Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Galia Shabtai
dblp:25/3504
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0002-7309-4760ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
2 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Cloud and datacenter computing · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network optimization and economics · 100% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market equilibrium
competitive equilibrium |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Two-Price Equilibrium · AAAI 2022 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
market equilibrium |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Two-Price Equilibrium · AAAI 2022 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
social welfare |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Two-Price Equilibrium · AAAI 2022 |
Cloud and datacenter computing
resource management |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Risk Aware Stochastic Placement of Cloud Services · IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2021 |
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud service management
service placement |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Risk Aware Stochastic Placement of Cloud Services · IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
auction theory |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding · AAAI 2021 |
Network optimization and economics
resource allocation |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Risk Aware Stochastic Placement of Cloud Services · IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
stochastic optimization · 1.0simulation · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Two-Price EquilibriumabstractWalrasian equilibrium is a prominent market equilibrium notion, but rarely exists in markets with indivisible items. We introduce a new market equilibrium notion, called two-price equilibrium (2PE). A 2PE is a relaxation of Walrasian equilibrium, where instead of a single price per item, every item has two prices: one for the item's owner and a (possibly) higher one for all other buyers. Thus, a 2PE is given by a tuple (S,p_high,p_low) of an allocation S and two price vectors p_high,p_low, where every buyer i is maximally happy with her bundle S_i, given prices p_low for items in S_i and prices p_high for all other items. 2PE generalizes previous market equilibrium notions, such as conditional equilibrium, and is related to relaxed equilibrium notions like endowment equilibrium. We define the discrepancy of a 2PE --- a measure of distance from Walrasian equilibrium --- as the sum of differences p_high_j-p_low_j over all items (normalized by social welfare). We show that the social welfare degrades gracefully with the discrepancy; namely, the social welfare of a 2PE with discrepancy d is at least a fraction 1/d+1 of the optimal welfare. We use this to establish welfare guarantees for markets with subadditive valuations over identical items. In particular, we show that every such market admits a 2PE with at least 1/7 of the optimal welfare. This is in contrast to Walrasian equilibrium or conditional equilibrium which may not even exist. Our techniques provide new insights regarding valuation functions over identical items, which we also use to characterize instances that admit a WE. Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2021 | Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2021 | Risk Aware Stochastic Placement of Cloud ServicesabstractAllocating the right amount of resources to each service in any of the datacenters in a cloud environment is a very difficult task. This task becomes much harder due to the dynamic nature of the workload and the fact that while long term statistics about the demand may be known, it is impossible to predict the exact demand in each point in time. As a result, service providers either over allocate resources and hurt the service cost efficiency, or run into situation where the allocated local resources are insufficient to support the current demand. In these cases, the service providers deploy overflow mechanisms such as redirecting traffic to a remote datacenter or temporarily leasing additional resources (at a higher price) from the cloud infrastructure owner. The additional cost is in many cases proportional to the amount of overflow demand. In this paper we study this approach and develop a novel mechanism to assign services to datacenters based on the available resources in each datacenter and the distribution of the demand for each service. We use comprehensive analysis to prove that the overall overflow cost is almost optimal for arbitrary demand distributions, as long as there are no dependencies among the services. We further show, using simulation based on real data that the scheme performs very well on realistic service workloads. Galia Shabtai, Danny Raz, Yuval Shavitt |
IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. | 1 |
| 2018 | A Relaxed FPTAS for Chance-Constrained KnapsackabstractThe stochastic knapsack problem is a stochastic version of the well known deterministic knapsack problem, in which some of the input values are random variables. There are several variants of the stochastic problem. In this paper we concentrate on the chance-constrained variant, where item values are deterministic and item sizes are stochastic. The goal is to find a maximum value allocation subject to the constraint that the overflow probability is at most a given value. Previous work showed a PTAS for the problem for various distributions (Poisson, Exponential, Bernoulli and Normal). Some strictly respect the constraint and some relax the constraint by a factor of (1+epsilon). All algorithms use Omega(n^{1/epsilon}) time. A very recent work showed a "almost FPTAS" algorithm for Bernoulli distributions with O(poly(n) * quasipoly(1/epsilon)) time. In this paper we present a FPTAS for normal distributions with a solution that satisfies the chance constraint in a relaxed sense. The normal distribution is particularly important, because by the Berry-Esseen theorem, an algorithm solving the normal distribution also solves, under mild conditions, arbitrary independent distributions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first (relaxed or non-relaxed) FPTAS for the problem. In fact, our algorithm runs in poly(n/epsilon) time. We achieve the FPTAS by a delicate combination of previous techniques plus a new alternative solution to the non-heavy elements that is based on a non-convex program with a simple structure and an O(n^2 log {n/epsilon}) running time. We believe this part is also interesting on its own right. Galia Shabtai, Danny Raz, Yuval Shavitt |
ISAAC | 1 |