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Modern high-performance computing (HPC) environments rely on hybrid storage systems (HSS) that combine multiple storage devices with diverse latency, bandwidth, endurance, and capacity characteristics to meet the performance, capacity, and cost requirements of data-intensive applications. The performance of an HSS highly depends on two key data-management policies: (1) data placement, which determines the most suitable storage device to store application data, and (2) data migration, which dynamically reorganizes previously-stored data across storage devices (i.e., prefetching hot data and evicting cold data) to sustain high HSS performance. These policies are tightly interdependent, and thus, improving one without considering the other leads to suboptimal HSS performance. Unfortunately, prior works optimize only one of the policies.

Vector-scalar comparison is a fundamental computation primitive that compares each element in a vector against a single scalar value. It is widely used in a broad range of data-intensive workloads from databases to machine learning. Due to its low computational intensity, the execution of this operation tends to be memory-bound, especially for large vectors, thereby limiting the utilization of compute resources. Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is an emerging computing paradigm that performs massively parallel bitwise operations directly within the DRAM array, alleviating off-chip data movement. Unfortunately, no prior work proposes an efficient PuD-based solution tailored to vector-scalar comparisons. Existing PuD-based approaches require many DRAM commands because the comparison's algorithmic complexity grows with operand bit-width in the bit-serial execution model, which is inherently induced by current PuD architectures. As a result, this command overhead becomes the dominant performance bottleneck, limiting application-level speed up. We propose Clutch, a novel data representation and comparison algorithm for accelerating vector-scalar comparisons in PuD systems with high efficiency and scalability. Our key idea is twofold. First, to reduce the number of DRAM commands required for comparison, Clutch adopts temporal coding for vectors, where each value is encoded as a sequence of leading ones. This enables lookup-based comparisons, where comparing against a scalar input simply involves accessing the corresponding DRAM row. Second, Clutch leverages our key insight that a divide-and-conquer approach enables scalable lookup-based comparisons without incurring a prohibitive memory footprint at high bit-precision. Specifically, Clutch partitions the operand into multiple multi-bit chunks which can be compared independently using compact lookup tables, and merges per-chunk results through a procedure designed to execute efficiently on PuD.Clutch provides a flexible tradeoff between throughput and memory usage by adjusting chunk count. Experimental results on two applications, predicate evaluation and decision tree inference, demonstrate that Clutch improves end-to-end application throughput (and energy efficiency) by an average of 12 × (69 ×) over highly-optimized CPU and GPU execution and 2.9 × (3.0 ×) over the state-of-the-art bit-serial PuD implementation. Notably, we present, to our knowledge, the first mapping of decision tree inference to PuD execution, extending PuD to a new application domain. Our results demonstrate that DRAM can serve as a high-performance and energy-efficient computing substrate for comparison-intensive workloads.

We introduce IMPACT, a set of high-throughput main memory-based timing attacks that leverage characteristics of processing-in-memory (PiM) architectures to establish covert and side channels. IMPACT enables high-throughput communication and private information leakage by exploiting the shared DRAM row buffer. To achieve high throughput, IMPACT (i) eliminates expensive cache bypassing steps required by processor-centric memory-based timing attacks and (ii) leverages the intrinsic parallelism of PiM operations. We showcase two applications of IMPACT. First, we build two covert channels that leverage different PiM approaches (i.e., processing-near-memory and processing-using-memory) to establish high-throughput covert communication channels. Our covert channels achieve 8.2 Mb/s and 14.8 Mb/s communication throughput, respectively, which is 3.6 × and 6.5 × higher than the state-of-the-art main memory-based covert channel. Second, we showcase a side-channel attack that leaks private information of concurrently-running victim applications with a low error rate. Our source-code is openly and freely available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/IMPACT.

