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Joe-Kai Tsay

dblp:28/4826 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 49% Authentication and access control · 36% Hardware security and side channels · 15%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptanalysis › protocol cryptanalysis
padding oracle attack
0.112012
Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware · CRYPTO 2012
Authentication and access control › kerberos authentication
public-key kerberos
0.112008
Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos · Inf. Comput. 2008
Hardware security and side channels
cryptographic hardware
0.012012
Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware · CRYPTO 2012
Authentication and access control
kerberos authentication
0.012008
Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos · Inf. Comput. 2008

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

padding oracle attack · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2012 Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware
Romain Bardou, Riccardo Focardi, Yusuke Kawamoto 0001, Lorenzo Simionato, Graham Steel, Joe-Kai Tsay
CRYPTO6
2008 Computationally sound mechanized proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos
abstract
We present a computationally sound mechanized analysis of Kerberos 5, both with and without its public-key extension PKINIT. We prove authentication and key secrecy properties using the prover CryptoVerif, which works directly in the computational model; these are the first mechanical proofs of a full industrial protocol at the computational level. We also generalize the notion of key usability and use CryptoVerif to prove that this definition is satisfied by keys in Kerberos.
Bruno Blanchet, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, Joe-Kai Tsay
AsiaCCS4
2008 Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos
Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, Joe-Kai Tsay, Christopher Walstad
Inf. Comput.4
2006 Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key Kerberos
Michael Backes 0001, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, Joe-Kai Tsay
ESORICS5