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Nikolaos Pantelaios

dblp:277/8303 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Web and mobile security · 76% Malware analysis · 24%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › web security
javascript engine security
0.812024
FV8: A Forced Execution JavaScript Engine for Detecting Evasive Techniques · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Web and mobile security › browser security
browser extension security
0.412020
You've Changed: Detecting Malicious Browser Extensions through their Update Deltas · CCS 2020
Web and mobile security
browser security
0.212024
FV8: A Forced Execution JavaScript Engine for Detecting Evasive Techniques · USENIX Security Symposium 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

forced execution · 0.8clustering · 0.4API abuse encoding · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 FV8: A Forced Execution JavaScript Engine for Detecting Evasive Techniques
Nikolaos Pantelaios, Alexandros Kapravelos
USENIX Security Symposium1
2020 You've Changed: Detecting Malicious Browser Extensions through their Update Deltas
abstract
In this paper, we conduct the largest to-date analysis of browser extensions, by investigating 922,684 different extension versions collected in the past six years, and using this data to discover malicious versions of extensions. We propose a two-stage system that first identifies malicious extensions based on anomalous extension ratings and locates the code that was added to a benign extension in order to make it malicious. We encode these code deltas according to the APIs that they abuse and search our historical dataset for other similar deltas of extensions which have not yet been flagged, neither by users nor by Chrome's Web Store. We were able to discover 143 malicious extensions belonging to 21 malicious clusters, exhibiting a wide range of abuse, from history stealing and ad injection, to the hijacking of new tabs and search engines. Our results show that our proposed techniques operate in an abuse-agnostic way and can identify malicious extensions that are evading detection.
Nikolaos Pantelaios, Nick Nikiforakis, Alexandros Kapravelos
CCS1