Read disturbance in modern DRAM is an important robustness (security, safety, and reliability) problem, where repeatedly accessing (hammering) a row of DRAM cells (DRAM row) induces bitflips in other physically nearby DRAM rows. Shrinking technology node size exacerbates DRAM read disturbance over generations. To help mitigate read disturbance, the latest DDR5 specifications (as of April 2024) introduced a new RowHammer mitigation framework, called Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC). PRAC 1) enables the DRAM chip to accurately track row activations by allocating an activation counter per row and 2) provides the DRAM chip with the necessary time window to perform RowHammer-preventive refreshes by introducing a new back-off signal. Unfortunately, no prior work rigorously studies PRAC’s security guarantees and overheads. In this paper, we 1) present the first rigorous security, performance, energy, and cost analyses of PRAC and 2) propose Chronus, a new mechanism that addresses PRAC’s two major weaknesses. Our analysis shows that PRAC’s system performance overhead on benign applications is non-negligible for modern DRAM chips and prohibitively large for future DRAM chips that are more vulnerable to read disturbance. We identify two weaknesses of PRAC that cause these overheads. First, PRAC increases critical DRAM access latency parameters due to the additional time required to increment activation counters. Second, PRAC performs a constant number of preventive refreshes at a time, making it vulnerable to an adversarial access pattern, known as the wave attack, and consequently requiring it to be configured for significantly smaller activation thresholds. To address PRAC’s two weaknesses, we propose a new on-DRAM-die RowHammer mitigation mechanism, Chronus. Chronus 1) updates row activation counters concurrently while serving accesses by separating counters from the data and 2) prevents the wave attack by dynamically controlling the number of preventive refreshes performed. Our performance analysis shows that Chronus’s system performance overhead is near-zero for modern DRAM chips and very low for future DRAM chips. Chronus outperforms three variants of PRAC and three other state-of-the-art read disturbance solutions. We discuss Chronus’s and PRAC’s implications for future systems and foreshadow future research directions. To aid future research, we open-source our Chronus implementation at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/Chronus.

Modern DRAM chips are subject to read disturbance errors. These errors manifest as security-critical bitflips in a victim DRAM row that is physically nearby a repeatedly activated (opened) aggressor row (RowHammer) or an aggressor row that is kept open for a long time (RowPress). State-of-the-art read disturbance mitigations rely on accurate and exhaustive characterization of the read disturbance threshold ($R D T$) (e.g., the number of aggressor row activations needed to induce the first RowHammer or RowPress bitflip) of every DRAM row (of which there are millions or billions in a modern system) to prevent read disturbance bitflips securely and with low overhead. We experimentally demonstrate for the first time that the RDT of a DRAM row significantly and unpredictably changes over time. We call this new phenomenon variable read disturbance (VRD). Our extensive experiments using 160 DDR4 chips and 4 HBM2 chips from three major manufacturers yield three key observations. First, it is very unlikely that relatively few RDT measurements can accurately identify the RDT of a DRAM row. The minimum RDT of a DRAM row appears after tens of thousands of measurements (e.g., up to 94,467), and the minimum RDT of a DRAM row is $3.5 \times$ smaller than the maximum RDT observed for that row. Second, the probability of accurately identifying a row’s RDT with a relatively small number of measurements reduces with increasing chip density or smaller technology node size. Third, data pattern, the amount of time an aggressor row is kept open, and temperature can affect the probability of accurately identifying a DRAM row’s RDT. Our empirical results have implications for the security guarantees of read disturbance mitigation techniques: if the RDT of a DRAM row is not identified accurately, these techniques can easily become insecure. We discuss and evaluate using a guardband for RDT and error-correcting codes for mitigating read disturbance bitflips in the presence of RDTs that change unpredictably over time. We conclude that $a\gt 10 \%$ guardband for the minimum observed RDT combined with SECDED or Chipkill-like SSC error-correcting codes could prevent read disturbance bitflips at the cost of large read disturbance mitigation performance overheads (e.g., 45% performance loss for an RDT guardband of $50 \%$). We hope and believe future work on efficient online profiling mechanisms and configurable read disturbance mitigation techniques could remedy the challenges imposed on today’s read disturbance mitigations by the variable read disturbance phenomenon.

