Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Protick Bhowmick
dblp:260/8979
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0008-7636-6603ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 2 · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 70% Web and mobile security · 23% Network security · 7% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Internet architecture and protocols · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management › public key infrastructure
certificate revocation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Reliable and Decentralized Certificate Revocation via DNS: The Case for RevDNS · SIGCOMM 2025 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
public key infrastructure |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Reliable and Decentralized Certificate Revocation via DNS: The Case for RevDNS · SIGCOMM 2025 |
Web and mobile security
mobile security |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | A comparative analysis of certificate pinning in Android & iOS · IMC 2022 |
Internet architecture and protocols
domain name system |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Reliable and Decentralized Certificate Revocation via DNS: The Case for RevDNS · SIGCOMM 2025 |
Network security › secure communication › secure communication protocol
TLS |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | A comparative analysis of certificate pinning in Android & iOS · IMC 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
comparative analysis · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Reliable and Decentralized Certificate Revocation via DNS: The Case for RevDNSabstractThe Online Certificate Status Protocol's long slide—after 25 years of soft-fail rules, privacy leakage, and shaky infrastructure—exposes a deeper failure in web-PKI revocation. Certificate Authorities increasingly route OCSP traffic through CDNs for speed, yet this recentralizes trust: our measurements show Akamai serves 62 percent of all revocation responses, creating single points of failure and betraying PKI's decentralized ideals. Taejoong Chung, Dave Levin, Protick Bhowmick |
SIGCOMM | 3 |
| 2023 | TTL Violation of DNS Resolvers in the Wild
Protick Bhowmick, Md. Ishtiaq Ashiq, Casey T. Deccio, Taejoong Chung |
PAM | 1 |
| 2022 | A comparative analysis of certificate pinning in Android & iOSabstractTLS certificate pinning is a security mechanism used by applications (apps) to protect their network traffic against malicious certificate authorities (CAs), in-path monitoring, and other methods of TLS tampering. Pinning can provide enhanced security to defend against malicious third-party access to sensitive data in transit (e.g., to protect sensitive banking and health care information), but can also hide an app's personal data collection from users and auditors. Prior studies found pinning was rarely used in the Android ecosystem, except in high-profile, security-sensitive apps; and, little is known about its usage on iOS and across mobile platforms. Amogh Pradeep, Muhammad Talha Paracha, Protick Bhowmick, Ali Davanian, Abbas Razaghpanah, Taejoong Chung, Martina Lindorfer, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Dave Levin, David R. Choffnes |
IMC | 3 |