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Runji Wang

dblp:256/9592 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 87% Systems and software security · 13%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
Intel SGX		 0.412020
Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX · ASPLOS 2020
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments		 0.412020
Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX · ASPLOS 2020
Operating systems › operating system design
library operating systems		 0.412020
Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX · ASPLOS 2020
Operating systems
multitasking		 0.412020
Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX · ASPLOS 2020
Systems and software security › trusted computing
enclave security		 0.112020
Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX · ASPLOS 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

library OS · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2020 Occlum: Secure and Efficient Multitasking Inside a Single Enclave of Intel SGX
abstract
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enables user-level code to create private memory regions called enclaves, whose code and data are protected by the CPU from software and hardware attacks outside the enclaves. Recent work introduces library operating systems (LibOSes) to SGX so that legacy applications can run inside enclaves with few or even no modifications. As virtually any non-trivial application demands multiple processes, it is essential for LibOSes to support multitasking. However, none of the existing SGX LibOSes support multitasking both securely and efficiently.
Youren Shen, Hongliang Tian, Yu Chen 0004, Kang Chen 0001, Runji Wang, Yubin Xia, Shoumeng Yan
 ASPLOS5