Read disturbance in modern DRAM chips is a widespread weakness that is used for breaking memory isolation, one of the fundamental building blocks of system security and privacy. RowHammer is a prime example of read disturbance in DRAM where repeatedly accessing (hammering) a row of DRAM cells (DRAM row) induces bitflips in physically nearby DRAM rows (victim rows). Unfortunately, shrinking technology node size exacerbates RowHammer and as such, significantly fewer accesses can induce bitflips in newer DRAM chip generations. To ensure robust DRAM operation, state-of-the-art mitigation mechanisms restore the charge in potential victim rows (i.e., they perform preventive refresh or charge restoration). With newer DRAM chip generations, these mechanisms perform preventive refresh more aggressively and cause larger performance, energy, or area overheads. Therefore, it is essential to develop a better understanding and in-depth insights into the preventive refresh to secure real DRAM chips at low cost. In this paper, our goal is to mitigate RowHammer at low cost by understanding the preventive refresh latency and the impact of reduced refresh latency on RowHammer. To this end, we present the first rigorous experimental study on the interactions between refresh latency and RowHammer characteristics in real DRAM chips. Our experimental characterization using 388 real DDR4 DRAM chips from three major manufacturers demonstrates that a preventive refresh latency can be significantly reduced (by 64%) at the expense of requiring slightly more (by 0.54%) preventive refreshes. To investigate the impact of reduced preventive refresh latency on system performance and energy efficiency, we reduce the preventive refresh latency and adjust the aggressiveness of existing RowHammer solutions by developing a new mechanism, Partial Charge Restoration for Aggressive Mitigation (PaCRAM). Our results show that by reducing the preventive refresh latency, PaCRAM reduces the performance and energy overheads induced by five state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms with small additional area overhead. Thus, PaCRAM introduces a novel perspective into addressing RowHammer vulnerability at low cost by leveraging our experimental observations. To aid future research, we open-source our PaCRAM implementation at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/PaCRAM.

In this work, we experimentally demonstrate that it is possible to generate true random numbers at high throughput and low latency in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) DRAM chips by leveraging simultaneous multiple-row activation (SiMRA) via an extensive characterization of 96 DDR4 DRAM chips. We rigorously analyze SiMRA's true random generation potential in terms of entropy, latency, and throughput for varying numbers of simultaneously activated DRAM rows (i.e., 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32), data patterns, temperature levels, and spatial variations. Among our 11 key experimental observations, we highlight four key results. First, we evaluate the quality of our TRNG designs using the commonly-used NIST statistical test suite for randomness and find that all SiMRA-based TRNG designs successfully pass each test. Second, 2-, 8-, 16-, and 32-row activation-based TRNG designs outperform the state-of-theart DRAM-based TRNG in throughput by up to 1.15×, 1.99×, 1.82×, and 1.39×, respectively. Third, SiMRA's entropy tends to increase with the number of simultaneously activated DRAM rows. For example, for most of the tested modules, the average entropy of 32-row activation is 2.51× higher than that of 2-row activation. Fourth, operational parameters and conditions (e.g., data pattern and temperature) significantly affect entropy. For example, increasing temperature from 50°C to 90°C decreases SiMRA's entropy by 1.53× for 32-row activation. To aid future research and development, we open-source our infrastructure at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/SiMRA-TRNG.

Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is a promising paradigm for alleviating the data movement bottleneck using a DRAM array's massive internal parallelism and bandwidth to execute very wide dataparallel operations.Performing a PuD operation involves activating multiple DRAM rows in quick succession or simultaneously, i.e., multiple-row activation.Multiple-row activation is fundamentally different from conventional memory access patterns that activate one DRAM row at a time.However, repeatedly activating even one DRAM row (e.g., RowHammer) can induce bitflips in unaccessed DRAM rows because modern DRAM is subject to read disturbance, a worsening safety, security, and reliability issue.Unfortunately, no prior work investigates the effects of multiple-row activation, as commonly used by PuD operations, on DRAM read disturbance.In this paper, we present the first characterization study of read disturbance effects of multiple-row activation-based PuD (which we call PuDHammer) using 316 real DDR4 DRAM chips from four major DRAM manufacturers.Our detailed characterization results covering various operational conditions and parameters (i.e., temperature, data patterns, access patterns, timing parameters, and spatial variation) show that 1) PuDHammer significantly exacerbates the read disturbance vulnerability, causing up to 158.58× reduction in the minimum hammer count required to induce the first bitflip (𝐻𝐶 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ), compared to RowHammer, 2) PuDHammer is affected by various operational conditions and parameters, 3) combining RowHammer with PuDHammer is more effective than using

