EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Biagio Montaruli
dblp:257/4534
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0002-6870-8075ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | The Role of Domain-Specific Features in Malware Detection: A macOS Case StudyabstractDespite the growing popularity of macOS among end users and enterprise systems, malware research has primarily focused on Windows and Android operating systems, leaving the problem of macOS malware detection relatively unexplored. Indeed, the specificity of the operating system and the unique characteristics of the Mach-O file format can play a fundamental role in the classification of unknown samples, drastically increasing the detection rate. In this work, for the first time in the literature, we employ new domain-specific features, i.e., static features specific to macOS binaries, such as embedded certificates, entitlements, persistence techniques and key system APIs, to train a machine learning malware detector. We perform a comprehensive experimental evaluation on a novel dataset of 41,129 samples, comprising 11,413 benign and 29,716 malicious executables, and demonstrate that our solution achieves state-of-the-art detection performance (98.50%), outperforming all existing approaches, with an average improvement of 16% in terms of detection rate. We also provide an in-depth analysis of the importance of the individual features, showing that our detector effectively leverages the new domain-specific features. Then, in order to evaluate the generalization capabilities of our detector over time, we perform a real-world evaluation on a new dataset of 9,000 fresh macOS executables. The results show that (i) our detector maintains a very high detection rate (99.50%), (ii) outperforms the state-of-the-art by 50%, and (iii) the domain-specific features are crucial for generalizing to novel malware samples, as their removal leads to a 15.92% drop in detection performance. Finally, we also release our dataset to the research community. Biagio Montaruli, Andrea Oliveri, Savino Dambra, Davide Balzarotti |
AsiaCCS | 1 |
| 2025 | One Detector Fits All: Robust and Adaptive Detection of Malicious Packages from PyPI to EnterprisesabstractThe rise of supply chain attacks via malicious Python packages calls for robust and adaptable detection solutions. However, current approaches overlook two critical challenges: (i) robustness to adversarial source code transformations, and (ii) the lack of adaptability to different actors in the software supply chain with different false positive rate (FPR) requirements, from repository maintainers (very low FPR) to enterprise security teams (higher FPR tolerance). To address these challenges, in this work we introduce a new robust detector that can be seamlessly integrated into both public repositories like PyPI and enterprise ecosystems. To thoroughly evaluate the robustness of our detector, we propose a novel methodology to generate adversarial packages by leveraging a new set of fine-grained code transformations based on code obfuscation techniques. By combining these adversarial packages with adversarial training (AT), we enhance the robustness of our detector by 2.5×. We comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of AT by testing our detector against a large dataset of 122,398 packages collected daily from PyPI over 80 days, showing that AT needs to be applied carefully: on the one hand, it makes the detector more robust to obfuscations and allows finding 10% more obfuscated packages, but on the other hand it introduces a negative effect by slightly decreasing the performance on non-obfuscated packages. To demonstrate its adaptability in production, we conduct two vetting case studies by tuning the detector to different FPR thresholds: (i) one for PyPI maintainers with a low FPR (0.1%) and (ii) one for enterprise security teams with a higher FPR (10%). In the first case study, we evaluate our final detector on 91,949 packages collected over 37 days, achieving an average daily detection rate of 2.48 malicious packages with only 2.18 false positives per day. In the second one, we analyze 1,596 packages adopted by a multinational software company, achieving only 1.24 false positives on average per day. These results show that our detector can be seamlessly integrated into both public repositories like PyPI and enterprise ecosystems, ensuring a very low time budget of a few minutes to review the false positives. Overall, our detector uncovered a total of 346 malicious packages, now reported to the community. Biagio Montaruli, Luca Compagna, Serena Elisa Ponta, Davide Balzarotti |
ACSAC | 1 |
| 2025 | ModSec-AdvLearn: Countering Adversarial SQL Injections With Robust Machine LearningabstractMany Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) leverage the OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) to block incoming malicious requests. The CRS consists of different sets of rules designed by domain experts to detect well-known web attack patterns. Both the set of rules and the weights used to combine them are manually defined, yielding four different default configurations of the CRS. In this work, we focus on the detection of SQL injection (SQLi) attacks, and show that the manual configurations of the CRS typically yield a suboptimal trade-off between detection and false alarm rates. Furthermore, we show that these configurations are not robust to adversarial SQLi attacks, i.e., carefully-crafted attacks that iteratively refine the malicious SQLi payload by querying the target WAF to bypass detection. To overcome these limitations, we propose (i) using machine learning to automate the selection of the set of rules to be combined along with their weights, i.e., customizing the CRS configuration based on the monitored web services; and (ii) leveraging adversarial training to significantly improve its robustness to adversarial SQLi manipulations. Our experiments, conducted using the well-known open-source ModSecurity WAF equipped with the CRS rules, show that our approach, named ModSec-AdvLearn, can (i) increase the detection rate up to 30%, while retaining negligible false alarm rates and discarding up to 50% of the CRS rules; and (ii) improve robustness against adversarial SQLi attacks up to 85%, marking a significant stride toward designing more effective and robustWAFs.We release our open-source code at https://github.com/pralab/modsec-advlearn. Giuseppe Floris, Christian Scano, Biagio Montaruli, Luca Demetrio, Andrea Valenza, Luca Compagna, Davide Ariu, Luca Piras 0001, Davide Balzarotti, Battista Biggio |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 3 |
| 2019 | QuakeSense, a LoRa-compliant Earthquake Monitoring Open SystemabstractDetecting disruptive events, such as earthquakes, using environmental monitoring systems is a particularly promising, but rather challenging, opportunity. The Internet of Things (IoT) can play a significant role in characterizing and predicting seismic events. The present contribution introduces QuakeSense, an open-source earthquake and weather monitoring system. The implemented IoT system is configured as a Long Range (LoRa)based star topology with a fully energy-autonomous sensor node. The system leverages some of the most useful features of two emerging IoT technologies, e.g., LoRa and Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and enables the near real-time monitoring of seismic events through a web-based interface. An experimental campaign has been carried out to verify the current consumption and, therefore, the battery lifetime of the sensor node. Moreover, LoRa parameters have been extensively tested as to evaluate performances in several configurations. The obtained results in terms of latency and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) demonstrated the reliability of the proposal. Pietro Boccadoro, Biagio Montaruli, Luigi Alfredo Grieco |
DS-RT | 2 |