Markov Games (MG) is an important model for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). It was long believed that the “curse of multi-agents” (i.e., the algorithmic performance drops exponentially with the number of agents) is unavoidable until several recent works (Daskalakis et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023). While these works resolved the curse of multi-agents, when the state spaces are prohibitively large and (linear) function approximations are deployed, they either had a slower convergence rate of $O(T^{-1/4})$ or brought a polynomial dependency on the number of actions $A_{\max}$ – which is avoidable in single-agent cases even when the loss functions can arbitrarily vary with time. This paper first refines the AVLPR framework by Wang et al. (2023), with an insight of designing \textit{data-dependent} (i.e., stochastic) pessimistic estimation of the sub-optimality gap, allowing a broader choice of plug-in algorithms. When specialized to MGs with independent linear function approximations, we propose novel \textit{action-dependent bonuses} to cover occasionally extreme estimation errors. With the help of state-of-the-art techniques from the single-agent RL literature, we give the first algorithm that tackles the curse of multi-agents, attains the optimal $O(T^{-1/2})$ convergence rate, and avoids $\text{poly}(A_{\max})$ dependency simultaneously.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve $\widetilde{O}\left(\Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}\right)$ regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation $\Delta$, is known, and $\widetilde{O}\left(\Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}\right)$ regret when $\Delta$ is unknown, where $T$ is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Off-policy dynamic programming (DP) techniques such as $Q$-learning have proven to be important in sequential decision-making problems. In the presence of function approximation, however, these techniques often diverge due to the absence of Bellman completeness in the function classes considered, a crucial condition for the success of DP-based methods. In this paper, we show how off-policy learning techniques based on return-conditioned supervised learning (RCSL) are able to circumvent these challenges of Bellman completeness, converging under significantly more relaxed assumptions inherited from supervised learning. We prove there exists a natural environment in which if one uses two-layer multilayer perceptron as the function approximator, the layer width needs to grow *linearly* with the state space size to satisfy Bellman completeness while a constant layer width is enough for RCSL. These findings take a step towards explaining the superior empirical performance of RCSL methods compared to DP-based methods in environments with near-optimal datasets. Furthermore, in order to learn from sub-optimal datasets, we propose a simple framework called MBRCSL, granting RCSL methods the ability of dynamic programming to stitch together segments from distinct trajectories. MBRCSL leverages learned dynamics models and forward sampling to accomplish trajectory stitching while avoiding the need for Bellman completeness that plagues all dynamic programming algorithms. We propose both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation to back these claims, outperforming state-of-the-art model-free and model-based offline RL algorithms across several simulated robotics problems.

In multiplayer games, self-interested behavior among the players can harm the social welfare. Tax mechanisms are a common method to alleviate this issue and induce socially optimal behavior. In this work, we take the initial step of learning the optimal tax that can maximize social welfare with limited feedback in congestion games. We propose a new type of feedback named \emph{equilibrium feedback}, where the tax designer can only observe the Nash equilibrium after deploying a tax plan. Existing algorithms are not applicable due to the exponentially large tax function space, nonexistence of the gradient, and nonconvexity of the objective. To tackle these challenges, we design a computationally efficient algorithm that leverages several novel components: (1) a piece-wise linear tax to approximate the optimal tax; (2) extra linear terms to guarantee a strongly convex potential function; (3) an efficient subroutine to find the exploratory tax that can provide critical information about the game. The algorithm can find an $\epsilon$-optimal tax with $O(\beta F^2/\epsilon)$ sample complexity, where $\beta$ is the smoothness of the cost function and $F$ is the number of facilities.