DRAM chips are increasingly vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or keeping open a DRAM row causes bitflips in nearby rows, due to DRAM density scaling.Attackers can exploit RowHammer bitflips in real systems to compromise security, which has motivated many prior works on RowHammer defenses.To enable such defenses, recent DDR specifications introduce new defense frameworks (e.g., PRAC and RFM).For robust (i.e., secure, safe, and reliable) operation, it is critical to analyze security implications of widely-adopted RowHammer defenses.Yet, no prior work analyzes the timing covert channel and side channel vulnerabilities RowHammer defenses introduce.This paper presents the first analysis and evaluation of timing covert channel and side channel vulnerabilities introduced by stateof-the-art RowHammer defenses.We demonstrate that RowHammer defenses' preventive actions (e.g., preventively refreshing potential victim rows) have two fundamental features that allow an attacker to exploit RowHammer defenses for timing leakage.First, preventive actions often reduce DRAM bandwidth availability because they block access to DRAM, thereby resulting in significantly longer memory access latencies.Second, users can intentionally trigger preventive actions because preventive actions highly depend on application memory access patterns.We introduce LeakyHammer, a new class of attacks that leverage the RowHammer defense-induced memory latency differences to establish communication channels between processes and leak secrets from victim processes.First, we build two covert channel attacks exploiting two state-of-the-art RowHammer defenses (i.e., PRAC and RFM), achieving 39.0 Kbps and 48.7 Kbps channel capacity.Second, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept website

We experimentally demonstrate a new widespread read disturbance phenomenon, ColumnDisturb, in real commodity DRAM chips.By repeatedly opening or keeping a DRAM row (aggressor row) open, we show that it is possible to disturb DRAM cells through a DRAM column (i.e., bitline) and induce bitflips in DRAM cells sharing the same columns as the aggressor row (across multiple DRAM subarrays).With ColumnDisturb, the activation of a single row concurrently disturbs DRAM cells across as many as three DRAM subarrays (e.g., up to 3072 DRAM rows in tested DDR4 DRAM chips) as opposed to RowHammer & RowPress, which affect only a few neighboring rows of the aggressor row in a single subarray.We rigorously and comprehensively characterize ColumnDisturb and its characteristics under various operational conditions (i.e., temperature, data pattern, DRAM timing parameters, average voltage level of the bitline, memory access pattern, and spatial variation) using 216 DDR4 and 4 HBM2 chips from three major DRAM manufacturers.Among our 27 key experimental observations, we highlight two major results and their implications.First, ColumnDisturb affects chips from all three major DRAM manufacturers and worsens as DRAM technology scales down to smaller node sizes (e.g., the minimum time to induce the first Col-umnDisturb bitflip reduces by up to 5.06x and 2.96x on average across all tested modules).We observe that, even in existing DRAM chips, ColumnDisturb induces bitflips within a nominal DDR4 refresh window (e.g., in 63.6 ms) in multiple cells from one module.We predict that, as DRAM technology node size reduces, ColumnDisturb would worsen in future DRAM chips, likely causing many more bitflips in the nominal refresh window.Second, beyond the nominal refresh window, ColumnDisturb induces bitflips in many (up to 198x) more DRAM rows than retention failures.Therefore, Column-Disturb has strong implications for existing retention-aware refresh mechanisms that aim to improve system performance and energy efficiency by leveraging the heterogeneity in DRAM cell retention

Modern DRAM is vulnerable to read disturbance (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress) that significantly undermines the robust operation of the system. Repeatedly opening and closing a DRAM row (RowHammer) or keeping a DRAM row open for a long period of time (RowPress) induces bitflips in nearby unaccessed DRAM rows. Prior works on DRAM read disturbance either 1) perform experimental characterization using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) DRAM chips to demonstrate the high-level characteristics of the read disturbance bitflips, or 2) perform device-level simulations to understand the low-level error mechanisms of the read disturbance bitflips.In this paper, we attempt to align and cross-validate the real-chip experimental characterization results and state-of-the-art device-level studies of DRAM read disturbance. To do so, we first identify and extract the key bitflip characteristics of RowHammer and RowPress from the device-level error mechanisms studied in prior works. Then, we perform experimental characterization on 96 COTS DDR4 DRAM chips that directly match the data and access patterns studied in the device-level works. Through our experiments, we identify fundamental inconsistencies in the RowHammer and RowPress bitflip directions and access pattern dependence between experimental characterization results and the device-level error mechanisms.Based on our results, we hypothesize that either 1) the retention failure based DRAM architecture reverse-engineering methodologies do not fully work on modern DDR4 DRAM chips, or 2) existing device-level works do not fully uncover all the major read disturbance error mechanisms. We hope our findings inspire and enable future works to build a more fundamental and comprehensive understanding of DRAM read disturbance.

