When a variety of anomalous features motivate flagging different samples as *outliers*, Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT) offers a principled way to unify them in terms of a sample’s *randomness deficiency*. Subject to the Independence of Mechanisms Principle, we show that for a joint sample on the nodes of a causal Bayesian network, the randomness deficiency decomposes into a sum of randomness deficiencies at each causal mechanism. Consequently, anomalous observations can be attributed to their root causes, i.e., the mechanisms that behaved anomalously. As an extension of Levin’s law of randomness conservation, we show that weak outliers cannot cause strong ones. We show how these information theoretic laws clarify our understanding of outlier detection and attribution, in the context of more specialized outlier scores from prior literature.

Skill estimation mechanisms, colloquially known as rating systems, play an important role in competitive sports and games. They provide a measure of player skill, which incentivizes competitive performances and enables balanced match-ups. In this paper, we present a novel Bayesian rating system for contests with many participants. It is widely applicable to competition formats with discrete ranked matches, such as online programming competitions, obstacle courses races, and video games. The system’s simplicity allows us to prove theoretical bounds on its robustness and runtime. In addition, we show that it is incentive-compatible: a player who seeks to maximize their rating will never want to underperform. Experimentally, the rating system surpasses existing systems in prediction accuracy, and computes faster than existing systems by up to an order of magnitude.