Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Ines Carmen Mikulski

dblp:27/6863 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
6ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2004
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 6Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Empirical software engineering · 41% Software maintenance and evolution · 22% Requirements engineering and software design · 19%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers
Embedded and real-time systems · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Software maintenance and evolution › software quality assurance › defect analysis
defect classification
0.012004
Empirical Analysis of Safety-Critical Anomalies During Operations · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2004
Empirical software engineering
issue report analysis
0.012003
Requirements Discovery during the Testing of Safety-Critical Software · ICSE 2003
Requirements engineering and software design › requirements elicitation
requirements extraction
0.012003
Requirements Discovery during the Testing of Safety-Critical Software · ICSE 2003
Software testing
safety-critical software testing
0.012003
Requirements Discovery during the Testing of Safety-Critical Software · ICSE 2003
Embedded and real-time systems › critical systems
safety-critical systems
0.012004
Empirical Analysis of Safety-Critical Anomalies During Operations · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2004
Embedded and real-time systems › critical systems
safety-critical software
0.012003
Requirements Discovery during the Testing of Safety-Critical Software · ICSE 2003

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

orthogonal defect classification · 0.1problem report analysis · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2004 Empirical Analysis of Safety-Critical Anomalies During Operations
abstract
Analysis of anomalies that occur during operations is an important means of improving the quality of current and future software. Although the benefits of anomaly analysis of operational software are widely recognized, there has been relatively little research on anomaly analysis of safety-critical systems. In particular, patterns of software anomaly data for operational, safety-critical systems are not well understood. We present the results of a pilot study using orthogonal defect classification (ODC) to analyze nearly two hundred such anomalies on seven spacecraft systems. These data show several unexpected classification patterns such as the causal role of difficulties accessing or delivering data, of hardware degradation, and of rare events. The anomalies often revealed latent software requirements that were essential for robust, correct operation of the system. The anomalies also caused changes to documentation and to operational procedures to prevent the same anomalous situations from recurring. Feedback from operational anomaly reports helped measure the accuracy of assumptions about operational profiles, identified unexpected dependencies among embedded software and their systems and environment, and indicated needed improvements to the software, the development process, and the operational procedures. The results indicate that, for long-lived, critical systems, analysis of the most severe anomalies can be a useful mechanism both for maintaining safer, deployed systems and for building safer, similar systems in the future.
Robyn R. Lutz, Ines Carmen Mikulski
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.2
2003 Requirements Discovery during the Testing of Safety-Critical Software
abstract
This paper describes the role of requirements discovery during the testing of a safety-critical software system. Analysis of problem reports generated by the integration and system testing of an embedded, safety-critical software system identified four common mechanisms for requirements discovery and resolution during testing: (1) Incomplete requirements, resolved by changes to the software, (2) Unexpected requirements interactions, resolved by changes to the operational procedures, (3) Requirements confusion by the testers, resolved by changes to the documentation, and (4) Requirements confusion by the testers, resolved by a determination that no change was needed The experience reported here confirms that requirements discovery during testing is frequently due to communication difficulties and subtle interface issues. The results also suggest that "false positive" problem reports from testing (in which the software behaves correctly but unexpectedly) provide a rich source of requirements information that can be used to reduce operational anomalies in critical systems.
Robyn R. Lutz, Ines Carmen Mikulski
ICSE2
2003 Resolving Requirements Discovery in Testing and Operations
abstract
We describe the results of an investigation into requirements discovery during testing and operations. Requirements discovery includes both new requirements and new knowledge regarding existing requirements. Analysis of anomaly reports shows that many of the anomalies that occur during these phases involve requirements discovery. Previous work identified four common mechanisms for requirements discovery and resolution during testing. The results reported here extend that work in two ways: (1) to show that very similar requirements-discovery mechanisms are at work in both testing and operations, and (2) to evaluate the requirements-discovery mechanisms against experience with seven additional systems. We discuss the consequences of these classifications and results in terms of reducing requirements-based defects in critical, embedded systems.
Robyn R. Lutz, Ines Carmen Mikulski
RE2
2003 Better Analysis of Defect Data at NASA
Tim Menzies, Robyn R. Lutz, Ines Carmen Mikulski
SEKE3
2003 Operational anomalies as a cause of safety-critical requirements evolution
Robyn R. Lutz, Ines Carmen Mikulski
J. Syst. Softw.2
2001 Evolution of Safety-Critical Requirements Post-Launch
abstract
This paper reports the results of a small study of requirements changes to the onboard software of three spacecraft subsequent to launch. Only those requirement changes that resulted from post-launch anomalies (i.e., during operations) were of interest here, since the goal was to better understand the relationship between critical anomalies during operations and how safety-critical requirements evolve. The results of the study were surprising in that anomaly-driven, post-launch requirements changes were rarely due to previous requirements having been incorrect. Instead, changes involved new requirements: (1) for the software to handle rare events; or (2) for the software to compensate for hardware failures or limitations. The prevalence of new requirements as a result of post-launch anomalies suggests a need for increased requirements-engineering support of maintenance activities in these systems. The results also confirm both the difficulty and the benefits of pursuing requirements completeness, especially in terms of fault tolerance, during development of critical systems.
Robyn R. Lutz, Ines Carmen Mikulski
RE2