We propose a new model, \emph{independent linear Markov game}, for multi-agent reinforcement learning with a large state space and a large number of agents.This is a class of Markov games with \emph{independent} linear function approximation, where each agent has its own function approximation for the state-action value functions that are {\it marginalized} by other players’ policies. We design new algorithms for learning the Markov coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) and Markov correlated equilibria (CE) with sample complexity bounds that only scale polynomially with \emph{each agent’s own function class complexity}, thus breaking the curse of multiagents. In contrast, existing works for Markov games with function approximation have sample complexity bounds scale with the size of the \emph{joint action space} when specialized to the canonical tabular Markov game setting, which is exponentially large in the number of agents. Our algorithms rely on two key technical innovations: (1) utilizing policy replay to tackle {\it non-stationarity} incurred by multiple agents and the use of function approximation; (2) separating learning Markov equilibria and exploration in the Markov games, which allows us to use the full-information no-regret learning oracle instead of the stronger bandit-feedback no-regret learning oracle used in the tabular setting. Furthermore, we propose an iterative-best-response type algorithm that can learn pure Markov Nash equilibria in independent linear Markov potential games, with applications in learning in congestion games.In the tabular case, by adapting the policy replay mechanism for independent linear Markov games, we propose an algorithm with $\widetilde{O}(\epsilon^{-2})$ sample complexity to learn Markov CCE, which improves the state-of-the-art result $\widetilde{O}(\epsilon^{-3})$ in \citep{daskalakis2022complexity}, where $\epsilon$ is the desired accuracy, and also significantly improves other problem parameters. Furthermore, we design the first provably efficient algorithm for learning Markov CE that breaks the curse of multiagents.

Although the shapes of the parameters are not crucial for designing first-order optimization methods in large scale empirical risk minimization problems, they have important impact on the size of the matrix to be inverted when developing second-order type methods. In this article, we propose an efficient and novel second-order method based on the parameters in the real matrix space [Formula: see text] and a matrix-product approximate Fisher matrix (MatFisher) by using the products of gradients. The size of the matrix to be inverted is much smaller than that of the Fisher information matrix in the real vector space [Formula: see text]. Moreover, by utilizing the matrix delayed update and the block diagonal approximation techniques, the computational cost can be controlled and is comparable with first-order methods. A global convergence and a superlinear local convergence analysis are established under mild conditions. Numerical results on image classification with ResNet50, quantum chemistry modeling with SchNet, and data-driven partial differential equations solution with PINN illustrate that our method is quite competitive to the state-of-the-art methods.

This paper considers offline multi-agent reinforcement learning. We propose the strategy-wise concentration principle which directly builds a confidence interval for the joint strategy, in contrast to the point-wise concentration principle which builds a confidence interval for each point in the joint action space. For two-player zero-sum Markov games, by exploiting the convexity of the strategy-wise bonus, we propose a computationally efficient algorithm whose sample complexity enjoys a better dependency on the number of actions than the prior methods based on the point-wise bonus. Furthermore, for offline multi-agent general-sum Markov games, based on the strategy-wise bonus and a novel surrogate function, we give the first algorithm whose sample complexity only scales $\sum_{i=1}^m A_i$ where $A_i$ is the action size of the $i$-th player and $m$ is the number of players. In sharp contrast, the sample complexity of methods based on the point-wise bonus would scale with the size of the joint action space $\Pi_{i=1}^m A_i$ due to the curse of multiagents. Lastly, all of our algorithms can naturally take a pre-specified strategy class $\Pi$ as input and output a strategy that is close to the best strategy in $\Pi$. In this setting, the sample complexity only scales with $\log |\Pi|$ instead of $\sum_{i=1}^m A_i$.

We study what dataset assumption permits solving offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. In stark contrast to the offline single-agent Markov decision process, we show that the single strategy concentration assumption is insufficient for learning the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. On the other hand, we propose a new assumption named unilateral concentration and design a pessimism-type algorithm that is provably efficient under this assumption. In addition, we show that the unilateral concentration assumption is necessary for learning an NE strategy. Furthermore, our algorithm can achieve minimax sample complexity without any modification for two widely studied settings: dataset with uniform concentration assumption and turn-based Markov games. Our work serves as an important initial step towards understanding offline multi-agent reinforcement learning.

In this paper, we investigate Nash-regret minimization in congestion games, a class of games with benign theoretical structure and broad real-world applications. We first propose a centralized algorithm based on the optimism in the face of uncertainty principle for congestion games with (semi-)bandit feedback, and obtain finite-sample guarantees. Then we propose a decentralized algorithm via a novel combination of the Frank-Wolfe method and G-optimal design. By exploiting the structure of the congestion game, we show the sample complexity of both algorithms depends only polynomially on the number of players and the number of facilities, but not the size of the action set, which can be exponentially large in terms of the number of facilities. We further define a new problem class, Markov congestion games, which allows us to model the non-stationarity in congestion games. We propose a centralized algorithm for Markov congestion games, whose sample complexity again has only polynomial dependence on all relevant problem parameters, but not the size of the action set.

