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Alexander Vlasov

dblp:249/0621 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 67% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 33%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic foundations › cryptographic commitments
polynomial commitment
0.612022
RedShift: Transparent SNARKs from List Polynomial Commitments · CCS 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs › succinct arguments
transparent zk-SNARKs
0.612022
RedShift: Transparent SNARKs from List Polynomial Commitments · CCS 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.612022
RedShift: Transparent SNARKs from List Polynomial Commitments · CCS 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

polynomial commitment · 0.6IOP · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 RedShift: Transparent SNARKs from List Polynomial Commitments
abstract
We introduce an efficient transformation from univariate polynomial commitment based zk-SNARKs to their transparent counterparts. The transformation is achieved with the help of a new IOP primitive which we call a list polynomial commitment. This primitive is applicable for preprocessing zk-SNARKs over both prime and binary fields. We present the primitive itself along with a soundness analysis of the transformation and instantiate it with an existing universal proof system. We also present benchmarks for a proof of concept implementation alongside a comparison with the current non-transparent state-of-the-art. Our results show competitive efficiency both in terms of proof size and generation times. At the 80-bit security level, our benchmarks provide proof generation times of about a minute and proof sizes of around 515 KB for a circuit with one million gates.
Assimakis Kattis, Konstantin Panarin, Alexander Vlasov
CCS3