We give a construction of statistically hiding commitment schemes (those in which the hiding property holds against even computationally unbounded adversaries) under the minimal complexity assumption that one-way functions exist. Consequently, one-way functions suffice to give statistical zero-knowledge arguments for any NP statement (whereby even a computationally unbounded adversarial verifier learns nothing other than the fact that the assertion being proven is true, and no polynomial-time adversarial prover can convince the verifier of a false statement). These results resolve an open question posed by Naor et al. [J. Cryptology, 11 (1998), pp. 87–108].

We give two applications of Nisan–Wigderson‐type (NW‐type) (“noncryptographic”) pseudorandom generators in cryptography. Specifically, assuming the existence of an appropriate NW‐type generator, we construct the following two protocols: (1) a one‐message witness‐indistinguishable proof system for every language in NP, based on any trapdoor permutation. This proof system does not assume a shared random string or any setup assumption, so it is actually an “NP proof system.” (2) a noninteractive bit‐commitment scheme based on any one‐way function. The specific NW‐type generator we need is a hitting set generator fooling nondeterministic circuits. It is known how to construct such a generator if $E = DTIME(2^{O(n)})$ has a function of nondeterministic circuit complexity $2^{\Omega(n)}$. Our witness‐indistinguishable proofs are obtained by using the NW‐type generator to derandomize the ZAPs of Dwork and Naor [Proceedings of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2000, pp. 283–293]. To our knowledge, this is the first construction of an NP proof system achieving a secrecy property. Our commitment scheme is obtained by derandomizing the interactive commitment scheme of Naor [J. Cryptology, 4 (1991), pp. 151–158]. Previous constructions of noninteractive commitment schemes were known only under incomparable assumptions.

We show that every language in NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument system under the (minimal) complexity assumption that one-way functions exist. In such protocols, even a computationally unbounded verifier cannot learn anything other than the fact that the assertion being proven is true, whereas a polynomial-time prover cannot convince the verifier to accept a false assertion except with negligible probability. This resolves an open question posed by Naor et al. (1998). Departing from previous works on this problem, we do not construct standard statistically hiding commitments from any one-way function. Instead, we construct a relaxed variant of commitment schemes called "1-out-of-2-binding commitments," recently introduced by Nguyen et al. (2006)

We investigate the feasibility of a variety of cryptographic tasks with imperfect randomness. The kind of imperfect randomness we consider are entropy sources, such as those considered by Santha and Vazirani, Chor and Goldreich, and Zuckerman. We show the following: (1) certain cryptographic tasks like bit commitment, encryption, secret sharing, zero-knowledge, non-interactive zero-knowledge, and secure two-party computation for any non-trivial junction are impossible to realize if parties have access to entropy sources with slightly less-than-perfect entropy, i.e., sources with imperfect randomness. These results are unconditional and do not rely on any un-proven assumption. (2) On the other hand, based on stronger variants of standard assumptions, secure signature schemes are possible with imperfect entropy sources. As another positive result, we show (without any unproven assumption) that interactive proofs can be made sound with respect to imperfect entropy sources.