Exposing intrusion campaigns has become a geopolitical tool, with governments and commercial firms publishing threat intelligence reports about hacking attempts and modus operandi. U.S. government officials have explained this as not just a defensive practice but also as a way to 'impose cost' on attackers by forcing them to develop new infrastructure, tools, and techniques. We empirically examine this claim by analyzing attacker behavior before and after publication of indicators of compromise (IOCs). Using IOC feeds from two leading commercial providers, we matched IOCs against a large dataset of real-world network traffic metadata. This enabled us to generate sightings retroactively, capturing malicious activity up to 150 days before and after publication. Unlike prior work focused on post-publication malicious activity, our method provides a more complete view over time. Our results show that most IOCs point to resources that attackers had already abandoned by publication, limiting their utility for detecting ongoing attacks and undermining the idea of 'imposing costs'. Statistical modeling further reveals that publication status has low explanatory power for sightings, suggesting that confounding variables exist. We also observed a 30-day delay between the peak of threat actor activity and IOC publication for one provider. This study is the first empirical assessment linking threat intelligence publication to attacker behavior, bridging computer science and international relations.

The number of published software vulnerabilities is increasing every year. How do organizations stay in control of their attack surface despite their limited staff resources? Prior work has analyzed the overall software vulnerability ecosystem as well as patching processes within organizations, but not how these two are connected.We investigate this missing link through semi-structured interviews with 22 organizations in critical infrastructure and government services. We analyze where in these organizations the responsibility is allocated to collect and triage information about software vulnerabilities, and find that none of our respondents is acquiring such information comprehensively, not even in a reduced and aggregated form like the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). This means that information on known vulnerabilities will be missed, even in critical infrastructure organizations. We observe that organizations apply implicit and explicit coping mechanisms to reduce their intake of vulnerability information, and identify three trade-offs in these strategies: independence, pro-activeness and formalization.Although our respondents’ behavior is in conflict with the widely accepted security advice to collect comprehensive vulnerability information about active systems, no respondents recall having experienced a security incident that was associated with missing information on a known software vulnerability. This suggests that, given scarce resources, reducing the intake of vulnerability information by up to 95% can be considered a rational strategy. Our findings raise questions about the allocation of responsibility and accountability for finding vulnerable systems, as well as suggest changing expectations around collecting vulnerability information.