded noise models and obtaining mistake bounds in realizable and agnostic online learning. We resolve open questions posed by Attias et al. for both proper and improper learning.

Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of actions that lead to different distributions over outcomes. We focus on a setting in which the seller has the ability to commit to an action and the buyer is free to accept or reject the outcome after seeing its realized quality. Our model is related to Mussa and Rosen's classic paper on selling products of differing qualities and monopolist lottery pricing, as well as recent work on selling hidden actions.

There has been a flurry of recent literature studying streaming algorithms for which the input stream is chosen adaptively by a black-box adversary who observes the output of the streaming algorithm at each time step. However, these algorithms fail when the adversary has access to the internal state of the algorithm, rather than just the output of the algorithm.