DeepCover [6] is a secure authenticator circuit family developed by Analog Devices. It was designed to provide cryptographic functions, true random number generation, and EEPROM secure storage. DS28C36 is one of the DeepCover family, which is widely used in secure boot and secure download for IoT. It has been recently deployed in the Coldcard Mk4 hardware wallet [3] as a second secure element to enhance its security. In this paper, we present for the first time, a detailed evaluation for the DS28C36 secure EEPROM against Laser Fault Injection (LFI). In the context of a black box approach, we prove by experimental results that the chip resists single fault attacks. In order to overcome this, we present the use of leakage detection such as Welch's T-test to facilitate finding the correct moments for injecting successful faults, which is not common in Fault Injection (FI) as this method has been used only for Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs). By using this knowledge, we found two moments for injecting laser pulses to extract the protected EEPROM user pages with 99% success rate. The attack can be reproduced within a day. The presented attack negatively impacts the users of DS28C36 (including Coldcard Mk4).

This work presents three vulnerabilities identified in the ATECC608B secure element. This circuit is the latest silicon revision of the ATECC devices family, which is widely deployed in IoT devices. When chained, the three vulnerabilities exploitation lead to a protected secret data extraction from the secure element. For this work, three different commands of the chip are faulted with laser illumination. The first attack recovers internal secret EEPROM masking keys. With the knowledge of those keys, further attacks are leveraged: we show how authentication and session key generation can be hijacked with laser assistance to finally gain authorized access to a secret data slot. We also used very long laser pulses for our attacks in order to fault multiple memory accesses with high efficiency. Our study was done in a black box approach, and shows multiple exploit attacks using laser fault injection can be practical. In particular, this allowed us to recover secret data on a real test device.

Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI) is considered as an effective fault injection technique for the purpose of conducting physical attacks against integrated circuits. It enables an adversary to inject errors on a circuit to gain knowledge of sensitive information or to bypass security features. The aim of this paper is to highlight the design and validation of SiliconToaster, which is a cheap and programmable platform for EM pulse injection. It has been designed using low-cost and accessible components that can be easily found. In addition, it can inject faults with a programmable voltage up to 1.2kV without the need to an external power supply as it is powered by the USB. The second part of the paper invests the SiliconToaster in order to bypass the firmware security protections of STM32F2 microcontroller. Two security levels were bypassed sequentially for the first time in a non-invasive way (without chip decapsulation).