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Bin-Chou Kao

dblp:249/3007 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Embedded and real-time systems · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security
industrial control system security
0.412019
Towards Automated Safety Vetting of PLC Code in Real-World Plants · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Embedded and real-time systems
real-time system verification
0.412019
Towards Automated Safety Vetting of PLC Code in Real-World Plants · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019
Program analysis
static analysis
0.112019
Towards Automated Safety Vetting of PLC Code in Real-World Plants · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

temporal invariant mining · 1.1static program analysis · 1.1causality graph · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Towards Automated Safety Vetting of PLC Code in Real-World Plants
abstract
Safety violations in programmable logic controllers (PLCs), caused either by faults or attacks, have recently garnered significant attention. However, prior efforts at PLC code vetting suffer from many drawbacks. Static analyses and verification cause significant false positives and cannot reveal specific runtime contexts. Dynamic analyses and symbolic execution, on the other hand, fail due to their inability to handle real-world PLC programs that are event-driven and timing sensitive. In this paper, we propose VetPLC, a temporal context-aware, program analysis-based approach to produce timed event sequences that can be used for automatic safety vetting. To this end, we (a) perform static program analysis to create timed event causality graphs in order to understand causal relations among events in PLC code and (b) mine temporal invariants from data traces collected in Industrial Control System (ICS) testbeds to quantitatively gauge temporal dependencies that are constrained by machine operations. Our VetPLC prototype has been implemented in 15K lines of code. We evaluate it on 10 real-world scenarios from two different ICS settings. Our experiments show that VetPLC outperforms state-of-the-art techniques and can generate event sequences that can be used to automatically detect hidden safety violations.
Mu Zhang 0001, Chien-Ying Chen, Bin-Chou Kao, Yassine Qamsane, Yuru Shao, Yikai Lin, Elaine Shi, Sibin Mohan, Kira Barton, James R. Moyne, Z. Morley Mao
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy3