Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Dmitry Kazhdan
dblp:263/1872
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0003-4039-2312ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 81% Graph learning · 15% Optimization for machine learning · 4% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability
concept-based explanation |
1.2 | 2 | 2023 | Towards Robust Metrics for Concept Representation Evaluation · AAAI 2023 Algorithmic Concept-Based Explainable Reasoning · AAAI 2022 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability |
1.2 | 2 | 2023 | Towards Robust Metrics for Concept Representation Evaluation · AAAI 2023 Algorithmic Concept-Based Explainable Reasoning · AAAI 2022 |
Machine learning › Graph learning
graph neural network |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Algorithmic Concept-Based Explainable Reasoning · AAAI 2022 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability
graph neural network explanation |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Algorithmic Concept-Based Explainable Reasoning · AAAI 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
backdoor injection |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Manipulating SGD with Data Ordering Attacks · NeurIPS 2021 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Manipulating SGD with Data Ordering Attacks · NeurIPS 2021 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
training-time attack |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Manipulating SGD with Data Ordering Attacks · NeurIPS 2021 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning
stochastic gradient descent |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Manipulating SGD with Data Ordering Attacks · NeurIPS 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
adversarial data ordering · 1.0disentanglement metrics · 0.7graph neural network · 0.6concept bottleneck · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Towards Robust Metrics for Concept Representation EvaluationabstractRecent work on interpretability has focused on concept-based explanations, where deep learning models are explained in terms of high-level units of information, referred to as concepts. Concept learning models, however, have been shown to be prone to encoding impurities in their representations, failing to fully capture meaningful features of their inputs. While concept learning lacks metrics to measure such phenomena, the field of disentanglement learning has explored the related notion of underlying factors of variation in the data, with plenty of metrics to measure the purity of such factors. In this paper, we show that such metrics are not appropriate for concept learning and propose novel metrics for evaluating the purity of concept representations in both approaches. We show the advantage of these metrics over existing ones and demonstrate their utility in evaluating the robustness of concept representations and interventions performed on them. In addition, we show their utility for benchmarking state-of-the-art methods from both families and find that, contrary to common assumptions, supervision alone may not be sufficient for pure concept representations. Mateo Espinosa Zarlenga, Pietro Barbiero, Zohreh Shams, Dmitry Kazhdan, Umang Bhatt, Adrian Weller, Mateja Jamnik |
AAAI | 4 |
| 2022 | Algorithmic Concept-Based Explainable ReasoningabstractRecent research on graph neural network (GNN) models successfully applied GNNs to classical graph algorithms and combinatorial optimisation problems. This has numerous benefits, such as allowing applications of algorithms when preconditions are not satisfied, or reusing learned models when sufficient training data is not available or can't be generated. Unfortunately, a key hindrance of these approaches is their lack of explainability, since GNNs are black-box models that cannot be interpreted directly. In this work, we address this limitation by applying existing work on concept-based explanations to GNN models. We introduce concept-bottleneck GNNs, which rely on a modification to the GNN readout mechanism. Using three case studies we demonstrate that: (i) our proposed model is capable of accurately learning concepts and extracting propositional formulas based on the learned concepts for each target class; (ii) our concept-based GNN models achieve comparative performance with state-of-the-art models; (iii) we can derive global graph concepts, without explicitly providing any supervision on graph-level concepts. Dobrik Georgiev, Pietro Barbiero, Dmitry Kazhdan, Petar Velickovic, Pietro Liò |
AAAI | 3 |
| 2021 | Manipulating SGD with Data Ordering AttacksabstractMachine learning is vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks. It is now well understood that by changing the underlying data distribution, an adversary can poison the model trained with it or introduce backdoors. In this paper we present a novel class of training-time attacks that require no changes to the underlying dataset or model architecture, but instead only change the order in which data are supplied to the model. In particular, we find that the attacker can either prevent the model from learning, or poison it to learn behaviours specified by the attacker. Furthermore, we find that even a single adversarially-ordered epoch can be enough to slow down model learning, or even to reset all of the learning progress. Indeed, the attacks presented here are not specific to the model or dataset, but rather target the stochastic nature of modern learning procedures. We extensively evaluate our attacks on computer vision and natural language benchmarks to find that the adversary can disrupt model training and even introduce backdoors. Ilia Shumailov, Zakhar Shumaylov, Dmitry Kazhdan, Nicolas Papernot, Murat A. Erdogdu, Ross J. Anderson |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2020 | MARLeME: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Model Extraction LibraryabstractMulti-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) encompasses a powerful class of methodologies that have been applied in a wide range of fields. An effective way to further empower these methodologies is to develop approaches and tools that could expand their interpretability and explainability. In this work, we introduce MARLeME: a MARL model extraction library, designed to improve explainability of MARL systems by approximating them with symbolic models. Symbolic models offer a high degree of interpretability, well-defined properties, and verifiable behaviour. Consequently, they can be used to inspect and better understand the underlying MARL systems and corresponding MARL agents, as well as to replace all/some of the agents that are particularly safety and security critical. In this work, we demonstrate how MARLeME can be applied to two well-known case studies (Cooperative Navigation and RoboCup Takeaway), using extracted models based on Abstract Argumentation. Dmitry Kazhdan, Zohreh Shams, Pietro Liò |
IJCNN | 1 |