Dianshi Yang

dblp:277/2695 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0006-2028-0152ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Too Open to be Secure: An Evaluation of OpenNIC DNS Services and Domains
Dianshi Yang, Xiaoqin Liang, Daiping Liu, Guannan Liu 0003, Shuai Hao 0001, Xing Gao 0001
DSN1
2023 IoT Sentinel: Correlation-based Attack Detection, Localization, and Authentication in IoT Networks
abstract
Security issues have become one of the major challenges for Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks. To overcome this challenge, the recent commonly-used approaches mainly focus on conducting encryption on IoT communication or performing continuous authentication for IoT devices by using pre-shared credentials (e.g., passcode and wireless channel signatures). However, these mechanisms are deemed insufficient, in part, due to the increasing number of data breaches and the recent proliferation of sensitive IoT devices and applications. We present IoT Sentinel - a novel security system that explores the correlation between IoT devices to effectively and efficiently secure IoT networks. Specifically, our system (i) detects potential attacks, (ii) localizes the attacker, and (iii) conducts dynamic implicit authentication at the same time. Moreover, instead of requiring full physical-layer access to IoT devices for finegrained measurement of the wireless signal, IoT Sentinel uses only coarse packet-level device correlation information to secure IoT networks with negligible overhead to the network. Thus, making our approach compatible with existing constrained IoT devices. We extensively evaluate the efficacy of IoT Sentinel in different scenarios and settings. The experiment results show that our approach achieves around 96% attack detection accuracy, more than 70% attacker localization accuracy, and around 100% device authentication accuracy.
Dianshi Yang, Abhinav Kumar 0007, Stuart Ray, Wei Wang 0190, Reza Tourani
ICCCN1
2022 Protecting the Integrity of IoT Sensor Data and Firmware With A Feather-Light Blockchain Infrastructure
abstract
Smart cities deploy large numbers of sensors and collect a tremendous amount of data from them. For example, Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs), which consist of physical meters that collect usage data about public utilities such as power and water, are an important building block in a smart city. In a typical sensor network, the measurement devices are connected through a computer network, which exposes them to cyber attacks. Furthermore, the data is centrally managed at the operator’s servers, making it vulnerable to insider threats.Our goal is to protect the integrity of data collected by large-scale sensor networks and the firmware in measurement devices from cyber attacks and insider threats. To this end, we first develop a comprehensive threat model for attacks against data and firmware integrity, which can target any of the stakeholders in the operation of the sensor network. Next, we use our threat model to analyze existing defense mechanisms, including signature checks, remote firmware attestation, anomaly detection, and blockchain-based secure logs. However, the large size of the Trusted Computing Base and a lack of scalability limit the applicability of these existing mechanisms. We propose the Feather-Light Blockchain Infrastructure (FLBI) framework to address these limitations. Our framework leverages a two-layer architecture and cryptographic threshold signature chains to support large networks of low-capacity devices such as meters and data aggregators. We have fully implemented the FLBI’s end-to-end functionality on the Hyperledger Fabric and private Ethereum blockchain platforms. Our experiments show that the FLBI is able to support millions of end devices.
Daniël Reijsbergen, Aung Maw, Sarad Venugopalan, Dianshi Yang, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Jianying Zhou 0001
ICBC4
2022 LARP: A Lightweight Auto-Refreshing Pseudonym Protocol for V2X
abstract
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is the key enabler for emerging intelligent transportation systems. Applications built on top of V2X require both authentication and privacy protection for the vehicles. The common approach to meet both requirements is to use pseudonyms which are short-term identities. However, both industrial standards and state-of-the-art research are not designed for resource-constrained environments. In addition, they make a strong assumption about the security of the vehicle's on-board computation units. In this paper, we propose a lightweight auto-refreshing pseudonym protocol (LARP) for V2X. LARP supports efficient operations for resource-constrained devices, and provides security even when parts of the vehicle are compromised. We provide formal security proof showing that the protocol is secure. We conduct experiments on a Raspberry Pi 4. The results demonstrate that LARP is feasible and practical.
Zheng Yang 0001, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Yingying Yao, Dianshi Yang, Xiaolin Chang, Jianying Zhou 0001
SACMAT5