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Tomás Kasl

dblp:275/3472 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game › strategic game
continuous games
0.512021
Double Oracle Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in Continuous Games · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › equilibrium computation
double oracle algorithm
0.512021
Double Oracle Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in Continuous Games · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium computation
0.512021
Double Oracle Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in Continuous Games · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium
0.512021
Double Oracle Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in Continuous Games · AAAI 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

semidefinite programming · 0.5fictitious play · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Double Oracle Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in Continuous Games
abstract
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite programming. In general, however, continuous games are not directly amenable to computational procedures. In this contribution, we develop an iterative strategy generation technique for finding a Nash equilibrium in a whole class of continuous two-person zero-sum games with compact strategy sets. The procedure, which is called the double oracle algorithm, has been successfully applied to large finite games in the past. We prove the convergence of the double oracle algorithm to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the algorithm is guaranteed to recover an approximate equilibrium in finitely-many steps. Our numerical experiments show that it outperforms fictitious play on several examples of games appearing in the literature. In particular, we provide a detailed analysis of experiments with a version of the continuous Colonel Blotto game.
Lukás Adam, Rostislav Horcík, Tomás Kasl, Tomás Kroupa
AAAI3