Information security in Naval shipboard platforms is becoming increasingly important with the move towards distributed computing, increased automation, and Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) systems. Additionally, there are hard real-time requirements that must be met in a combat system, which is a critical component of the total shipboard platform. Information security services and real-time services are sometimes required simultaneously. However the real-time requirements and the security requirements conflict with one another. NSWC-DD has initiated testing of a security enhancement for the Internet Protocol, IP Security (IPSEC) in a distributed real-time environment. This paper provides a brief overview how IPSEC may be used in the platform of interest and the impact of implementing IPSEC within the kernel of the workstation operating system.

FDDI, with its inherent reconfiguration capabilities, is being selected as the key technology for data transfer within mission critical systems including those used aboard military platforms. Much has been written about FDDI mechanisms and interconnection topologies which can increase the number of failures needed to segment an FDDI network. While this is one attribute key to mission critical systems, another important attribute is the time needed to complete reconfiguration. The paper is intended to provide a theoretical and analytical description of FDDI reconfiguration and provide a means for experimentally determining FDDI reconfiguration timing. The theoretical minimum reconfiguration time provides a basis for considering the results of FDDI product testing.

The fiber distributed data interface (FDDI) concentrator tree topology with loopback is proposed for use in networks which need to continue operation after multiple faults. Initial experiments to use the concentrator tree with loop-back result in configurational dependencies which are not initially understood. A few caveats are found which can be handled through careful cabling. Both a theoretical and an experimental analysis of various cases of the concentrator tree with loopback are provided. A discussion on the use of bypass relays in the concentrator tree with loopback is given.

The new direction taken by the US Navy in its SAFENET standardization effort is described. A discussion is provided on the survivability issues in the trunk ring, dual homing, and alternate path configurations. In addition, the approach of using multiple independent networks (e.g. FDDI networks) with dynamic network layer protocols is presented.>

The US Navy is selecting a et of local area networking standards, under the name SAFENET, for use on tactical platforms. The set of standards incorporate the FDDI local area network (LAN) at the physical and data link layers. The SAFENET group has taken an FDDI feature (the hold policy option) and used it as the basis of a data path hop (or switch) capability. The paper provides a discussion of FDDI trunk ring reconfiguration both in a normal mode of operation and when the hold policy is in effect. Operational issues of concern to tactical network survivability are discussed. A discussion of the issues that result from the use of optical switches, the use of the hold policy, the use of dual media access controllers, the resolution of addresses and the association of one data path to one of two media access controllers is provided.>

SAFENET (survivable adaptable fiber optic embedded network), a local area network profile covering all seven ISO/OSI layers, has been selected to meet the needs of systems used aboard the US Navy's combat ships and aircraft and is one of the Navy's NGCR (Next Generation Computer Resources) programme standard sets which are being developed to provide an architecture for computing resources in future Navy systems. While much of the SAFENET profile is taken directly from the existing GOSIP and MAP profiles, requirements of the combat environment necessitate some different capabilities. Areas of concern include: network cable plant, provision and reconfiguration of redundant paths, support for time synchronization across the network, a real-time oriented transport protocol, network management, directory services, and communication from application process to application process. Activities of the SAFENET Working Group to overcome the shortfalls of commercial standards are discussed.>