Marco Pernpruner

dblp:260/5521 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-8936-2726ORCID · verified

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Security and privacy · 3 · 3 first-author · 2 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 An Automated Multi-Layered Methodology to Assist the Secure and Risk-Aware Design of Multi-Factor Authentication Protocols
abstract
Authentication protocols represent the entry point to online services, so they must be sturdily designed in order to allow only authorized users to access the underlying data. However, designing authentication protocols is a complex process: security designers should carefully select the technologies to involve and integrate them properly in order to prevent potential vulnerabilities. In addition, these choices are usually restricted by further factors, such as the requirements associated with the scenario, the regulatory framework, the dimensions to balance (e.g., security vs. usability), and the standards to rely on. We come to the rescue by presenting an automated multi-layered methodology we have developed to assist security designers in this phase: by repeatedly evaluating their protocols, they can select the security mitigations to consider until they reach the desired security level, thus enabling a security-by-design approach. For concreteness, we also show how we have applied our methodology to a real use case scenario in the context of a collaboration with the Italian Government Printing Office and Mint.
Marco Pernpruner, Roberto Carbone, Giada Sciarretta, Silvio Ranise
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.1
2021 A Framework for Security and Risk Analysis of Enrollment Procedures: Application to Fully-remote Solutions based on eDocuments
abstract
More and more online services are characterised by the need for strongly verifying the real-world identity of end users, especially when sensitive operations have to be carried out: just imagine a fully-remote signature of a contract, and what could happen whether someone managed to perform it by using another person’s name. For this reason, the identity management lifecycle contains specific procedures – called enrollment or onboarding – providing a certain level of assurance on digital users’ real identities. These procedures must be as secure as possible to prevent frauds and identity thefts. In this paper, we present a framework composed of a specification language, a security analysis methodology and a risk analysis methodology for enrollment solutions. For concreteness, we apply our framework to a real use case (i.e., fully-remote solutions relying on electronic documents as identity evidence) in the context of a collaboration with an Italian FinTech startup. Beyond validating the framework, we analyse and highlight the essential role of mitigations on the overall security of enrollment procedures.
Marco Pernpruner, Giada Sciarretta, Silvio Ranise
SECRYPT1
2020 The Good, the Bad and the (Not So) Ugly of Out-of-Band Authentication with eID Cards and Push Notifications: Design, Formal and Risk Analysis
abstract
Everyday life is permeated by new technologies allowing people to perform almost any kind of operation from their smart devices. Although this is amazing from a convenience perspective, it may result in several security issues concerning the need for authenticating users in a proper and secure way. Electronic identity cards (also called eID cards) play a very important role in this regard, due to the high level of assurance they provide in identification and authentication processes. However, authentication solutions relying on them are still uncommon and suffer from many usability limitations. In this paper, we thus present the design and implementation of a novel passwordless, multi-factor authentication protocol based on eID cards. To reduce known usability issues while keeping a high level of security, our protocol leverages push notifications and mobile devices equipped with NFC, which can be used to interact with eID cards. In addition, we evaluate the security of the protocol through a formal security analysis and a risk analysis, whose results emphasize the acceptable level of security.
Marco Pernpruner, Roberto Carbone, Silvio Ranise, Giada Sciarretta
CODASPY1