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Mary R. Thompson

dblp:27/3553 · DBLP profile ↗
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11ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2006
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 5Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-authorComputer networks · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
5 papers
Distributed systems · 95% Electronic design automation · 5%
Network and information security
3 papers
Authentication and access control · 70% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 30%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Distributed systems
grid computing
0.132005
Security for Grids · Proc. IEEE 2005
Security Implications of Typical Grid Computing Usage Scenarios · HPDC 2001
A Monitoring Sensor Management System for Grid Environments · HPDC 2000
Distributed systems › grid computing
grid security
0.112005
Security for Grids · Proc. IEEE 2005
Authentication and access control
authorization
0.022005
Security Implications of Typical Grid Computing Usage Scenarios · HPDC 2001
Security for Grids · Proc. IEEE 2005
Cyber-physical and IoT security
grid security
0.012001
Security Implications of Typical Grid Computing Usage Scenarios · HPDC 2001
Electronic design automation › hardware verification and test
fault detection
0.012000
A Monitoring Sensor Management System for Grid Environments · HPDC 2000
Distributed systems › operating system support
interprocess communication
0.011985
Matchmaker: An Interface Specification Language for Distributed Processing · POPL 1985

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trust management · 0.1public key infrastructure · 0.1certificate-based authentication · 0.0agent-based system · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2006 Intra and Interdomain Circuit Provisioning Using the OSCARS Reservation System
abstract
With the advent of service sensitive applications such as remote controlled experiments, time constrained massive data transfers, and video-conferencing, it has become apparent that there is a need for the setup of dynamically provisioned, quality of service enabled virtual circuits. The ESnet on-demand secure circuits and advance reservation system (OSCARS) is a prototype service enabling advance reservation of guaranteed bandwidth secure virtual circuits. OSCARS operates within the energy sciences network (ESnet), and has provisions for interoperation with other network domains. ESnet is a high-speed network serving thousands of Department of Energy scientists and collaborators worldwide. OSCARS utilizes the Web services model and standards to implement communication with the system and between domains, and for authentication, authorization, and auditing (AAA). The management and operation of end-to-end virtual circuits within the network is done at the layer 3 network level. Multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) and the resource reservation protocol (RSVP) are used to create the virtual circuits or label switched paths (LSP's). quality of service (QoS) is used to provide bandwidth guarantees. This paper describes our experience in implementing OSCARS, collaborations with other bandwidth-reservation projects (including interdomain testing) and future work to be done.
Chin Guok, David W. Robertson, Mary R. Thompson, Jason Lee 0001, Brian Tierney, William E. Johnston
BROADNETS3
2006 ROAM: An Authorization Manager for Grids
Justin Burruss, Thomas W. Fredian, Mary R. Thompson
J. Grid Comput.3
2005 Security for Grids
abstract
Securing a Grid environment presents a distinctive set of challenges. This work groups the activities that need to be secured into four categories: naming and authentication; secure communication; trust, policy, and authorization; and enforcement of access control. It examines the current state of the art in securing these activities and introduces new technologies that promise to meet the security requirements of Grids more completely.
Marty Humphrey, Mary R. Thompson, Keith R. Jackson
Proc. IEEE2
2003 Certificate-based authorization policy in a PKI environment
abstract
The major emphasis of public key infrastructure has been to provide a cryptographically secure means of authenticating identities. However, procedures for authorizing the holders of these identities to perform specific actions still need additional research and development. While there are a number of proposed standards for authorization structures and protocols such as KeyNote, SPKI, and SAML based on X.509 or other key-based identities, none have been widely adopted. As part of an effort to use X.509 identities to provide authorization in highly distributed environments, we have developed and deployed an authorization service based on X.509 identified users and access policy contained in certificates signed by X.509 identified stakeholders. The major goal of this system, called Akenti, is to produce a usable authorization system for an environment consisting of distributed resources used by geographically and administratively distributed users. Akenti assumes communication between users and resources over a secure protocol such as transport layer security (TLS) to provide mutual authentication with X.509 certificates. This paper explains the authorization model and policy language used by Akenti, and how we have implemented an Apache authorization module to provide Akenti authorization.
Mary R. Thompson, Abdelilah Essiari, Srilekha Mudumbai
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.1
2002 Computational Grids in action: the National Fusion Collaboratory
Kate Keahey, Thomas W. Fredian, David P. Schissel, Mary R. Thompson, Ian T. Foster, M. J. Greenwald, Douglas McCune
Future Gener. Comput. Syst.5
2001 Security Implications of Typical Grid Computing Usage Scenarios
abstract
A Computational Grid is a collection of heterogeneous computers and resources spread across multiple administrative domains with the intent of providing users easy access to these resources. There are many ways to access the resources of a Computational Grid, each with unique security requirements and implications for both the resource user and the resource provider. A comprehensive set of Grid usage scenarios is presented and analyzed with regard to security requirements such as authentication, authorization, integrity, and confidentiality. The main value of these scenarios and the associated security discussions is to provide a library of situations against which an application designer can match, thereby facilitating security-aware application use and development from the initial stages of the application design and invocation. A broader goal of these scenarios is to increase the awareness of security issues in Grid Computing. The purpose of this paper is to review the various Grid usage scenarios and analyze their security requirements and implications.
Marty Humphrey, Mary R. Thompson
HPDC2
2001 An Integrated Solution for Secure Group Communication in Wide-Area Networks
abstract
Many distributed applications require a secure reliable group communication system to provide coordination among the application components. This paper describes a secure group layer (SGL) which bundles a reliable group communication system, a group authorization and access control mechanism, and a group key agreement protocol to provide a comprehensive and practical secure group communication platform. The SGL also encapsulates the standard message security services (i.e., confidentiality, authenticity and integrity). A number of challenging issues encountered in the design of SGL are brought to light and experimental results obtained with a prototype implementation are discussed.
Deborah A. Agarwal, Olivier Chevassut, Mary R. Thompson, Gene Tsudik
ISCC3
2000 A Monitoring Sensor Management System for Grid Environments
abstract
Large distributed systems, such as computational grids, require a large amount of monitoring data be collected for a variety of tasks, such as fault detection, performance analysis, performance tuning, performance prediction and scheduling. Ensuring that all necessary monitoring is turned on and that the data is being collected can be a very tedious and error-prone task. We have developed an agent-based system to automate the execution of monitoring sensors and the collection of event data.
Brian Tierney, Brian Crowley, Dan Gunter, Mason Holding, Jason Lee 0001, Mary R. Thompson
HPDC6
2000 A data intensive distributed computing architecture for "Grid" applications
Brian Tierney, William E. Johnston, Jason Lee 0001, Mary R. Thompson
Future Gener. Comput. Syst.4
1999 Certificate-based Access Control for Widely Distributed Resources
Mary R. Thompson, William E. Johnston, Srilekha Mudumbai, Gary Hoo, Keith R. Jackson, Abdelilah Essiari
USENIX Security Symposium1
1985 Matchmaker: An Interface Specification Language for Distributed Processing
abstract
Matchmaker, a language used to specify and automate the generation of interprocess communication interfaces, is presented. The process of and reasons for the evolution of Matchmaker are described. Performance and usage statistics are presented. Comparisons are made between Matchmaker and other related systems. Possible future directions are examined.
Michael B. Jones, Richard F. Rashid, Mary R. Thompson
POPL3