Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Chufeng Shi

dblp:277/6471 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0002-8507-0077ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 87% Mathematical optimization · 13%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
2 papers
Information retrieval · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Information retrieval
online advertising
1.122025
ComRecycle: An Intelligent Computation Recycling Framework for Online Advertising · KDD (2) 2025
Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising · KDD (1) 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.912025
Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising · KDD (1) 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
incentive compatibility
0.912025
Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising · KDD (1) 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

regret minimization · 1.7online constrained optimization · 1.7end-to-end learning · 1.7caching · 1.7autoregressive generative model · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 ComRecycle: An Intelligent Computation Recycling Framework for Online Advertising
abstract
xisting online advertising systems generate high-quality ad recommendations through a complex online serving pipeline whenever a user's ad request arrives. However, our analyses on the display advertising system in Taobao show that this paradigm could lead to an inefficient utilization of computational resources. In this work, we propose an intelligent computation recycling framework called ComRecycle, which caches and reuses unexposed ad sets for repetitive ad requests to improve the computational resource utilization. We introduce fine-grained computation recycling strategies, and formulate the computation recycling decision as an online constrained optimization problem. Therefore, ComRecycle can achieve the goal of reducing computation costs while guaranteeing the same level of recommendation performance. Extensive offline experiments validate the correctness and effectiveness of ComRecycle. Our online A/B testing demonstrates that ComRecycle can save over 20% computational resources while maintaining the same system performance as the baseline.
Chufeng Shi, Yangsu Liu, Zhenzhe Zheng 0001, Dagui Chen, Ruitao Zhu, Fan Wu 0006
KDD (2)1
2025 Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising
abstract
Online advertising has become a core revenue driver for internet industry, with ad auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives. Classical auction mechanisms, such as GSP, rely on the independent CTR assumption and fail to account for the interplay among the displayed items, also called as externalities in economics. Recent advancements in learning-based auctions enable the encoding of high-dimensional contextual features. However, existing methods are limited by the ''prediction-before-allocation'' design paradigm, which models set-level externalities within candidate ads and fails to consider the context of the final allocation, leading to suboptimal results. In this work, we introduce Contextual Generative Auction (CGA), a novel framework that incorporates permutation-level externalities in multi-slot ad auctions. Built on the structure of our theoretically derived optimal auction, CGA decouples the optimization of allocation and payment. We construct an autoregressive generative model for allocation, and reformulate incentive compatibility (IC) constraint into minimizing ex-post regret that supports gradient computation, enabling end-to-end learning of the optimal payment rule. Extensive offline and online experiments demonstrate that CGA significantly enhances platform revenue and CTR compared to existing methods, and effectively approximates the optimal auction with nearly maximal revenue and minimal regret.
Ruitao Zhu, Yangsu Liu, Dagui Chen, Zhenjia Ma, Chufeng Shi, Zhenzhe Zheng 0001, Jie Zhang 0135, Jian Xu 0015, Bo Zheng 0007, Fan Wu 0006
KDD (1)5