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Yuqiao Zhang

dblp:250/6082 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0001-7579-4923ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers
Emerging computing paradigms · 57% Integrated circuit design · 43%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › hardware obfuscation
integrated circuit camouflaging
0.612022
CamSkyGate: camouflaged skyrmion gates for protecting ICs · DAC 2022
Hardware security and side channels
counterfeit IC detection
0.412020
End-to-End Traceability of ICs in Component Supply Chain for Fighting Against Recycling · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020
Hardware security and side channels › intellectual property protection
reverse engineering protection
0.212022
CamSkyGate: camouflaged skyrmion gates for protecting ICs · DAC 2022
Internet of things and sensor networks
RFID systems
0.112020
End-to-End Traceability of ICs in Component Supply Chain for Fighting Against Recycling · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

chain of trust · 1.3RFID tagging · 1.3differential doping · 1.1SAT attack evaluation · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 CamSkyGate: camouflaged skyrmion gates for protecting ICs
abstract
Magnetic skyrmion has the potential to become one of the candidates for emerging technologies due to its ultra-high integration density and ultra-low energy. Skyrmion is a magnetic pattern created by transverse current injection in the ferromagnetic (FM) layer. A skyrmion can be generated by localized spin-polarized current and behaves like a stable pseudoparticle. Different logic gates have been proposed, where the presence or absence of a single skyrmion is represented as binary logic 1 or logic 0, respectively. In this paper, we propose novel camouflaged logic gate designs to prevent an adversary from extracting the original netlist. The proposal uses differential doping to block the propagation of the skyrmions to realize the camouflaged gates. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose camouflaged skyrmion gates to prevent an adversary from performing reverse engineering. We demonstrate the functionality of different camouflaged gates using the mumax3 micromagnetic simulator. We have also evaluated the security of the proposed camouflaged designs using SAT attacks. We show that the same security from the traditional CMOS-based camouflaged circuits can be retained.
Yuqiao Zhang, Chunli Tang, Ujjwal Guin
DAC1
2020 End-to-End Traceability of ICs in Component Supply Chain for Fighting Against Recycling
abstract
The rise of recycled integrated circuits (ICs) in the critical infrastructures causes a major concern to the government and industry because these chips exhibit lower performance and have shorter remaining useful life. The detection of these ICs becomes extremely challenging when they are in the supply chain. It is necessary to power up a chip at a distributor's site to measure different electrical parameters for verifying whether it is used before. However, this can be challenging, as many of the distributors may not be equipped with proper test infrastructures. Moreover, the reliability of authentic chips may be reduced if they have been removed from the packaging boxes for testing purposes. In this paper, we propose a robust and low-cost solution for enabling the traceability of an IC. The proposed solution builds a chain of trust among the manufacturer, distributors, and system integrator by enabling end-to-end traceability from manufacturing to system integration and provides protection against IC recycling. The proposed solution utilizes a small passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag, which needs to be placed on the package. Any entity in the supply chain can verify the authenticity of a chip using a commercial RFID reader.
Yuqiao Zhang, Ujjwal Guin
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.1