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Kailani R. Jones

dblp:275/2899 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Usable security · 43% Web and mobile security · 28% Systems and software security · 28%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software maintenance and evolution · 77% Empirical software engineering · 23%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Usable security › security operations
security operations center
0.712023
Work-From-Home and COVID-19: Trajectories of Endpoint Security Management in a Security Operations Center · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Systems and software security › operating system security › mobile OS security
android security updates
0.412020
Deploying Android Security Updates: an Extensive Study Involving Manufacturers, Carriers, and End Users · CCS 2020
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.412020
Deploying Android Security Updates: an Extensive Study Involving Manufacturers, Carriers, and End Users · CCS 2020
Software maintenance and evolution
software ecosystems
0.412020
Deploying Android Security Updates: an Extensive Study Involving Manufacturers, Carriers, and End Users · CCS 2020
Computational social science and digital humanities
organizational studies
0.212023
Work-From-Home and COVID-19: Trajectories of Endpoint Security Management in a Security Operations Center · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Empirical software engineering
mining software repositories
0.112020
Deploying Android Security Updates: an Extensive Study Involving Manufacturers, Carriers, and End Users · CCS 2020

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

qualitative analysis · 1.3interview study · 1.3quantitative measurement · 0.9HTTP request analysis · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Work-From-Home and COVID-19: Trajectories of Endpoint Security Management in a Security Operations Center
Kailani R. Jones, Dalton A. Brucker-Hahn, Bradley Fidler, Alexandru G. Bardas
USENIX Security Symposium1
2020 Deploying Android Security Updates: an Extensive Study Involving Manufacturers, Carriers, and End Users
abstract
Android's fragmented ecosystem makes the delivery of security updates and OS upgrades cumbersome and complex. While Google initiated various projects such as Android One, Project Treble, and Project Mainline to address this problem, and other involved entities (e.g., chipset vendors, manufacturers, carriers) continuously strive to improve their processes, it is still unclear how effective these efforts are on the delivery of updates to supported end-user devices. In this paper, we perform an extensive quantitative study (Aug. 2015 to Dec. 2019) to measure the Android security updates and OS upgrades rollout process. Our study leverages multiple data sources: the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), device manufacturers, and the top four U.S. carriers (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint). Furthermore, we analyze an end-user dataset captured in 2019 (152M anonymized HTTP requests associated with 9.1M unique user identifiers) from a U.S.-based social network. Our findings include unique measurements that, due to the fragmented and inconsistent ecosystem, were previously challenging to perform. For example, manufacturers and carriers introduce a median latency of 24 days before rolling out security updates, with an additional median delay of 11 days before end devices update. We show that these values alter per carrier-manufacturer relationship, yet do not alter greatly based on a model's age. Our results also delve into the effectiveness of current Android projects. For instance, security updates for Treble devices are available on average 7 days faster than for non-Treble devices. While this constitutes an improvement, the security update delay for Treble devices still averages 19 days.
Kailani R. Jones, Ting-Fang Yen, Sathya Chandran Sundaramurthy, Alexandru G. Bardas
CCS1