EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
C. Russel Szelag
dblp:25/1024
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1978
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Privacy and data protection · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Data models and query languages · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Data models and query languages
query inference |
0.0 | 1 | 1978 | Database Security · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1978 |
Privacy and data protection
inference attack |
0.0 | 1 | 1978 | Database Security · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1978 |
Privacy and data protection
statistical database privacy |
0.0 | 1 | 1978 | Database Security · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1978 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1978 | Database SecurityabstractDatabases may be compromised by asking a set of queries which return only statistical information and making inferences about a specific entry from the results of the set of queries. We present methods of constructing the set of queries to compromise a database where all the queries in the set return the maximum of a set of k elements, or all queries return the mean of a set of k elements. In the case of the mean query, all elements involved will be compromised. We also consider bounds on the number of queries required to compromise the database. George I. Davida, David J. Linton, C. Russel Szelag, David L. Wells |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 3 |