In the course of playing or solving a game, it is common to face a series of changing other-agent strategies. These strategies often share elements: the set of possible policies to play has overlap, and the policies are sampled at the beginning of play by possibly differing distributions. As it faces the series of strategies, therefore, an agent has the opportunity to transfer its learned play against the previously encountered other-agent policies. We tackle two problems: (1) how can learned responses transfer across changing opponent strategies, and (2) how can this transfer be used to reduced the cumulative cost of learning in game solving. The first problem we characterize as the strategic knowledge transfer problem. For value-based response policies, we demonstrate that Q-Mixing approximately solves this problem by appropriately averaging the component Q-values. Solutions to the first problem can be applied to reduce the computational cost of learning-based game solving algorithms. We offer two algorithms that operate within the Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework. Mixed-Oracles reduces the per-policy construction cost by transferring responses from previously encountered opponents. Mixed-Opponents performs strategic knowledge transfer by combining the previously encountered opponents into a single novel policy. Experimental evaluation of these methods on general-sum grid-world games provide evidence about their advantages and limitations in comparison to standard PSRO.

Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or non-deterministic time to converge, and could fail. We introduce the Neural Equilibrium Solver which utilizes a special equivariant neural network architecture to approximately solve the space of all games of fixed shape, buying speed and determinism. We define a flexible equilibrium selection framework, that is capable of uniquely selecting an equilibrium that minimizes relative entropy, or maximizes welfare. The network is trained without needing to generate any supervised training data. We show remarkable zero-shot generalization to larger games. We argue that such a network is a powerful component for many possible multiagent algorithms.

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincar{é} recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect information games and other sequential game settings. We then investigate how adapting the reward (by adding a regularization term) of the game can give strong convergence guarantees in monotone games. We continue by showing how this reward adaptation technique can be leveraged to build algorithms that converge exactly to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how these insights can be directly used to build state-of-the-art model-free algorithms for zero-sum two-player Imperfect Information Games (IIG).

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent, and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator, designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play. With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.

Sequential decision making problems, such as structured prediction, robotic control, and game playing, require a combination of planning policies and generalisation of those plans. In this paper, we present Expert Iteration (ExIt), a novel reinforcement learning algorithm which decomposes the problem into separate planning and generalisation tasks. Planning new policies is performed by tree search, while a deep neural network generalises those plans. Subsequently, tree search is improved by using the neural network policy to guide search, increasing the strength of new plans. In contrast, standard deep Reinforcement Learning algorithms rely on a neural network not only to generalise plans, but to discover them too. We show that ExIt outperforms REINFORCE for training a neural network to play the board game Hex, and our final tree search agent, trained tabula rasa, defeats MoHex1.0, the most recent Olympiad Champion player to be publicly released.