We experimentally analyze the computational capability of commercial off-the-shelf(COTS) DRAM chips and the robustness of these capabilities under various timing delays between DRAM commands, data patterns, temperature, and voltage levels. We extensively characterize 120 COTS DDR4 chips from two major manufacturers. We highlight four key results of our study. First, COTS DRAM chips are capable of 1) simultaneously activating up to 32 rows (i.e., simultaneous many-row activation), 2) executing a majority of X (MAJX) operation where X>3 (i.e., MAJ5, MAJ7, and MAJ9 operations), and 3) copying a DRAM row (concurrently) to up to 31 other DRAM rows, which we call Multi-RowCopy. Second, storing multiple copies of MAJX's input operands on all simultaneously activated rows drastically increases the success rate (i.e., the percentage of DRAM cells that correctly perform the computation) of the MAJX operation. For example, MAJ3 with 32-row activation (i.e., replicating each MAJ3's input operands 10 times) has a 30.81% higher average success rate than MAJ3 with 4-row activation (i.e., no replication). Third, data pattern affects the success rate of MAJX and MUlti-RowCopy operations by 11.52% and 0.07% on average. Fourth, simultaneous many-row activation, MAJX, and Multi-RowCopy operations are highly resilient to temperature and voltage changes, with small success rate variations of at most 2.13% among all tested operations. We believe these empirical results demonstrate the promising potential of using DRAM as a computation substrate. To aid future research and development, we open-source our infrastructure at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/SiMRA-DRAM.

DRAM chips are increasingly more vulnerable to read-disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing DRAM rows causes bitflips in nearby rows due to DRAM density scaling. Under low RowHammer thresholds, existing RowHammer mitigations either incur high area overheads or degrade performance significantly. We propose a new RowHammer mitigation mechanism, CoMeT, that prevents RowHammer bitflips with low area, performance, and energy costs in DRAM-based systems at very low RowHammer thresholds. The key idea of CoMeT is to use low-cost and scalable hash-based counters to track DRAM row activations. CoMeT uses the Count-Min Sketch technique that maps each DRAM row to a group of counters, as uniquely as possible, using multiple hash functions. When a DRAM row is activated, CoMeT increments the counters mapped to that DRAM row. Because the mapping from DRAM rows to counters is not completely unique, activating one row can increment one or more counters mapped to another row. Thus, CoMeT may overestimate, but never underestimates, a DRAM row's activation count. This property of CoMeT allows it to securely prevent RowHammer bitflips while properly configuring its hash functions reduces overestimations. As a result, CoMeT 1) implements substantially fewer counters (e.g., thousands of counters) than the number of DRAM rows in a DRAM bank (e.g., 128K rows) and 2) does not significantly overestimate a DRAM row's activation count. We demonstrate that CoMeT securely prevents RowHammer bitflips at low area, performance, and energy cost. Our comprehensive evaluations show that CoMeT prevents RowHammer bitflips with an average performance overhead of only 0.19% and 4.01 % across 61 benign single-core workloads for a RowHammer threshold of 1K and a very low RowHammer threshold of 125, respectively, normalized to a system with no RowHammer mitigation. CoMeT achieves a good trade-off between performance, energy, and area overheads. Compared to the best prior performance- and energy-efficient RowHammer mitigation mechanism, CoMeT requires 5.4x and 74.2x less area overhead at RowHammer thresholds of 1K and 125, respectively, and incurs a small (≤ 1.75%) performance overhead on average, for all RowHammer thresholds. Compared to the best prior low-area-cost mitigation mechanism, at a very low RowHammer threshold of 125, CoMeT improves performance by up to 39.1% while incurring a similar area overhead. CoMeT is openly and freely available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/CoMeT.

