Grace H. Cimaszewski

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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

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Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Cryptographically-Secured Domain Validation
abstract
Certificate Authorities (CAs) bootstrap HTTPS-based privacy and trust on the Internet by authenticating the identity of domain names via a process known as domain control validation (DV). Ironically, currently used DV mechanisms rely on unauthenticated web protocols, including plaintext DNS and HTTP, and have been shown vulnerable to a range of network attacks. To address this critical challenge, we propose a framework for cryptographic verification of domain control, which fundamentally mitigates network-layer attacks. Our framework rethinks live DV protocol mechanisms using a domain owner specified security policy which constrains CAs to use authenticated channels and provide cryptographic verification. Our approach minimizes deployment burden on CAs by leveraging existing pieces of the Web PKI and DNS ecosystems,such as Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA) policies and secure DNS. We demonstrate the security properties of our design formally using the Tamarin verification tool and empirically via ethically-conducted real-world attacks. We showcase the feasibility of our framework through collaboration with a major anonymous CA: we analyze DNS and certificate issuance practices of over 400M live domains to understand the current state of CAA policies and secure DNS. We also report on the CA’s experiences implementing parts of our design in production. Finally, to realize our framework in the live Web PKI, we led a successful standardization effort for mandatory use of secure DNS by CAs at the CA/Browser Forum.
Grace H. Cimaszewski, Henry Birge-Lee, Cyrill Krähenbühl, Liang Wang 0054, Aaron Gable, Prateek Mittal
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2025 Scaling SCIERA: A Journey Through the Deployment of a Next-generation Network
abstract
The SCION Next-Generation Network (NGN) architecture has expanded steadily since 2017, with today 20+ ISPs offering SCION connectivity. In production, IP-to-SCION-to-IP translation by SCION-IP-Gateways (SIGs) is used, such that applications are unaware of the NGN communication. To accelerate innovation and deployments, our aim is to increase the number of native SCION use cases, where the application is fully SCION-aware and optimizes communication across all path choices offered by the network. We set out to achieve two core objectives: (1) facilitating simple native connectivity for applications, and (2) enhancing the scalability of SCION deployment at academic sites.
François Wirz, Marten Gartner, Jelte van Bommel, Elham Ehsani Moghadam, Grace H. Cimaszewski, Anxiao He, Yizhe Zhang 0006, Henry Birge-Lee, Felix Kottmann, Cyrill Krähenbühl, Jonghoon Kwon, Kyveli Mavromati, Liang Wang 0054, Daniel Bertolo, Marco Canini, Buseung Cho, Ronaldo A. Ferreira, Simon Peter Green, David Hausheer, Junbeom Hur, Xiaohua Jia, Heejo Lee, Prateek Mittal, Omo Oaiya, Chanjin Park, Adrian Perrig, Jerry Sobieski, Yixin Sun 0004, Cong Wang 0001, Klaas Wierenga
SIGCOMM5
2023 How Effective is Multiple-Vantage-Point Domain Control Validation?
Grace H. Cimaszewski, Henry Birge-Lee, Liang Wang 0054, Jennifer Rexford, Prateek Mittal
USENIX Security Symposium1
2022 Creating a Secure Underlay for the Internet
Henry Birge-Lee, Joel Wanner, Grace H. Cimaszewski, Jonghoon Kwon, Liang Wang 0054, François Wirz, Prateek Mittal, Adrian Perrig, Yixin Sun 0004
USENIX Security Symposium3