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Michael Cao

dblp:282/6437 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Malware analysis · 64% Security and privacy of machine learning · 26% Web and mobile security · 10%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Malware analysis
android malware
0.612022
Rotten Apples Spoil the Bunch: An Anatomy of Google Play Malware · ICSE 2022
Malware analysis
evasion
0.612022
Rotten Apples Spoil the Bunch: An Anatomy of Google Play Malware · ICSE 2022
Malware analysis
malware detection
0.612022
Rotten Apples Spoil the Bunch: An Anatomy of Google Play Malware · ICSE 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial robustness
0.412020
On Benign Features in Malware Detection · ASE 2020
Malware analysis › mobile malware detection
android malware detection
0.412020
On Benign Features in Malware Detection · ASE 2020
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial robustness
evasion attack robustness
0.412020
On Benign Features in Malware Detection · ASE 2020
Web and mobile security › mobile security
android security
0.212022
Rotten Apples Spoil the Bunch: An Anatomy of Google Play Malware · ICSE 2022
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.212022
Rotten Apples Spoil the Bunch: An Anatomy of Google Play Malware · ICSE 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

manual analysis · 0.6graph-based representation · 0.6feature analysis · 0.4classifier retraining · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Rotten Apples Spoil the Bunch: An Anatomy of Google Play Malware
abstract
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of Android malware that bypassed the strictest defenses of the Google Play application store and penetrated the official Android market between January 2016 and July 2021. We systematically identified 1,238 such malicious applications, grouped them into 134 families, and manually analyzed one application from 105 distinct families. During our manual analysis, we identified malicious payloads the applications execute, conditions guarding execution of the payloads, hiding techniques applications employ to evade detection by the user, and other implementation-level properties relevant for automated malware detection. As most applications in our dataset contain multiple payloads, each triggered via its own complex activation logic, we also contribute a graph-based representation showing activation paths for all application payloads in form of a control- and data-flow graph. Furthermore, we discuss the capabilities of existing malware detection tools, put them in context of the properties observed in the analyzed malware, and identify gaps and future research directions. We believe that our detailed analysis of the recent, evasive malware will be of interest to researchers and practitioners and will help further improve malware detection tools.
Michael Cao, Khaled E. Ahmed, Julia Rubin
ICSE1
2020 On Benign Features in Malware Detection
abstract
This paper investigates the problem of classifying Android applications into malicious and benign. We analyze the performance of a popular malware detection tool, Drebin, and show that its correct classification decisions often stem from using benign rather than malicious features for making predictions. That, effectively, turns the classifier into a benign app detector rather than a malware detector. While such behavior allows the classifier to achieve a high detection accuracy, it also makes it vulnerable to attacks, e.g., by a malicious app pretending to be benign by using features similar to those of benign apps. In this paper, we propose an approach for deprioritizing benign features in malware detection, focusing the detection on truly malicious portions of the apps. We show that our proposed approach makes a classifier more resilient to attacks while still allowing it to maintain a high detection accuracy.
Michael Cao, Sahar Badihi, Khaled E. Ahmed, Peiyu Xiong, Julia Rubin
ASE1