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Binqing Guo

dblp:267/5741 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0003-4757-1281ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.322024
No-Box Universal Adversarial Perturbations Against Image Classifiers via Artificial Textures · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
A Few Seconds Can Change Everything: Fast Decision-based Attacks against DNNs · IJCAI 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › black-box attack
decision-based black-box attack
1.322024
No-Box Universal Adversarial Perturbations Against Image Classifiers via Artificial Textures · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
A Few Seconds Can Change Everything: Fast Decision-based Attacks against DNNs · IJCAI 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › adversarial perturbation
universal adversarial perturbation
0.812024
No-Box Universal Adversarial Perturbations Against Image Classifiers via Artificial Textures · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transfer attack · 0.8artificial texture generation · 0.8frequency-domain perturbation · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 No-Box Universal Adversarial Perturbations Against Image Classifiers via Artificial Textures
abstract
Recent advancements in adversarial attack research have seen a transition from white-box to black-box and even no-box threat models, greatly enhancing the practicality of these attacks. However, existing no-box attacks focus on instance-specific perturbations, leaving more powerful universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) unexplored. This study addresses a crucial question: can UAPs be generated under a no-box threat model? Our findings provide an affirmative answer with a texture-based method. Artificially crafted textures can act as UAPs, termed Texture-Adv. With a modest density and a fixed budget for perturbations, it can achieve an attack success rate of 80% under the constraint of$l_{\infty }$= 10/255. In addition, Texture-Adv can also take effect under traditional black-box threat models. Building upon a phenomenon associated with dominant labels, we utilize Texture-Adv to develop a highly efficient decision-based attack strategy, named Adv-Pool. This approach creates and traverses a set of Texture-Adv instances with diverse classification distributions, significantly reducing the average query budget to less than 1.3, which is near the 1-query lower bound for decision-based attacks. Moreover, we empirically demonstrate that Texture-Adv, when used as a starting point, can enhance the success rates of existing transfer attacks and the efficiency of decision-based attacks. The discovery suggests its potential as an effective starting point for various adversarial attacks while preserving the original constraints of their threat models.
Ningping Mou, Binqing Guo, Lingchen Zhao, Cong Wang 0001, Yue Zhao 0027, Qian Wang 0002
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.2
2022 Towards Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Interpretable Deep Learning Systems
abstract
Recent works have empirically shown that neural network interpretability is susceptible to malicious manipulations. However, existing attacks against Interpretable Deep Learning Systems (IDLSes) all focus on the white-box setting, which is obviously unpractical in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we make the first attempt to attack IDLSes in the decision-based black-box setting. We propose a new framework called Dual Black-box Adversarial Attack (DBAA) which can generate adversarial examples that are misclassified as the target class, yet have very similar interpretations to their benign cases. We conduct comprehensive experiments on different combinations of classifiers and interpreters to illustrate the effectiveness of DBAA. Empirical results show that in all the cases, DBAA achieves high attack success rates and Intersection over Union (IoU) scores.
Yike Zhan, Baolin Zheng, Qian Wang 0002, Ningping Mou, Binqing Guo, Qi Li 0002, Chao Shen 0001, Cong Wang 0001
ICME5
2022 A Few Seconds Can Change Everything: Fast Decision-based Attacks against DNNs
abstract
Previous researches have demonstrated deep learning models' vulnerabilities to decision-based adversarial attacks, which craft adversarial examples based solely on information from output decisions (top-1 labels). However, existing decision-based attacks have two major limitations, i.e., expensive query cost and being easy to detect. To bridge the gap and enlarge real threats to commercial applications, we propose a novel and efficient decision-based attack against black-box models, dubbed FastDrop, which only requires a few queries and work well under strong defenses. The crux of the innovation is that, unlike existing adversarial attacks that rely on gradient estimation and additive noise, FastDrop generates adversarial examples by dropping information in the frequency domain. Extensive experiments on three datasets demonstrate that FastDrop can escape the detection of the state-of-the-art (SOTA) black-box defenses and reduce the number of queries by 13~133× under the same level of perturbations compared with the SOTA attacks. FastDrop only needs 10~20 queries to conduct an attack against various black-box models within 1s. Besides, on commercial vision APIs provided by Baidu and Tencent, FastDrop achieves an attack success rate (ASR) of 100% with 10 queries on average, which poses a real and severe threat to real-world applications.
Ningping Mou, Baolin Zheng, Qian Wang 0002, Yunjie Ge, Binqing Guo
IJCAI5