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Yao Hsiao

dblp:283/7701 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-0459-6679ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
3 papers
Storage systems · 38% Electronic design automation · 37% Memory systems · 26%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program verification · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Electronic design automation › hardware verification and test
hardware verification
1.322024
RTL2MμPATH: Multi-μPATH Synthesis with Applications to Hardware Security Verification · MICRO 2024
Synthesizing Formal Models of Hardware from RTL for Efficient Verification of Memory Model Implementations · MICRO 2021
Hardware security and side channels
microarchitectural side channel
0.812024
RTL2MμPATH: Multi-μPATH Synthesis with Applications to Hardware Security Verification · MICRO 2024
Memory systems › memory consistency
memory consistency verification
0.512021
Synthesizing Formal Models of Hardware from RTL for Efficient Verification of Memory Model Implementations · MICRO 2021
Storage systems
crash consistency
0.412020
Determinizing Crash Behavior with a Verified Snapshot-Consistent Flash Translation Layer · OSDI 2020
Storage systems
flash and SSD
0.412020
Determinizing Crash Behavior with a Verified Snapshot-Consistent Flash Translation Layer · OSDI 2020
Storage systems › flash and SSD › flash memory management
flash translation layer
0.412020
Determinizing Crash Behavior with a Verified Snapshot-Consistent Flash Translation Layer · OSDI 2020
Memory systems › memory consistency
memory consistency model
0.422024
RTL2MμPATH: Multi-μPATH Synthesis with Applications to Hardware Security Verification · MICRO 2024
Synthesizing Formal Models of Hardware from RTL for Efficient Verification of Memory Model Implementations · MICRO 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal verification · 2.0symbolic information flow analysis · 1.5verification · 0.9snapshot consistency · 0.9RTL synthesis · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 RTL2MμPATH: Multi-μPATH Synthesis with Applications to Hardware Security Verification
abstract
The Check tools automate formal memory consistency model and security verification of processors by analyzing abstract models of microarchitectures, called μSPEC models. Despite the efficacy of this approach, a verification gap between μSPEC models, which must be manually written, and RTL limits the Check tools' broad adoption. Our prior work, called RTL2μSPEC, narrows this gap by automatically synthesizing formally verified μSPEC models from System Verilog implementations of simple processors. But, RTL2μSPEC assumes input designs where an instruction (e.g., a load) cannot exhibit more than one microarchitectural execution path (μPATH, e.g., a cache hit or miss path)-its single-execution-path assumption. In this paper, we first propose an automated approach and tool, called RTL2MμPATH, that resolves RTL2μSPEC's single-execution-path assumption. Given a System Verilog processor design, instruction encodings, and modest design metadata, RTL2MμPATH finds a complete set of formally verified μPATHS for each instruction. Next, we make an important observation: an instruction that can exhibit more than one μPATH strongly indicates the presence of a microarchitectural side channel in the input design. Based on this observation, we then propose an automated approach and tool, called Synthlc, that extends RTL2MμPATH with a symbolic information flow analysis to support synthesizing a variety of formally verified leakage contracts from System Verilog processor designs. Leakage contracts are foundational to state-of-the-art defenses against hardware side-channel attacks. SYnthlcis the first automated methodology for formally verifying hardware adherence to them.
Yao Hsiao, Nikos Nikoleris, Artem Khyzha, Dominic P. Mulligan, Gustavo Petri, Christopher W. Fletcher, Caroline Trippel
MICRO1
2021 Synthesizing Formal Models of Hardware from RTL for Efficient Verification of Memory Model Implementations
abstract
Modern hardware complexity makes it challenging to determine if a given microarchitecture adheres to a particular memory consistency model (MCM). This observation inspired the Check tools, which formally check that a specific microarchitecture correctly implements an MCM with respect to a suite of litmus test programs. Unfortunately, despite their effectiveness and efficiency, the Check tools must be supplied a microarchitecture in the guise of a manually constructed axiomatic specification, called a μspec model.
Yao Hsiao, Dominic P. Mulligan, Nikos Nikoleris, Gustavo Petri, Caroline Trippel
MICRO1
2020 Determinizing Crash Behavior with a Verified Snapshot-Consistent Flash Translation Layer
Yun-Sheng Chang, Yao Hsiao, Tzu-Chi Lin, Che-Wei Tsao, Chun-Feng Wu, Yuan-Hao Chang 0001, Hsiang-Shang Ko, Yu-Fang Chen 0001
OSDI2