Read disturbance in modern DRAM chips is a widespread phenomenon and is reliably used for breaking memory isolation, a fundamental building block for building robust systems. RowHammer and RowPress are two examples of read disturbance in DRAM where repeatedly accessing (hammering) or keeping active (pressing) a memory location induces bitflips in other memory locations. Unfortunately, shrinking technology node size exacerbates read disturbance in DRAM chips over generations. As a result, existing defense mechanisms suffer from significant performance and energy overheads, limited effectiveness, or prohibitively high hardware complexity. In this paper, we tackle these shortcomings by leveraging the spatial variation in read disturbance across different memory locations in real DRAM chips. To do so, we 1) present the first rigorous real DRAM chip characterization study of spatial variation of read disturbance and 2) propose Svärd, a new mechanism that dynamically adapts the aggressiveness of existing solutions based on the row-level read disturbance profile. Our experimental characterization on 144 real DDR4 DRAM chips representing 11 die revisions demonstrates a large variation in read disturbance vulnerability across different memory locations: in the part of memory with the worst read disturbance vulnerability, 1) up to 2 × the number of bitflips can occur and 2) bitflips can occur at an order of magnitude fewer accesses, compared to the memory locations with the least vulnerability to read disturbance. Svärd leverages this variation to reduce the overheads of five state-of-the-art read disturbance solutions, and thus significantly increases system performance.

Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is an emerging paradigm that leverages the analog operational properties of DRAM circuitry to enable massively parallel in-DRAM computation. PuD has the potential to significantly reduce or eliminate costly data movement between processing elements and main memory. A common approach for PuD architectures is to make use of bulk bitwise computation (e.g., AND, OR, NOT). Prior works experimentally demonstrate three-input MAJ (i.e., MAJ3) and two-input AND and OR operations in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) DRAM chips. Yet, demonstrations on COTS DRAM chips do not provide a functionally complete set of operations (e.g., NAND or AND and NOT). We experimentally df performing 1) functionally-complete Boolean operations: NOT, NAND, and NOR and 2) many-input (i.e., more than two-input) AND and OR operations. We present an extensive characterization of new bulk bitwise operations in 256 off-theshelf modern DDR4 DRAM chips. We evaluate the reliability of these operations using a metric called success rate: the fraction of correctly performed bitwise operations. Among our 19 new observations, we highlight four major results. First, we can perform the NOT operation on COTS DRAM chips with a 98.37% success rate on average. Second, we can perform up to 16-input NAND, NOR, AND, and OR operations on COTS DRAM chips with high reliability (e.g., 16-input NAND, NOR, AND, and OR with an average success rate of 94.94%, 95.87%, 94.94%, and 95.85%, respectively). Third, data pattern only slightly affects NAND, NOR, AND, and OR operations. Our results show that executing NAND, NOR, AND, and OR operations with random data patterns decreases the success rate compared to all logic-1/logic-0 patterns by 1.39%, 1.97%, 1.43%, and 1.98%, respectively. Fourth, NOT, NAND, NOR, AND, and OR operations are highly resilient to temperature changes, with small success rate fluctuations of at most 1.66% among all the tested operations when the temperature is increased from 50°C to 95°C. We believe these empirical results demonstrate the promising potential of using DRAM as a computation substrate.

RowHammer is a major read disturbance mechanism in DRAM where repeatedly accessing (hammering) a row of DRAM cells (DRAM row) induces bitflips in other physically nearby DRAM rows. RowHammer solutions perform preventive actions (e.g., refresh neighbor rows of the hammered row) that mitigate such bitflips to preserve memory isolation, a fundamental building block of security and privacy in modern computing systems. However, preventive actions induce non-negligible memory request latency and system performance overheads as they interfere with memory requests. As shrinking technology node size over DRAM chip generations exacerbates RowHammer, the overheads of RowHammer solutions become prohibitively expensive. As a result, a malicious program can effectively hog the memory system and deny service to benign applications by causing many RowHammer-preventive actions. In this work, we tackle the performance overheads of RowHammer solutions by tracking and throttling the generators of memory accesses that trigger RowHammer solutions. To this end, we propose BreakHammer. BreakHammer 1) observes the time-consuming RowHammer-preventive actions of existing RowHammer mitigation mechanisms, 2) identifies hardware threads that trigger many of these actions, and 3) reduces the memory bandwidth usage of each identified thread. As such, BreakHammer significantly reduces the number of RowHammer-preventive actions performed, thereby improving 1) system performance and DRAM energy, and 2) reducing the maximum slowdown induced on a benign application, with near-zero area overhead. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate that BreakHammer effectively reduces the negative performance, energy, and fairness effects of eight RowHammer mitigation mechanisms. To foster further research we open-source our BreakHammer implementation and scripts at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/BreakHammer.

