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Xue-Yang Li

dblp:273/5273 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0003-0177-5214ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 62% Security and privacy of machine learning · 38%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
federated learning security
0.812024
Efficiently Achieving Privacy Preservation and Poisoning Attack Resistance in Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure aggregation
0.812024
Efficiently Achieving Privacy Preservation and Poisoning Attack Resistance in Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
additive secret sharing
0.212024
Efficiently Achieving Privacy Preservation and Poisoning Attack Resistance in Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.212024
Efficiently Achieving Privacy Preservation and Poisoning Attack Resistance in Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

secure median · 0.8secure distance computation · 0.8secure comparison · 0.8secure clipping · 0.8euclidean distance filtering and clipping · 0.8additive secret sharing · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Efficiently Achieving Privacy Preservation and Poisoning Attack Resistance in Federated Learning
abstract
Federated learning enables clients to train models locally and provide local updates to the server instead of raw dataset, thereby preserving data privacy to some extent. However, adversaries can still pry users’ privacy by inferring updates, and compromise the integrity of the global model through poisoning attack. Therefore, many related works have integrated poisoning attack detection method with secure computation to address both issues. Nevertheless, they still encounter two major challenges: (i) the efficiency is too low to be applied in practice, and (ii) the privacy is still at risk of being leaked, e.g., the distance of two local updates for detecting poisoning attack could be exposed to the server. Aiming at the challenges, in this paper, we propose an Efficient Privacy-preserving and Poisoning attack Resistant scheme for Federated Learning, named EPPRFL, which preserves the privacy for local updates and some intermediate information used to detect poisoning attack. In particular, we design an efficient poisoning attack detection method based on Euclidean distance filtering & clipping technique, named F&C. Then, considering the privacy preservation of the F&C method, we efficiently customize secure comparison, secure median, secure distance computation and secure clipping protocols based on additive secret sharing. Experimental results and theoretical analysis show that compared with existing schemes, EPPRFL can better resist poisoning attack and has lower computational and communication overheads on the client side.
Xue-Yang Li, Xue Yang 0003, Zhengchun Zhou, Rongxing Lu
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.1