This paper presents a systematic study on gap-dependent sample complexity in offline reinforcement learning. Prior works showed when the density ratio between an optimal policy and the behavior policy is upper bounded (single policy coverage), then the agent can achieve an $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}\right)$ rate, which is also minimax optimal. We show under the same single policy coverage assumption, the rate can be improved to $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)$ when there is a gap in the optimal $Q$-function. Furthermore, we show under a stronger uniform single policy coverage assumption, the sample complexity can be further improved to $O(1)$. Lastly, we also present nearly-matching lower bounds to complement our gap-dependent upper bounds.

We study algorithms using randomized value functions for exploration in reinforcement learning. This type of algorithms enjoys appealing empirical performance. We show that when we use 1) a single random seed in each episode, and 2) a Bernstein-type magnitude of noise, we obtain a worst-case $\widetilde{O}\left(H\sqrt{SAT}\right)$ regret bound for episodic time-inhomogeneous Markov Decision Process where $S$ is the size of state space, $A$ is the size of action space, $H$ is the planning horizon and $T$ is the number of interactions. This bound polynomially improves all existing bounds for algorithms based on randomized value functions, and for the first time, matches the $\Omega\left(H\sqrt{SAT}\right)$ lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Our result highlights that randomized exploration can be near-optimal, which was previously achieved only by optimistic algorithms. To achieve the desired result, we develop 1) a new clipping operation to ensure both the probability of being optimistic and the probability of being pessimistic are lower bounded by a constant, and 2) a new recursive formula for the absolute value of estimation errors to analyze the regret.

We propose a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm inspired by the popular randomized least squares value iteration (RLSVI) algorithm as well as the optimism principle. Unlike existing upper-confidence-bound (UCB) based approaches, which are often computationally intractable, our algorithm drives exploration by simply perturbing the training data with judiciously chosen i.i.d. scalar noises. To attain optimistic value function estimation without resorting to a UCB-style bonus, we introduce an optimistic reward sampling procedure. When the value functions can be represented by a function class $\mathcal{F}$, our algorithm achieves a worst-case regret bound of $\tilde{O}(\mathrm{poly}(d_EH)\sqrt{T})$ where $T$ is the time elapsed, $H$ is the planning horizon and $d_E$ is the \emph{eluder dimension} of $\mathcal{F}$. In the linear setting, our algorithm reduces to LSVI-PHE, a variant of RLSVI, that enjoys an $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{d^3H^3T})$ regret. We complement the theory with an empirical evaluation across known difficult exploration tasks.

The empirical success of multi-agent reinforcement learning is encouraging, while few theoretical guarantees have been revealed. In this work, we prove that the plug-in solver approach, probably the most natural reinforcement learning algorithm, achieves minimax sample complexity for turn-based stochastic game (TBSG). Specifically, we perform planning in an empirical TBSG by utilizing a ‘simulator’ that allows sampling from arbitrary state-action pair. We show that the empirical Nash equilibrium strategy is an approximate Nash equilibrium strategy in the true TBSG and give both problem-dependent and problem-independent bound. We develop reward perturbation techniques to tackle the non-stationarity in the game and Taylor-expansion-type analysis to improve the dependence on approximation error. With these novel techniques, we prove the minimax sample complexity of turn-based stochastic game.

It is believed that a model-based approach for reinforcement learning (RL) is the key to reduce sample complexity. However, the understanding of the sample optimality of model-based RL is still largely missing, even for the linear case. This work considers sample complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-optimal policy in a Markov decision process (MDP) that admits a linear additive feature representation, given only access to a generative model. We solve this problem via a plug-in solver approach, which builds an empirical model and plans in this empirical model via an arbitrary plug-in solver. We prove that under the anchor-state assumption, which implies implicit non-negativity in the feature space, the minimax sample complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-optimal policy in a $\gamma$-discounted MDP is $O(K/(1-\gamma)^3\epsilon^2)$, which only depends on the dimensionality $K$ of the feature space and has no dependence on the state or action space. We further extend our results to a relaxed setting where anchor-states may not exist and show that a plug-in approach can be sample efficient as well, providing a flexible approach to design model-based algorithms for RL.