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Mario Gersbach

dblp:252/4276 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 61% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 39%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Programming languages and type systems · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
0.412019
zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts · CCS 2019
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › smart contract
privacy-preserving smart contracts
0.412019
zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts · CCS 2019
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.412019
zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts · CCS 2019
Programming languages and type systems › type systems › security type systems
information-flow type systems
0.412019
zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts · CCS 2019
Programming languages and type systems
type systems
0.412019
zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts · CCS 2019
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
smart contract security
0.112019
zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts · CCS 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

static type checking · 0.8program transformation · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 zkay: Specifying and Enforcing Data Privacy in Smart Contracts
abstract
Privacy concerns of smart contracts are a major roadblock preventing their wider adoption. A promising approach to protect private data is hiding it with cryptographic primitives and then enforcing correctness of state updates by Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proofs. Unfortunately, NIZK statements are less expressive than smart contracts, forcing developers to keep some functionality in the contract. This results in scattered logic, split across contract code and NIZK statements, with unclear privacy guarantees. To address these problems, we present the zkay language, which introduces privacy types defining owners of private values. zkay contracts are statically type checked to (i) ensure they are realizable using NIZK proofs and (ii) prevent unintended information leaks. Moreover, the logic of zkay contracts is easy to follow by just ignoring privacy types. To enforce zkay contracts, we automatically transform them into contracts equivalent in terms of privacy and functionality, yet executable on public blockchains. We evaluated our approach on a proof-of-concept implementation generating Solidity contracts and implemented 10 interesting example contracts in zkay. Our results indicate that zkay is practical: On-chain cost for executing the transformed contracts is around 1M gas per transaction (~0.50US$) and off-chain cost is moderate.
Samuel Steffen, Benjamin Bichsel, Mario Gersbach, Noa Melchior, Petar Tsankov, Martin T. Vechev
CCS3