Natural language processing (NLP) models are widely used in various scenarios, yet they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Existing works aim to mitigate this vulnerability, but each work targets a specific attack category or has computational overhead limitations, making them vulnerable to adaptive attacks. In this paper, we exhaustively investigate the adversarial attack algorithms in NLP and discover that existing attack algorithms mainly disrupt the importance distribution of words in a text. A well-trained model can distinguish subtle importance distribution differences between clean and adversarial texts. Based on this intuition, we propose TextDefense, a new adversarial example detection framework that utilizes the target model’s capability to defend against adversarial attacks, requiring no prior knowledge. Unlike previous approaches, TextDefense is attack-type agnostic and outperforms existing methods in experiments with different architectures, datasets, and attack methods. We also discover that the target model’s generalizability is a leading factor influencing the performance of TextDefense. Finally, we provide insights into the adversarial attacks in NLP and the principles of our defense method by analyzing the properties of the target model and the adversarial example.

Transformers based on attention mechanisms exhibit vulnerability to adversarial examples, posing a substantial threat to the security of their applications. Aiming to solve this problem, the concept of robustness certification is introduced to formally ascertain the presence of any adversarial example within a specified region surrounding a given sample. However, prior works have neglected the dependencies among inputs of softmax (the most complex function in attention mechanisms) during linear relaxations. This oversight has consequently led to imprecise certification results. In this work, we introduce GaLileo, a general linear relaxation framework designed to certify the robustness of Transformers. GaLileo effectively surmounts the trade-off between precision and efficiency in robustness certification through our innovative n-dimensional relaxation approach. Notably, our relaxation technique represents a pioneering effort as the first linear relaxation for n-dimensional functions such as softmax. Our novel approach successfully transcends the challenges posed by the curse of dimensionality inherent in linear relaxations, thereby enhancing linear bounds by incorporating input dependencies. Our evaluations encompassed a thorough analysis utilizing the SST and Yelp datasets along with diverse Transformers of different depths and widths. The experimental results demonstrate that, as compared to the baseline method CROWN-BaF, GaLileo achieves up to 3.24 times larger certified radii while requiring similar running times. Additionally, GaLileo successfully attains certification for Transformers' robustness against multi-word lp perturbations, marking a notable accomplishment in this field.

Certifiable robustness, the functionality of verifying whether the given region surrounding a data point admits any adversarial example, provides guaranteed security for neural networks deployed in adversarial environments. A plethora of work has been proposed to certify the robustness of feed-forward networks, e.g., FCNs and CNNs. Yet, most existing methods cannot be directly applied to recurrent neural networks (RNNs), due to their sequential inputs and unique operations.

Pre-trained general-purpose language models have been a dominating component in enabling real-world natural language processing (NLP) applications. However, a pre-trained model with backdoor can be a severe threat to the applications. Most existing backdoor attacks in NLP are conducted in the fine-tuning phase by introducing malicious triggers in the targeted class, thus relying greatly on the prior knowledge of the fine-tuning task. In this paper, we propose a new approach to map the inputs containing triggers directly to a predefined output representation of the pre-trained NLP models, e.g., a predefined output representation for the classification token in BERT, instead of a target label. It can thus introduce backdoor to a wide range of downstream tasks without any prior knowledge. Additionally, in light of the unique properties of triggers in NLP, we propose two new metrics to measure the performance of backdoor attacks in terms of both effectiveness and stealthiness. Our experiments with various types of triggers show that our method is widely applicable to different fine-tuning tasks (classification and named entity recognition) and to different models (such as BERT, XLNet, BART), which poses a severe threat. Furthermore, by collaborating with the popular online model repository Hugging Face, the threat brought by our method has been confirmed. Finally, we analyze the factors that may affect the attack performance and share insights on the causes of the success of our backdoor attack.