On-chip memory (usually based on Static RAMs—SRAMs) are crucial components for various computing devices including heterogeneous devices, e.g., GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs, to achieve high performance. Modern workloads such as deep neural networks (DNNs) running on these heterogeneous fabrics are highly dependent on the on-chip memory architecture for efficient acceleration. Hence, improving the energy efficiency of such memories directly leads to an efficient system. One of the common methods to save energy is undervolting, i.e., supply voltage underscaling below the nominal level. Such systems can be safely undervolted without incurring faults down to a certain voltage limit. This safe range is also called voltage guardband. However, reducing voltage below the guardband level without decreasing frequency causes timing-based faults. In this article, we propose MoRS, a framework that generates the first approximate undervolting fault model using real faults extracted from experimental undervolting studies on SRAMs to build the model. We inject the faults generated by MoRS into the on-chip memory of the DNN accelerator to evaluate the resilience of the system under the test. MoRS has the advantage of simplicity without any need for high-time overhead experiments while being accurate enough in comparison to a fully randomly generated fault injection approach. We evaluate our experiment in popular DNN workloads by mapping weights to SRAMs and measure the accuracy difference between the output of the MoRS and the real data. Our results show that the maximum difference between real fault data and the output fault model of MoRS is 6.21%, whereas the maximum difference between real data and random fault injection model is 23.2%. In terms of average proximity to the real data, the output of MoRS outperforms the random fault injection approach by$3.21\times $.

We empirically evaluate an undervolting technique, i.e., underscaling the circuit supply voltage below the nominal level, to improve the power-efficiency of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) accelerators mapped to Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Undervolting below a safe voltage level can lead to timing faults due to excessive circuit latency increase. We evaluate the reliability-power trade-off for such accelerators. Specifically, we experimentally study the reduced-voltage operation of multiple components of real FPGAs, characterize the corresponding reliability behavior of CNN accelerators, propose techniques to minimize the drawbacks of reduced-voltage operation, and combine undervolting with architectural CNN optimization techniques, i.e., quantization and pruning. We investigate the effect ofenvironmental temperature on the reliability-power trade-off of such accelerators. We perform experiments on three identical samples of modern Xilinx ZCU102 FPGA platforms with five state-of-the-art image classification CNN benchmarks. This approach allows us to study the effects of our undervolting technique for both software and hardware variability. We achieve more than 3X power-efficiency (GOPs/W ) gain via undervolting. 2.6X of this gain is the result of eliminating the voltage guardband region, i.e., the safe voltage region below the nominal level that is set by FPGA vendor to ensure correct functionality in worst-case environmental and circuit conditions. 43% of the power-efficiency gain is due to further undervolting below the guardband, which comes at the cost of accuracy loss in the CNN accelerator. We evaluate an effective frequency underscaling technique that prevents this accuracy loss, and find that it reduces the power-efficiency gain from 43% to 25%.

This demo aims to demonstrate undervolting below the nominal level set by the vendor for off-the-shelf FPGAs running Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), to achieve power-efficiency. FPGAs are becoming popular [1-4], thanks to their higher throughput than GPUs and better flexibility than ASICs. To further improve the power-efficiency, we propose to employ undervolting below the nominal level (i.e., V_nom= 850mV for studied platform). FPGA vendors usually add a voltage guardband to ensure the correct operation under the worst-case circuit and environmental conditions [5-9]. However, these guardbands can be very conservative and unnecessary for state-of-the-art applications. Reducing the voltage in this guardband region does not lead to reliability issues under normal operating conditions, and thus, eliminating it can result in a significant power reduction for a wide variety of real-world applications. We will experimentally demonstrate a large voltage guardband for modern FPGAs: an average of 33%. Eliminating this guardband leads to significant power-efficiency (GOPs/W) improvement, on average, 2.6X, see Figure 1.